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Sorenson Best Paper Award 
The Journal of Air Transportation is proud to present the Sorenson Best 
Paper Award, named in honor of Dr. Frank E. Sorenson. This award gives 
recognition to the authotfs) with the best literary and scholarly contributions 
to the field of air transportation. The Editor, on the basis of reviewer 
rankings during the review process, grants the Sorenson Award. The 
manuscript with the highest overall score is awarded the Sorenson Best 
Paper Award. This is considered a high recognition in the aviation 
community. 
Dr. Frank E. Sorenson was a pioneer in the field of aviation education 
since its early beginnings in the 1940s. A renowned educator and prolific 
writer, Sorenson contributed not only educational texts to the field, but also 
served as a consultant and innovator throughout the expanding realm of 
aviation education and research. 
Dr. Sorenson’s aviation impact and potential were recognized early on 
by the National Aeronautics Association when he received the Frank G. 
Brewer Trophy in 1946 for the most outstanding contribution to the 
development of youth in the field of education and training. In 1958, the 
University Aviation Association honored him with the William A. Wheatley 
Award in recognition of outstanding contributions to aviation education. 
These were the first of many awards and citations he would earn on a local 
and national level as he continued his active involvement in the field of 
aerospace education up until his death in 1977. 
Through his involvement with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Teachers College, Dr. Sorenson generated some of the earliest teaching 
mate:ia!s f ~ r  mia t i~ r?  e d u c & ~  and textbooks for mi!itarl J aviators during 
World War 11. Throughout the course of his career, he contributed over forty 
articles and publications related to the field of aviation education. His efforts 
guided the way for extensive aerospace research and scholarship from the 
grassroots to the global level through is participation in Civic Aeronautics 
Association, the World Congress on Air Age Education, and UNESCO. He 
has served as chairman of the Air Force Associations Aerospace Council, the 
Aerospace Education Forum at the First World Congress of Flight, the U.S. 
Air Force Air Training Command, the Men in Space book series, and 
NASA’s Aerospace Education Advisory Committee. As a result of his 
visionary involvement and development of the Link Foundation, the 
organization has gone to provide grants now totaling over a half million 
dollars a year to support and advance aerospace education and training in 
aeronautics. 
Dr. Sorenson’s continuous involvement in aviation education and 
research laid the groundwork for many of the advancements currently taking 
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place in the industry. His ceaseless research and educational outreach 
demonstrated how one person can make a difference not just today but well 
into the future. 
Currently, several awards exist that are representative of his 
achievement in aerospace education and research. These include the Frank E. 
Sorenson Award for Excellence in Aviation Scholarship, representing the 
highest scholarly honor in aviation education, presented annually by the 
University Aviation Association; the Frank E. Sorenson Pioneers in 
Nebraska Aviation Education award presented annually by the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute, as well as a memorial lecture fund 
and scholarship fund. A maximum of two award plaques will be given per 
article to the two lead authors in order of submission 
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A TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY BASED STRUCTURE 
FOR TACTICAL CLUSTER ASSESSMENT: EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Bijan Vasigh 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Kenneth Fleming 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we analyze and assess the efficiency of  the United States (U.S.) airline 
industry through the total factor productivity (TFP) method. While airlines use 
various resources to produce a heterogeneous group of outputs, this article focuses 
on certain fundamental outputs as final products of selected airlines. The results 
from this analysis indicate that the national airlines (US. domestic carriers) have 
higher TFP as compared to the major airlines. While major airlines have drastically 
cut costs in the past few years, they also need to improve efficiency or risk going out 
of business. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency and productivity of a 
selection of U.S. airlines for the years 1996 through 200 I .  These years have been 
chosen as a good example of years in which the industry experienced normal growth 
and generally positively returns. Subsequent to 2001 the industry experienced two 
severe external shocks, namely, the September 11.2001. terrorist attacks and the Iraq 
war. l.hese anomaious shocks make the years after i U U i  inconsistent with respect to 
the type of index developed in this article. 
Bijan Vasigb is professor of Economics and Finance in the Department of Business 
Administration at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, and a 
Managing Director at ACG, Aviation Consulting Group, LLC. Dr. Vasigh received a Ph.D. 
degree in Economics from the State University of New York in 1984. He has written and 
published many articles concerning the aviation industry and has been published in the Journal 
of Economics and Finance, Journal of Transportation Management, Transportation Quarterly, 
Airport Business, Journal of  Business and Economics, and Journal of Travel Research. He was 
consultant with the International Civil Aviation Organization and provided assistance on the 
evolution of aeronautical charge structure for the Brazilian Institute of Civil Aviation. He is 
currently a member of the international faculty at the International Air Transport Association 
Learning Center, where he is faculty leader of Airline Finance and Accounting Management. He 
is a member of the editorial board of Journal of Air Transport Management and Journal of Air 
Transportation. He worked on NASA Research Grants in 2001 and 2003 on Determination of 
Statewide Economics Benejits of the Small Aircrafr Transportation System. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent decline in airline profitability and productivity is not unique 
by historical standards. The magnitude of this decline,' however, is 
significantly greater due, in part, to the confluence of economic recession, 
SARS, the Iraq war and recent security concerns. Since the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 (9/1 I ) ,  certain airlines, such as United and US 
Airways, have filed for bankruptcy, while others, such as Delta and 
American, have flirted with the idea repeatedly, but have so far managed to 
avoid this fate. US Airways received $900 million in federal bailout money 
in March 2003 as it emerged from bankruptcy protection. However, only 
two years since its first filing, US Airways was forced again to return to the 
protection of the bankruptcy courts. 
Nonetheless, even in the absence of strong traffic demand, innovative 
new airlines, such as JetBlue Airways, have been able to enter airline 
markets and successfully capture market share from incumbent airlines. For 
the past few years, smaller airlines have prospered as the bigger airlines 
rushed to bankruptcy courts. On April 2 5 ,  2003, JetBlue Airways placed a 
firm order for 65 Airbus A320 aircraft. Delivery of the new aircraft began in 
2004 and will run through to 201 1.' JetBlue Airways also announced an 
airlines, Southwest is the only airline to remain profitable despite 9/1 I .3 To 
ensure survivability, many airlines, such as Delta, Northwest, American and 
United, have slashed costs in order to improve financial and operational 
efficiencies. While efforts to reduce costs are not uncommon during 
been extreme. These initiatives have included massive reductions in work 
force, major changes to service, and significant wage concessions from 
employee groups. In effect, these airlines have had to substantially 
I option for 50 more Airbus planes (Carey, 2003). Among the major U.S. 
I economic recessions, the efforts undertaken by the airline industry may have 
Kenneth Fleming has extensive experience in aviation operations research and economics. He 
specializes in analyzing airspace, air traffic control, and airline operationaVmanagement 
systems. A former military pilot with over 3,000 hours in nine different aircraft, he holds an 
FAA Commercial Pilot Airplane Single and Multi-engine Instrument Rating. During the past 
five years, he has been active in developing proposed new National Airspace procedures and 
processes. These initiatives included funded research programs that totaled $ I S M  for numerous 
organizations including the FAA, NAN, Lockheed Martin Corporation. Harris Corporation, 
NASA Ames Research Center and NASA Langley Research Center. Dr. Fleming has led the 
development of a number of proprietary airspace and airport modeling and analysis tools used in 
the study of system efficiency and operational capacity. He is a published and recognized expert 
I in aviation economics, air traffic control and air traffic management 
' U.S. airlines have sustained $18 billion in losses in the past two years. 
' JetBlue has reported a profit each quarter since its public offering in April 2002. 
Since the 1978 airline deregulation act, 13 of the largest 20 airlines have gone out of business. 
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restructure themselves, operationally and financially, whether they sought 
the protection of the bankruptcy courts or not. 
On the other hand, the success of the low cost, low frills airlines relative 
to their hub-and-spoke counterparts has not been limited to their fmancial 
performance. In the most recent update of their annual Airline Quality 
Rating study, Bowen and Headley (2004) find that the low cost, low frills 
carriers generally outperform the legacy hub-and-spoke carriers in terms of 
service measures for on-time performance, denied boardings, mishandled 
baggage, and customer complaints. The most recent update is based upon 
2003 data reported to the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
success of rivals Southwest and JetBlue Airways. United Airlines has also created a low-cost 
airline in an attempt to recapture the market share lost to low-cost Competitors, including 
America West, Southwest and JetBlue. United has chosen the name Ted for its low-cost airline 
venture and it started flying in February 2004. Ted will be based at Denver International 
Table 1. 2004 Airline Quality Rating (AQR) 
Airline AQR Airline AQR 
Jet Blue (0.64) Air Tran (1.05) 
Alaska (0.74) United (1.1 1 )  
Southwest (0.89) ATA (1.17) 
America West (0.89) American 
US. Airways (0.96) Delta 
(1.24) 
(1.24) 
Northwest (1.02) American Eagle (2.10) 
Continental (1.04) Atlantic Southeast (5.76) 
Conversely, the major airlines have substantially reduced the number of 
flights operated, and have parked thousands of unused aircraft in the desert. 
American Airlines has restructured its flight schedule in order to eliminate 
flight banks at its major hubs (i.e., de-hubbing) in order to gain better 
utilization of employees and operating assets. In-flight services have been 
scaled-back or eliminated, including meal service on most domestic flights 
and complimentary cocktails on international flights. US Airways' labor 
force has dwindled dramatically in recent years; from 46,000 employees 
before 911 1 to 28,000 in 2004. The airline has gone through a bankruptcy 
restructuring and successfully cut costs by nearly $2 billion, including about 
$1 billion in concessions from employees. Further, certain major airlines 
have attempted to emulate their low-cost competitors with the formation of 
their own low-cost, no-frills subsidiaries: despite limited historical success 
at such operations. 
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Airlines, however, tend to operate with substantial operating and 
financial l e ~ e r a g e . ~  While these efforts do reduce operating costs, the impact 
is mitigated by the substantially fixed nature of airline costs. Although 
parking aircraft in the desert allows airlines to avoid operating costs such as 
labor, fuel and associated maintenance, the substantial carrying cost of these 
assets in the form of lease payments and interest expense remains. Further, 
the substantial costs associated with operating hub structures are not easily 
reduced. Thus, the major airlines tend to enjoy higher levels of leverage, 
which can be beneficial in periods of economic expansion, but detrimental in 
periods of contraction. As the preceding discussion makes clear, not all 
airlines have been equally affected by 9/ 1 1. 
Therefore, the question arises as to how these results might be 
generalized, and how to provide quantitative measures of the factors that 
have influenced the more successhl smaller airlines during this period. If 
some measure of productivity that accounted for these factors could be 
determined, then airlines and external analysts could have benchmarks 
against which they could measure individual airline performance. Such 
measures might also provide internal indications of problems. It is the 
purpose of this paper to provide a methodology against which an airline 
between and amongst airlines that ranks them according to productivity and 
efficiency. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the productivity 
analysis and methodology are presented. This is followed by a description 
of the efficiency measurement methodologies. The fourth section discusses 
data issues and variables used in the models, while the tifth section presents 
the empirical results. The final section provides a summary and conclusion 
of the ideas discussed above relating to the TFP of the U.S. commercial 
aviation industry. 
I 
I could measure its performance. This methodology involves a comparison 
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
Despite the fact that many studies of efficiency and productivity have 
been conducted on airports and other industries, limited work has been 
completed in evaluating the efficiency of commercial airlines (Hooper & 
Airport, the home of discount carrier Frontier. The Ted fleet will begin with four Airbus A320 
aircraft and expand to as many as 45. 
A high degree of operating leverage implies that a small change in sales will result in a large 
change in net profit. Therefore, high operating leverage equals high business risk. Financial 
leverage is the degree to which a business is utilizing borrowed money or fixed assets. 
Companies that are highly leveraged may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make 
payments on their debt; they may also be unable to find new lenders in the future. 
~ 
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Hensher 1997; Oum, Yu, & Fu, 2003).6 This paper seeks to f i l l  this void by 
adapting the models and techniques used in these studies of other industries 
to evaluate the efficiency of U.S. airlines. This is of particular importance 
given the current concerns over the financial condition of commercial 
aviation and the financial viability of the industry. 
Efficiency and productivity are key to the success of the commercial 
aviation industry, and, therefore, models that measure efficiency can be 
extremely useful. The available literature reports the adoption of commonly 
used techniques such as ratio analysis, data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
TFP, and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) each with its own strengths and 
weaknesses. 
DEA measures the relative efficiencies of Decision Making Units 
(DMUs) based upon a linear programming model. Inferences are drawn 
from optimal solutions. The critical feature of DEA is the selection of 
inputs/outputs, as well as the definition of the appropriate DMUs. 
The DEA methodology was utilized by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) who built on the frontier concept initiated by Farrell (1957). DEA 
uses linear programming techniques to calculate the Malmquist index of TFP 
growth, while the SFA calculates both technical efficiency and technical 
change components of TFP growth. 
Farrell (1957) pioneered the primary ideal of the SFA to measure the 
efficiency of productive units. Since then, many researchers have broadened 
the SFA in evaluating efficiency. Nonetheless, Farrell’s parametric 
estimation was unable to fully satisfy the particular nature of the large 
stochastic model. Hence, Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), as well as 
Meeuseu and van den Broeck (1977), brought forth the SFA to measure 
efficiency. 
The SFA was applied to decompose TFP into technological progress 
and efficiency. This enabled the model to specify the mechanism by which 
investment affects productivity (Cooper & Tone, 1997). The typical 
approach with the SFA is to draw inferences from optimizations over all 
observations (Cooper & Tone, 1997). The word frontier emphasizes the idea 
of maximally and represents the best practice approach to production. 
Nero (1999) explored the extent to which a competitive advantage is 
secured by airlines operating large hub-and-spoke networks. Specifically, he 
looked at the relationship that arises among productive efficiencies and 
profitability when the size of the network expands. Nero found that returns 
to size are not constant, but rather decreasing. However, while suggesting 
For example, the Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) publishes its annual Global Airport 
Performance Benchmarking Report. The report measures and compares the performance of 
three aspects of  airport operation: Productivity and Efficiency, Cost Competitiveness and 
Financial Results, for up to 90 major airports in Asia Pacific, Europe and North America. 
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that an effective limit to size likely exists, Nero concluded that increasing 
network size still provides a competitive advantage. Ozment and Morash 
(1998), in their research to evaluate the relationship between productivity 
and performance quality in the U.S. domestic airline industry, argued that 
network density is correlated with productivity and lower output costs, as 
well as higher subjective measures of quality. On the other hand, Ozment 
and Morash found no such correlation between input cost efficiency, and 
lower output costs and quality. 
Coelli, Grifell-Tatje and Perelman (2002) examined the inefficiency in 
profit generation (as well as the contributing components) of a sample of 
international airlines. Feng and Wang (2000) argued for the inclusion of 
financial ratios and considerations, in addition to operational measures, in 
evaluating airline performance. They contended that ignoring these financial 
considerations provides an incomplete picture of airline performance and 
survivability. The approach of Feng and Wang divided airline performance 
into production, marketing and execution efficiencies. Financial statistics 
are found to be best for measuring execution efficiency, while operational 
measures are best in measuring production efficiency. Forsyth, Hill and 
Trengove (1988) found that the North American airlines performed well 
compared to the European airlines, confirming the results of some earlier 
studies of airline productivity. In addition, the study discovered substantial 
differences across some of the European airlines. 
Using the DEA methodology, Bazargan and Vasigh (2003) analyzed the 
performance of 45 U.S. commercial airports selected from the top 15 large, 
medium, and small hub airports. The results suggest that the relative 
efficiency of the airports is highest for small and lowest for large hub 
airports. 
Thus, the literature shows numerous attempts to measure various aspects 
of efficiency. For this study, TFP will be used to measure and compare 
commercial airlines. The rationale for this is outlined below. 
Performance can be measured based on efficiency or effectiveness. 
Efficiency is related to the supply side, where the technique of 
transformation of physical inputs (such as pilots, flight attendants, aircraft, 
fuel, etc.) into physical outputs of service (such as passengers, cargo, 
operating revenues and profits) can be assessed. Productivity is basically an 
efficiency measure that shows how well an airline utilizes its resources, and 
can be expressed in different ways. 
TFP measures the productivity of all inputs engaged in the production 
process. This, in effect, allows us to measure its cost-efficiency and cost- 
effectiveness (the difference being in the selection of the measure of 
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output).’ TFP aggregates outputs on the basis of their revenue contribution, 
and inputs on the basis of their relative importance to total costs, in order to 
calculate the overall airline productivity as a function of these quantities. 
Therefore, TFP allows us to distinguish productivity differences in 
airlines that arise from economies of scale as opposed to those differences 
resulting from managerial performance. In this paper, a Malmquist (1  953) 
TFP index is used to investigate the efficiency and productivity of a selection 
of US. airlines for the years 1996 through 2001. The results are then used to 
compare airline performance. 
There are many different ways of measuring productivity. For example, 
in a factory productivity might be measured based on the number of hours it 
takes to produce a product, while in the service sector productivity might be 
measured based on the revenue generated by an employee divided by the 
number of hours worked. Hence, productivity is concerned with the ratio of 
outputs over inputs. 
Productivity measures can be categorized in two primary methods: first, 
TFP, which is calculated by dividing total measured outputs by total 
measured inputs, and second, partial productivity, which is calculated by 
dividing total outputs by each factor input. 
We start by introducing a production function that relates different 
observable inputs (Im) to output Q: 
The above production function contains a time variable t that explains 
the shift of the production function over time. In this paper we measure 
productivity by using the index number method. Productivity measures try to 
capture the ability of inputs to produce output. 
Following Tomqvist (1936) the output quantity index is defined as 
follows: 
The Tornqvist index is the weighted geometric average of the output 
relatives, with weights given by a simple averaging of the value of the shares 
’ It is also possible to examine economies of  scale and density, as well as investigate the impact 
of  variations of input and output prices on the performance of a DMU (Gillen & Lall, 1997). 
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in period s and c. In the above equation, Q,& represents the quantity of j‘” 
output in the s period. 
Input quantity indexes are defined in a similar manner: 
In general a productivity index is defined as the ratio of an output 
quantity index to input quantity index, that is: 
TFP, = (3) 
The following TFP model, in logarithmic format, is similarly a 
framework introduced by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982). The 
appropriate input weights in the following equations are the contributions of 
each input and output in the system (Hooper & Hensher, 1997). Equation 4 
represents a pair-wise comparison of two airlines in one year. To form the 
TFP, it is necessary to divide the output quantity indexes by input quantity 
indexes: 
Ln TFp, = { CVk (Ln Qk, - Ln QL7 )- 2 C: ( Ln Ik ,  --)} T F e  2 I I 
L I  
Where: 
Ln I,, = geometric average of input over the entire observations in the 
sample; 
the sample; and 
Ln& = geometric average of output over the entire observations in 
b = base airline. 
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Likewise, where: 
= is the j x k matrix of all airlines outputs 
I / k  = is the i x k matrix of all airlines inputs 
j = number of outputs, j = 1, ..., J 
i = number of inputs, i = 1, ..., N 
k = number of airlines, k = 1, ..., K 
W = weights assigned to each output 
11 
The revenue contributions of each output could be used as applicable 
output weights. 
Where: 
V = weights assigned to each input; 
Ln I,k = geometric average of input over the entire observations in the 
LnQ,, = geometric average of output over the entire observations in 
sample; 
the sample; and 
b = base airline. 
EVALUATION OF AIRLINE EFFICIENCY: EMPIRlCAL RESULTS 
The intent of this study is to analyze and evaluate the efficiencies of 
major U.S. airlines and to compare them to national airlines (U.S. domestic 
carriers).' This study used the annual statistics (1996-2001) on major and 
national airlines from the Form 41 (Form 41, 2003): On the input side, the 
study includes two types of variables: physical units of input, and dollar 
vaiues. Five inpui variabies were seiecied: 
1. Available seat miles (ASM); 
2. Total expense; 
3. 
4. 
5 .  Fuel cost. 
Cost per available seat mile (CASM); 
Average number of employees; and 
RThe FAA groups carriers according to the operating revenue boundaries contained in Section 
04 of Part 241. Major airlines have operating revenues of over $ I  billion. Airlines with 
revenues behveen $100 million and $1 billion in revenues are defined as national airlines. 
Large, small, and commuter certificated air carriers are required to complete Form 41 
Financial and Traffic Reporting Requirements. The Office of Airline Information (OAI) within 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) collects data on the Form 41. 
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A total of five output variables were also selected: 
1. Revenue passenger miles (RPM); 
2. Yield; 
3. Total revenue; 
4. 
5. Load factor. 
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM); and 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the rankings of the major and national airlines in 
terms of their efficiency scores and the average TFP, for the years 1996 
through 200 1. 
Table 2. Total factor productivity for U.S. major airlines, 1996-2001 
Majors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
American 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.09 
AmericanTrans Air 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.95 0.90 0.66 
Continental 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.39 0.36 
Delta 0.16 0.25 0.28 0.16 0.29 0.16 
Northwest 0.30 0.49 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.25 
Southwest 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.63 0.41 
United 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.10 
US Airways, Inc 0.32 0.36 0.45 0.28 0.24 0.34 
Table 3. Total factor productivity for U.S. national airlines, 1996-2001 
National 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AirTran 0.69 0.76 0.68 0.76 0.73 0.76 
Alaska 
Aloha 
American West 
Frontier 
Hawaiian 
Horizon 
Midwest Express 
Spirit 
World 
0.57 0.59 0.69 
0.85 0.83 0.89 
0.53 0.56 0.57 
0.83 0.64 0.83 
0.84 0.67 0.72 
0.85 0.84 0.85 
0.83 0.81 0.82 
0.90 0.86 0.85 
0.77 0.81 0.82 
0.60 0.56 0.61 
1.00 0.85 0.92 
0.56 0.52 0.59 
0.89 0.84 0.84 
0.64 0.69 0.80 
0.93 0.81 0.91 
0.89 0.77 0.84 
0.82 0.87 0.85 
0.89 0.85 0.71 
During the observation period, national airlines have continuously out- 
performed major airlines. As the tables imply, among the major airlines, 
American Trans Air and Southwest Airlines have the highest productivity for 
all 6 years (1996-2001). However, it should be pointed out that subsequent to 
the period of evaluation, and as a direct result of sluggish demand, resulting 
from 9/11, ATA imposed a wage freeze for non-contractual personnel, 
furloughed 300 people and eliminated 400 jobs. It is also of interest to note 
that Southwest Airlines is the only major U.S. based airline to remain 
continuously profitable since its maiden voyage in 197 I .  In 2003, Southwest 
posted a net income of $442 million (up $78 million from 1999). On the 
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other hand, American, United and Delta Airlines have had the lowest 
productivity. In 2000, American Airlines' net income was at $813 million 
(down $172 million from the year before), while in 2001 it reported a net 
loss of $1,762 Million. Also, in 2000, United Airlines reported net earnings 
of $50 million (down $1,185 million from 1999) while in 2001 it had a net 
loss of $1,762 million.1° US Airways and United have lowered costs 
through bankruptcy, and American Airlines enjoyed major labor concessions 
from unions and avoided bankruptcy. While US Airways slashed its costs, 
they still are the highest in the industry. It is 11.7 cents cost per available 
seat mile (CASM) is about 20% above the average for the major airlines. 
The third worst performer, Delta Airlines, has a cost structure that is much 
higher than those of its competitors. 
Table 4. Average total factor productivity for U.S. airlines, 1996-2001 
Airline ATFP Airline ATFP 
Aloha 0.89 American Trans Air 0.71 
Horizon 0.87 American West 0.56 
Spirit 0.86 Southwest 0.49 
Midwest Express 0.83 Continental 0.38 
Frontier 0.8 I US Airways 0.33 
World 0.81 Northwest 0.28 
Airtran 0.73 Delta 0.22 
Hawaiian 0.73 United 0.13 
Alaska 0.60 American 0.10 
While the productivity rankings within the group of major airlines have 
remained relatively static, the productivity rankings of the national airlines 
have exhibited considerable variability from year to year, 4 3  smaller, less 
stable enterprises, these operations are subject to considerable variability in 
both operational and financial performance. The calculated productivity for 
these individual airlines is influenced by their rising and falling fortunes. 
However, they have still managed to be more productive than the major 
airlines. Some reasons for this greater productivity may be attributed to 
smaller fleet sizes, lower financial leverage, avoidance of congested hub 
airports, and a less diverse fleet." 
lo United Airlines filed for Chapter 1 1  bankruptcy in December 2002. US Airways, the sixth 
largest domestic airline. had previously filed for bankruptcy protection in August 2002, 
following the collapse of Midway, Sun Country and Vanguard airlines. 
I '  Delta Airlines avoids its hubs using Song (its low-cost carrier) and flies the aircraft, B-757, 
more hours per day than its mainline operations. 
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As shown on Table 3, the top three national airlines are Aloha Airlines, 
Horizon Airlines, and Spirit Airlines, in that order. Alaska Airlines has been 
the least efficient national carrier during the period of 1996 through 200 1. 
Founded in 1946, Aloha operates an average of 145 daily flights with a 
fleet of Boeing 737 jets.” In 1999, Aloha improved its first-quarter profit by 
10.7 percent despite a 2.7 percent drop in revenues. 
This analysis has demonstrated a consistently higher productivity for the 
national airlines as compared to the major airlines (Figure 1). The peak 
productivity occurred in 2000 for the national airlines, at which time the 
major airlines exhibited a relatively significant lower productivity. The 
major airlines exhibited relatively consistent productivity as compared to the 
national airlines, which peaked in 1999-2000. The national airlines 
demonstrated a decline in productivity in 1999, but experienced an 
immediate recovery after that. 
Figure 1. Total factor productivity for major airline and national airline, 1996- 
2001 
0.80 
n 0.60 
LL I 
0.00 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 I 
YEAR 
These results raise questions with respect to the cost structures of 
airlines. The stronger productivity of the national airlines as a group, relative 
to the major airlines, indicates that the major airlines may have exceeded the 
effective limit to size suggested by Nero (1999). Further, while the hub-and- 
spoke system, which evolved following deregulation of the industry, has 
been credited with allowing for the efficient provision of air transportation to 
smaller markets and routes, the relative productivity rankings of this analysis 
l 2  The airline’s outstanding in-flight service was recently recognized as the first place Diamond 
Award winner in international competition conducted by Onboard Services magazine. 
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suggest that perhaps these hub-and-spoke systems decrease TFP. In addition 
to the national airlines out performing the major airlines, Southwest Airlines, 
a point-to-point carrier, has significantly outperformed the remaining major 
carriers. Southwest has been profitable by keeping costs about 20% lower 
than the industry average. The lower productivity of the major airlines may 
in fact result from the inefficient use of assets and expenses associated with 
the operation of hub systems, an issue American Airlines has tried to address 
with its de-hubbing efforts at O’Hare International Airport and Dallas-Fort 
Worth International Airport. 
Potential explanations for the decline in productivity of the national 
airlines over the analysis period are less readily apparent. Harraf and Vasigh 
( 1994) suggest a counter-cyclical beneficial impact for low-cost and start-up 
carriers. These airlines benefit from reduced wage rates and aircraft 
acquisition costs, as well as demand substitution impacts associated with 
periods of economic recession. These same influences negatively impact 
such carriers during economic expansion. Thus, under this proposal, the 
national airlines would have experienced increasing pressures from these 
factors as an economic expansion continued through this analysis period and 
did not wane until late-2000 or early 200 1. 
In January 2004, America West Airlines reported a fourth quarter net 
income of $6.8 million or $0.13 diluted earnings per share. This compares to 
a net loss of $52.0 million or $1.54 per share for the same period last year. 
The airline’s operating expenses in the fourth quarter decreased 1.5 percent 
to $544.6 million. Continued cost diligence and increased capacity resulted 
in a 2.5 percent decrease in the airline’s CASM in the fourth quarter of 2003. 
On a fuel exclusive basis, the airline’s CASM in the fourth quarter of 2003 
declined 4.3 percent to 6.44 cents. 
iri urdei to piovide a further evaluaiioii of the TFP index de-veioped in 
this paper, we compared the TFP to some more conventional measures of 
financial performance for all of the airlines used in this study and also the 
major and national carriers as a group. The first of these financial measures 
was a simple measure of return on assets (ROA), defined as total revenue 
minus total cost divided by total assets, and the second measure was 
basically a measure of the gross profit margin (GPM), and defined as total 
revenue minus total cost divided by total revenue. Our hypothesis was that 
the TFP should track positively (in either the negative or positive direction) 
with the more conventional measures over the time period evaluated. 
The results of this analysis are contained in Table 5. As the table 
indicates, and as might be expected with the data sample of this size, the 
results are mixed, but generally supportive of the hypothesis. 
More specifically, as far as the major airlines are concerned, for those 
with a negative Y value, or no correlation either negative or positive between 
the TFP and the financial measures, the t value is not significant at any 
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meaninghl level. The only exception to this is the ROA value for American 
Airlines, and this measure would require further investigation. The 
remaining major airlines have positive correlations with varying levels of 
significance for the two measures used. When the major airlines are 
aggregated, then the results are much better for both measures. In both cases 
the aggregated measures of correlation are significant at a better than 95% 
level of significance, showing a strong correlation between the TFP and the 
more conventional measures of performance. This may also be a reflection 
of the generally smaller variation of the performance measures for the major 
airlines that was mentioned earlier in the paper. 
Table 5. Statistical analysis of measures of financial performance, for major and 
national airlines, 1996-2001 
ROA GPM Critial t 
One Two 
R t R t tail tail 
Major Airlines 
American Trans Air 0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.21 2.13 2.78 
Continental 0.11 0.16 0.82 2.00 2.13 2.78 
Northwest 0.85 2.27 0.78 1.75 2.13 2.78 
Southwest 0.51 0.84 0.71 1.42 2.13 2.78 
US Airways, Inc. 0.66 1.24 1.00 24.48 2.13 2.78 
Major aggregated 0.47 1.98 0.56 3.41 1.70 2.05 
American 0.94 -3.74 0.54 -0.90 2.13 2.78 
Delta 0.33 -0.50 0.35 -0.52 2.13 2.78 
United 0.05 -0.06 0.22 0.32 2.13 2.78 
National Airlines 
AirTran 0.39 -0.60 0.15 0.21 2.13 2.78 
Alaska 
Aloha 
American West 
Frontier 
Hawaiian 
Horizon 
Midwest Express 
Spirit 
0.73 1.51 0.75 1.62 2.13 2.78 
0.95 4.46 0.99 11.98 2.13 2.78 
0.98 7.46 0.93 3.68 2.13 2.78 
0.80 1.89 0.89 2.70 2.13 2.78 
0.85 2.29 0.84 2.18 2.13 2.78 
0.67 1.26 0.76 1.63 2.13 2.78 
0.23 -0.33 0.32 -0.48 2.13 2.78 
0.19 -0.28 0.12 -0.17 2.13 2.78 
World 0.17 -0.24 0.78 -1.75 2.13 2.78 
~ 
~ 
All 0.05 -0.43 0.21 -1.84 1.68 2.01 
The results for the national airlines are again mixed. Just as in the case 
of the majors, the national airlines that exhibit negative correlations are not 
significant at any meaningful levels, and this is true for all of the negative 
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values. On the other hand, for those nationals that exhibit positive 
correlations, the majority of the results are very significant and strong for 
both conventional measures. The weakest of these is the ROA correlation 
for Midwest Express that is not significant at conventional levels, but still 
exhibits a respectable r value of .66. All of the other values for the 
correlation of the financial measures with TFP are significant at a .9 or better 
level (five airlines and nine t values). However, the aggregate measure for 
the national airlines is not significant at all. Again, and as mentioned earlier, 
this result probably reflects the inherently larger variation present in all the 
performance measures for the national airlines. 
Overall, the results from this extended analysis of the TFP index are 
encouraging, although it is obvious that a larger data sample (over time) will 
be needed to provide a more significant validation of the TFP index. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper espouses an embryonic process, which uses selected 
literature to explore the applications of different productivity measures and 
their limitations on the U.S. commercial aviation industry. This study 
highlights the relatively stronger productivity achieved by the U.S. national 
airlines as compared to the U.S. major airlines. This analysis did not attempt 
to examine the relatively poor performance of the major airline group. 
It is clear that little work has been completed to date in the area of 
airline productivity. Yet, this industry is a vitally important element of the 
U.S. transportation system and exhibits a significant impact on the overall 
economy. Understanding that differences in productivity do exist is the first 
step in evaluating these differences. 
It is not surprising that differences in performance exist between 
individual enterprises. However, it is interesting that significant, sustained 
differences in productivity exist between important segments within this 
industry. These differences raise important questions with respect to the 
nature, cost structure, and long-term viability of these segments. Such 
questions correspond to the performance of the industry as a whole, as well 
as the relative performances of the various segments in 2001 through the 
current period. 
Important further study of this subject would include the analysis of 
productivity through the industry recession as that data becomes available. It 
should be expected that significant erosion in productivity would be 
followed by an improvement as restructuring efforts take effect. The 
dynamic nature of demand, with the static nature of supply and cost 
structure, would dictate that the near-term plunge in demand would cause a 
decline in productivity since the supply is necessarily slower to adjust. As 
predicted by these productivity measures, the major airlines have undertaken 
significant measures to increase productivity and to lower cost. However, 
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these responses have been formulated in the absence of significant academic 
research into the reasons of the specific causes of these productivity 
differences. Thus, these results indicate the urgency of further research in 
order to formulate appropriate responses and structures to insure long-term 
viability. 
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AIR CARRIER SAFETY AND CULTURE: AN 
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WESTERN INCIDENT REPORTING PROGRAMS 
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ABSTRACT 
During the summer of 2003, a descriptive study was conducted of Taiwan’s air 
carrier flight crew members’ acceptance and usage of the government’s confidential 
incident reporting program. Survey results from 205 Taiwanese airline pilots 
revealed numerous problems with the incident reporting program that were directly 
attributable to the structure of Taiwan’s airlines and safety system within the Chinese 
culture. It was concluded that adaptation to the principles of the United States 
Aviation Safety Action Program is desirable to the Taiwanese air carrier pilots, but 
that the current airline structure within Chinese culture is a considerable impediment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of accident investigation as a critical factor in aviation safety 
can be traced to the first airplane passenger fatality in 1908. The accident site 
was Fort Myer, Virginia; Orville Wright was the pilot who survived; and 
Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge of the United States U.S. Army was the 
passenger whose life was lost. In this case, Wright, the surviving pilot, knew 
the cause of the accident before the actual crash. “The investigation of the 
first air accident in which a passenger was killed took only about three 
seconds” (Barlay, 1970, p. 13). 
The use of accident investigation as an air safety practice is approaching 
100 years, and the process now involves considerable attendant data and 
complexity. In the U.S., during the 1970s, aviation human factors (AHF) 
became recognized as an important component of accident investigation and 
Ping 1 Lee earned his Master of Aeronautical Science degree at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, Daytona Beach, Florida in 2003. He completed his B.S. at the same campus in 2001. 
He returned to Taiwan to pursue both an air carrier pilot career and a doctorate. 
Thomas R. Weitzel, Ed.D., is a retired airline captain who teaches at the Daytona Beach 
campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He has been involved with the air carrier 
industry and its learning for 36 years. 
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aviation safety (Lauber, 1993). Those air safety investigators, who have 
concentrated on the mechanical and environmental aspects of air carrier 
accidents during the last 30 years, have seldom been able to attribute causes 
to these two factors. Today, there is little doubt that the majority of recent air 
carrier accidents have involved AHF issues (Reynard, 1995). 
Incidents, classified as subordinate to accidents, provide free lessons (or 
lessons learned) and become salient case studies for aviation safety programs 
(Reason, 1997). As a result, the implementation of a confidential incident 
reporting program for the humans involved with aviation safety has become 
one of the most effective tools to enhance the AHF of air carrier safety and 
thereby reduce the accident rate (Henrotte, 1995). 
The use of confidential incident reporting systems for air carrier flight 
crew members has been added to the list of effective Western air safety 
tools. Thus, in 1999, the Republic of China (Taiwan), similar to many 
Western nations, established the Taiwan Confidential Aviation Safety 
Reporting Program (TACARE). Although the program has been in existence 
for 4 years, TACARE has suffered from limited funding and little flight crew 
member participation. This study addresses factors affecting TACARE and 
examines the possibility of adopting principles from the U.S. Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP) into TACARE. 
VOLUNTARY INCIDENT REPORTING 
One of the most important aspects of incident investigation has been 
data collection. Although incidents occur more often than accidents, an 
incident can only be investigated if it has been reported. Thus, developing an 
effective incident reporting system is fundamental to incident investigation. 
Several Western nations, including the U.S., have developed incident 
collecting databases. An examination of some U.S. incident reporting 
databases follows. 
Aviation Safety Report System 
The U.S. was one of the first nations to develop an incident reporting 
program. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was established in 
1975 under a Memorandum of Agreement between the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). 
Today, ASRS is one of the world’s most comprehensive aviation 
incident collection databases. The current database receives reports from 
pilots, air traffic controllers, air carrier inspectors, cabin attendants, 
mechanics, and a variety of other individuals. Currently, ASRS averages 727 
reports per week and more than 3,153 reports per month (NASA, n.d.). Due 
to the non-punitive nature of the program, ASRS has become one of the 
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world’s leading, effective aviation safety programs in the identification of 
aviation hazards and the minimization of aviation incidents and accidents. 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
Few individuals have doubted that NASA’s ASRS program has been 
very successful in analyzing and minimizing aviation incidents and 
accidents. However, it became clear to the FAA and several major U.S. 
airlines that a carrier-specific voluntary incident reporting program was 
needed to further analyze the individual carriers’ operations; as a result, the 
ASAP was created. 
The goal of ASAP is to minimize accidents and incidents. The program 
works toward its goal by identifying flight safety concerns and achieving 
corrective actions. Similar to its NASA counterpart, ASAP analyzes risks, 
increases education and awareness, validates program effectiveness, 
measures system performance, and ensures accountability (American 
Airlines, n.d.). 
Although ASAP is similar in nature to NASA’s ASRS program, there 
are several differences between the two programs. One of the most 
noticeable differences is the intended participants. NASA’s ASRS is a 
voluntary incident reporting program that accepts incident reports from both 
general aviation (GA) pilots and commercial air carriers. ASAP, on the other 
hand, is an air carrier-specific program where participants include flight crew 
members, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel. This discussion will be 
limited to flight crew members only. Unlike the ASRS, ASAP entails 
specific guidelines that govern the acceptance of reports. 
Since ASAP’S goal is to analyze and minimize incidents and accidents, 
it is critical to conduct continuous reviewing processes to identify potential 
hazards to flight safety. This is accomplished with an Event Review Team 
(ERT). The ERT is comprised of three members: (a) one member from the 
FAA, (b) a representative of the participating air carrier, and (c) a member 
from the employee (pilot) union. The principal function of the ERT is to 
conduct weekly meetings to review each ASAP on a case-by-case basis. 
These meetings can identify potential hazards and trends that could result in 
mishaps. 
Even though ASAP is a relative newcomer within the group of aviation 
voluntary safety reporting programs, it has proven to be one of the most 
successful models within the commercial aviation industry. As a result of its 
successful American Airlines trial during 1994, several other major U.S. air 
carriers have chosen to adopt similar programs, the objectives of which are 
to enhance aviation safety through the minimization of accidents and 
incidents. 
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CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
According to Lloyd (l972), cross-cultural psychology is “any field of 
research in which cultural variables are considered in order to clarify our 
understanding of a psychological process” (p. 18). Cross-cultural psychology 
is a relatively new discipline within AHF. Traditionally, cultural differences 
have often been disregarded and overlooked in the pilot training process. 
Many have viewed flight training as an interaction between machines 
(aircraft) and humans (pilots), thus flight training has been highly 
concentrated on a universal and standardized approach. According to 
Helmreich and Merritt (1998), commercial aviation consists of a complex 
system and carries the risk of large-scale catastrophe. Thus, it is imperative 
that the aviation industry should be highly regulated and standardized. As a 
result, air carrier pilots have become one of the most standardized 
professions in the world. 
Although flight crew standardization ensures operational safety, as the 
cockpit has become a multi-cultural workplace, pilots have become aware of 
the effects caused by differences in national culture in the cockpit. These 
effects have become more apparent following the introduction of Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) concepts. CRM was the first safety program 
that concentrated on the interaction between flight crews. Although generally 
considered to be a great success in the U.S., CRM received mixed reviews 
when it was practiced overseas (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Consequently, 
it became apparent that in-depth research was necessary to further 
understand the impact of multi-cultural flight crews in today’s cockpits. 
CHINESE CIJIATIJRE 
China is one of the oldest civilizations in mankind. Chinese culture 
originated thousands of years before most Western cultures, with the 
Chinese living in unison, and governed by emperors. Although emperors are 
long gone, certain aspects of Chinese culture today remain relatively 
unchanged. The following section identifies several characteristics of 
Chinese culture and the effects on aviation safety. 
Individualism 
Unlike most Western cultures that are often founded on the principal of 
individualism, Chinese culture is characterized by its strong emphasis on 
collectivism. Chinese often consider the implications of their behavior in a 
framework of concern that extends beyond their immediate family. 
According to Helmreich and Merritt (1998), people in a collectivist culture 
often link their behavior to the extended family or organization. A result of 
this cultural trait is that Chinese children are taught at a young age to listen 
and not speak, and speak only when spoken t e t h e  practice of which is 
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popularized by the Chinese saying ‘God provided us with two ears and only 
one mouth because we should listen more and speak less’ (author unknown). 
The resultant belief led to the development of collective thinking. The 
harmony of the group often becomes the primary concern; therefore, the 
Chinese will seldom express their individual opinions during social settings 
such as conferences, lectures, and intra-cockpit communications. 
Social Pressure 
Due to the strong emphasis on collectivism, Chinese culture has evolved 
into a shame culture. Chinese grow up sensitive to pressure from the society 
instead of their internal feelings. Many other cultures emphasize honor 
systems or codes of honor based on one’s own judgments and internal 
feelings of guilt. This same type of honor system does not exist in the 
Chinese culture since it is the society-not the individual-that determines 
the belief system. For example, the practice of cutting corners is widely 
accepted by Chinese society. The results of this cultural characteristic can be 
serious. According to a study conducted by the Taiwanese Naval Academy, 
people in a Chinese society can easily break rules, operating procedures, and 
even the code of law when it is deemed acceptable by society. Due to social 
pressure, Chinese would view such behaviors as righteous, and would even 
encourage it (Lu et al., n.d.). 
Authoritarianism 
Chinese culture is based on 5,000 years of dictatorships. As a result, 
authoritarianism has been an important part within the society (Jing, Lu, & 
Peng, 2001). Figures of authority, such as professors, managers, and airline 
captains are treated with a great amount of respect by their subordinates. 
Unlike cultures where this relationship only exists within the working 
environment, Chinese subordinates treat their superiors with respect 
regardless of the environment and/or conditions. This relationship between 
superior and subordinate is routinely witnessed during daily interactions. Eye 
contact is an example of a daily interaction. In Western cultures it is 
acceptable-even encouraged-for a subordinate to make eye contact with 
figures of authority. In Chinese culture, a subordinate making eye contact 
with a figure of authority is considered disrespectful, and, thus, it is strongly 
discouraged. 
It is also a common belief, in Chinese culture, that a figure of authority 
is error-free. Thus, it is considered an outrage when a Chinese subordinate 
challenges a figure of authority. Figures of authority will not allow such 
challenges, nor will they admit their errors. This is because of fear of losing 
face. Face in Chinese culture signifies one’s dignity and prestige. It is often 
the subordinate’s responsibility to preserve the superior’s face, and thereby 
maintain the harmony of the group. 
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Profile of Taiwanese Flight Crews 
There are few doubts that flight crew members, regardless of their 
nationalities, are often trained in the latest technologies and are typically at 
the technological and modernized forefront of their country’s workforce 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). According to Helmreich and Merritt, national 
culture will have limited effects on these individuals; however, cultural 
influences will continue to be evident in flight crew members’ interactions 
and communication processes 
As a result of the long history of dictatorship, Taiwanese figures of 
authority (e.g., professors, physicians and airline captains) are highly 
respected, and even feared by their subordinates, resulting in a high power 
distance between superiors and subordinates. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) 
determined that Taiwanese flight crews could be characterized as a group of 
individuals who have a strong preference for order (time limits, finding the 
one way to do a job, etc.), with a very high power distance between captains 
and first oficers in their work environment. These traits were notably 
different in comparison to Western flight crew members; the Western pilots 
showed a strong preference for flexibility (changing work routine, no single 
solution, and challenging tasks). 
FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE INCIDENT 
REPORTING SYSTEM IN TAIWAN 
It is evident how some of the values and beliefs of Chinese culture could 
have a negative impact on Taiwan’s flight safety. Thus, it is not surprising to 
discover that Taiwan has one of the world’s worst flight safety records. 
According to Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council (ASC), there were 21 
accidents aiid 300 fataiities during tht: years 1999-2003; tiiis is nigh for a 
small island with only 200 commercial transport aircraft (ASC, n.d. [b]). 
There is little doubt that such an accident rate is unacceptable; as a 
result, the Taiwanese government has begun a series of initiatives to enhance 
flight safety. One of the attempts has been the establishment of a Taiwanese 
voluntary incident reporting program for flight crew members. The 
following section focuses on the history and characteristics of the Taiwanese 
voluntary incident reporting program. 
The Role of Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council 
The ASC was established in 1999 as a relative newcomer to the field of 
aviation accident investigations. It has participated in high profile 
commercial aviation accident investigations, including Singapore Airlines’ 
runway incursion at Taipei and China Airlines’ in-flight breakup in 2002 
(ASC, n.d. [b]) . Similar to other investigation agencies, ASC quickly 
realized that accident investigation is a limited resource for enhancing flight 
safety, and that the optimal tool to combat aviation accidents is to minimize 
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their occurrence. Recognition of the need to minimize the number of 
accidents generated ASC interest in the establishment of a confidential 
incident reporting program for flight crew members (ASC, n.d. [a]). 
The loss of an Airbus 300 and 180 lives in 1998 was the impetus for 
Taiwanese authorities to recognize the importance of a voluntary incident 
reporting program. In 1999 TACARE was established. TACARE is the 
government’s attempt to introduce a non-punitive incident reporting program 
for Taiwanese flight crew members, but it has faced numerous challenges. 
THE TACARE STRUCTURE 
Due to Taiwan’s unique aviation environment (non-existent general 
aviation and a relatively small, yet highly competitive, airline industry), 
TACARE was modeled after the British Confidential Human Factors 
Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) where the reporting program was 
designed specifically for air carriers (ASC, n.d. [a]). 
Similar to CHIRP, TACARE consists of three committees: (a) the Core 
Committee, (b) the Work Group, and (c) the Technical Advisory Committee. 
The Core Committee has six members: the director, the executive secretary, 
and four consultants. The director and executive secretary are members of 
the ASC, and the four consultants are experienced aviation safety experts 
from various Taiwanese air carriers. The Core Committee serves as the 
overseer of all functions of TACARE and the evaluator of the effectiveness 
of the entire program (ASC, n.d. [a]). 
The Work Group is the main workforce of TACARE; the group is 
charged with the operation of TACARE and responsible for receiving, 
analyzing, maintaining, and de-identifying actual TACARE reports. The 
Work Group has three members-two analysts and a database engineer 
(ASC, n.d. [c]). 
The Technical Advisory Committee has 14 members representing a 
variety of special interest groups including air carrier management, air traffic 
controllers, pilots, and flight attendants. The principal task for the Technical 
Advisory Committee is technical assistance and advice to the work group 
(ASC, n.d. [c]). 
Categorization and Processing of TACARE Reports 
Categorization of incident reports is one of the most important parts in a 
voluntary incident reporting system. A successhl program effectively 
categorizes submitted reports and provides valuable information for trend 
analysis (Chidester, 2000). TACARE adopted a human factors categorization 
system used by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 
International Air Transport Association, and the U.S. Navy. All TACARE 
reports are categorized under three headings: (a) technical, (b) environment, 
and (c) human factors. A total of 52 sub-categories are used to analyze 
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submitted TACARE reports (ASC, n.d. [c]). The analysis process is 
conducted by the Work Group with a set of procedures used to review each 
report. A checklist is utilized by the Work Group to properly identify the 
nature of the submitted reports. Upon completion of the analysis process, the 
report is blinded by having all identifying information removed and entered 
into a database for trend analysis and publication. 
Meetings, where analysis and newly submitted reports are reviewed, are 
conducted between the TACARE Work Group and the Technical Advisory 
Committee on a monthly basis. The joint session issues recommendations to 
the appropriate agencies, and completes the process by destroying the 
original copies of the TACARE reports. 
The problems with TACARE prompted this study. An investigation was 
designed to analyze the cause of difficulties from a cultural prospective and 
examine the possibilities of adopting other existing programs such as ASAP 
to enhance TACARE. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The review of the literature associated with the TACARE problem 
How does the Taiwanese TACARE compare with ASAP in the 
U.S.? 
How would Taiwanese air carrier flight crew members accept 
certain ASAP principles? 
How would a Western flight safety program integrate with 
Chinese culture? 
resulted in three research questions: 
1. 
2. 
3.  
Although TACARE has been in existence since 1999, limited data has 
been generated that would determine the effectiveness of the program. The 
only survey that was administered to measure the effectiveness of TACARE 
was conducted by ASC in 2002. However, the study was for internal 
evaluation only, and the results have not been made available to the public. 
Subsequent to a thorough review of all available data, the need for this study 
became apparent. The new survey would be designed and administered as a 
measure of the effectiveness and degree of acceptance of TACARE by 
Taiwanese air carrier pilots. 
Design of the Survey 
Since many Taiwanese pilots believed that TACARE was a sensitive 
issue, the survey was designed to be confidential, with no publication of any 
of the participants’ personal data. The two-page instrument measured 
demographics and opinions. The first 6 items gathered basic demographics 
(eg., the ages of the participants, their aviation experiences, and the sources 
of their primary training). The 1 1  opinion items that followed comprised 5 
multiple choice questions, and 6 Likert scale inquiries. The Likert scale is 
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generally a five-point scale where participants choose responses ranging 
between Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree and Strongly Disagree. A 
five-point Likert scale has been very popular in similar studies, but it was 
determined that the Neutral choice would compromise this study. As a result, 
the six-point Likert scale was more desirable; it eliminated the Neutral 
choice, and effected either an agreement or a disagreement with the 
statement. The six choices used on the survey instrument were: (a) Strongly 
Agree, (b) Agree, (c) Somewhat Agree, (d) Somewhat Disagree, (e) 
Disagree, and (f) Strongly Disagree. These options were numerically coded 
with 1 representing Strongly Agree and 6 representing Strongly Disagree. 
The five multiple choice items ranged from queries of the individuals’ 
basic understandings of TACARE’s voluntary incident reporting to more 
complex statements evaluating the effectiveness of the program. The six 
Likert scale items consisted of several operating principles of ASAP. These 
items were designed to examine participants’ acceptance of certain ASAP 
principles and the possibilities of incorporating such principles into 
TACARE. The survey’s original English design was translated to Chinese 
and reviewed by three Taiwanese safety professionals for the administration 
process. 
Administration of the Instrument 
The survey was administered to flight crew members of four Taiwanese 
air carriers: Mandarin Airlines, UNI Airlines, Far Eastern Air Transport, and 
China Airlines. Cooperation and endorsement of the participating air 
carriers’ safety offices enabled survey distribution to each pilot’s company 
mailbox. An unfortunate result of the surveys being e-mailed to each 
participating airlines’ safety office was that control and monitoring of the 
total number of surveys distributed was lost. 
After contacting the participating air carriers, it was determined that the 
four carriers had distributed the survey to all of their pilots. The survey was 
available to the pilots for completion for 1 week in July 2003; the completed 
surveys were collected by each air carrier’s safety office, and returned to the 
researcher the same month. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
With an apparent I ,  135 surveys distributed and a total of 208 surveys 
(205 usable) returned, the return rate was 18%. A discussion of the results 
follows. 
Demographics 
The participants were predominantly males younger than 45 years of 
age, with less than 15 years of civil aviation experience. The majority of the 
participants received their primary flight training in the Taiwanese military 
and, due to the absence of GA in Taiwan, had less than 2,000 hours of total 
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flight time. This profile of the participants characterizes the Taiwanese 
aviation industry. (In Taiwan, the terms aviation and air carrier are 
synonymous.) The absence of GA in Taiwan has resulted in less experienced 
flight crew members, which could be one of the contributing factors to 
Taiwan’s high rate of air carrier accidents. 
Four Representative Opinion Items 
The multiple choice opinion items of the instrument were designed to 
measure the participants’ awareness of TACARE. The results indicate that 
81% of the participants were aware of TACARE, but had not submitted 
reports to the program. In addition, 59% of the participants indicated that 
they were willing to participate in TACARE in the event of an operational 
deviation. The results clarify that the majority of the Taiwanese flight crew 
members are aware of TACARE; however, there are also numerous 
participants who are not willing to participate in TACARE. It is noteworthy 
that 37% of the participants indicated that they would not submit TACARE 
reports after encountering an operational deviation. The survey also revealed 
that 53% of participants who had previously participated in TACARE 
indicated that they would choose not to submit a TACARE report in the 
future. 
The first opinion item asked the question “In the event of an operational 
deviation, would you submit a report to TACARE.” Participants could select 
yes or no. The majority (60%) answered yes; with fewer (37%) answering 
no. It is interesting to note that 2 of the participants answered both yes and 
no. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Number and percent of Taiwanese pilots who would submit a report to 
TACARE in the event of an operational deviation, 2003 
Number Percent 
Yes 122 59.5 
Yes and No 
No 
2 
75 
I .o 
36.6 
No Response 6 2.9 
Total 205 100.0 
The second opinion item asked for agreement or disagreement to the 
statement: “Unanimous consensus must be reached by all members of the 
incident report review team on event reported.” Table 2 displays the results. 
The replies indicate that 82% of the participants agreed that it is important 
for the incident report review team to reach unanimous consensus prior to 
issuing any recommendations to the flight crews. This is a critical principle 
for the incident review team, since unanimous consensus would signify that 
all participating parties are in agreement with the issued recommendations. 
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The third item asked for agreement or disagreement with the statement: 
“A union member/pilot representative should be included as part of the 
incident report review team.” Table 3 displays the results. More than 95% of 
the participants agreed that a uniodpilot representative should participate in 
the incident reviewing process. Similar to their Western counterparts, 
Taiwanese flight crew members expressed the importance of being properly 
represented during the incident reviewing process. 
The fourth opinion item asked for agreement or disagreement with the 
statement: “Qualified participants of the incident reporting program should 
be protected from legal and airline disciplinary actions.” Table 4 displays the 
results. The current TACARE program does not provide legal protections for 
the participating crewmembers. The majority (94%) of the participants 
I agreed it is imperative that reporting flight crew members be protected when 
Table 2. Agreement with the statement that unanimous consensus must be 
reached by all members of the incident report team on event reported to 
TACARE before issuing a recommendation to flight crew members, by 
Taiwanese pilots, 2003 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree 51 24.9 
Agree 83 40.5 
Somewhat Agree 32 15.6 
Somewhat 22 10.7 
Disagree 
Disagree 13 6.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.5 
No ResDonse 3 1.5 
Table 3. Agreement with the statement that a union memberlpilot representative 
should be included as part of the TACRE incident report review team, by 
Taiwanese pilots, 2003 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree 112 54.6 
Agree 68 33.2 
Somewhat Agree 13 6.3 
Somewhat Disagree 3 1.5 
Disagree 6 2.9 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.5 
No Response 2 1 .o 
Total 205 100.0 
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submitting an incident report. Results of this item emphasize the importance 
of providing protections and immunity to participants of the TACARE 
program. 
Table 4. Agreement with the statement that qualified participants of the 
TACARE incident reporting program should be protected from legal and airline 
disciplinary actions, by Taiwanese pilots, 2003 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree 105 51.2 
Agree 66 
Somewhat Agree 16 
Somewhat Disagree 7 
Disagree 2 
Strongly Disagree 3 
No Remonse 6 
32.2 
7.8 
3.4 
1 .o 
1.5 
2.9 
Total 205 100.0 
The results of the survey indicate that Taiwanese flight crew members 
accept and agree with several ASAP principles. Results confirmed the 
possibility of adapting ASAP principles into the current TACARE program. 
It was concluded that participation in the TACARE program would increase 
significantly with the addition of the ASAP principles. 
In summary, the survey results indicate that the majority of Taiwanese 
air carrier flight crew members are: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Aware of the TACARE system; 
Familiar with the concepts of voluntary incident reporting 
programs: and 
In agreement with several ASAP operating principles. 
Overall, this is an indication that certain ASAP concepts would be well 
accepted regardless of cultural differences, and could be adopted into the 
TACARE. Indications are that TACARE is currently faced with challenges, 
including the low participation rates from its intended users and the lack of 
complete immunity protection policy. Examination of the challenges and 
other concerns faced by TACARE follows. 
TACARE’S OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES 
TACARE has faced several operational difficulties since its 1999 
introduction. Most of these challenges have been direct results of Taiwan’s 
unique aviation industry. Unlike the deregulated airline industry of the U.S., 
Taiwan’s air carriers have remained highly regulated. Therefore, each carrier 
is assigned specific operating routes. Additionally, each Taiwanese air 
carrier operates specific and unique types of transports. The combination of 
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these two factors has presented a unique challenge for TACARE 
management regarding confidentiality. 
One of the most important advantages of a voluntary incident reporting 
system is the ability to provide useful incident data with specific routes and 
type of equipment for trend analysis. The unique regulations of Taiwan’s air 
carrier industry make it difticult to create blinded TACARE reports. 
According to H.C. Wang (personal communication, August 5, 2003), 
manager of TACARE, significant sections of information submitted in 
TACARE reports are considered proprietary. For example, a blinded 
TACARE report would not reveal the route flown and type of aircraft used, 
because this information would reveal the identity of the carrier involved in 
the incident. Consequently, limited information for trend analysis can be 
obtained from the blinded TACARE reports. 
The success of a voluntary incident reporting program is heavily 
depended on support from the air carriers. An example was the European 
Confidential Aviation Safety Reporting Network program (EUCARE). 
Established in 1992, EUCARE was the European attempt to establish a 
voluntary incident reporting program. However, EUCARE suffered from 
low participation by its intended users. This was because several European 
carriers already had established their own incident reporting programs. Thus, 
many European air carriers did not support or encourage flight crew 
members to participate in EUCARE. The lack of participation and support 
from European air carriers ultimately led to the termination of the EUCARE 
program (Importuntfinul announcements, 1999). Unfortunately, TACARE is 
currently encountering challenges similar to its European counterpart. 
According to Wang, most Taiwanese airlines do not encourage their flight 
crew members to participate in TACARE. And since it is not encouraged by 
their employer nor mandatory, it is not surprising that most flight crew 
members neglect to submit reports to TACARE. 
The Punishment Culture 
Many flight crew members who participated in the TACARE survey 
expressed their fear of disciplinary action by their companies as a result of 
submitting TACARE reports-a direct effect of the Chinese punishment 
culture. Unlike Western cultures where disciplinary actions are the last 
resource of corrective actions, in Taiwan, punishment is often the only 
solution to most problems regardless of the root causes. In fact, the 
punishment culture is not concerned with identifying the root cause of a 
problem, but rather utilizes forms of punishment to prevent further similar 
occurrences. This punishment culture is commonly practiced in the 
Taiwanese society, an example of which has been the Flight Operation 
Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. 
The FOQA program was developed to assist flight operations 
management discover unfavorable trends in airline flight operations, and 
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analyze such problems for countermeasures. However, following its 
introduction to Taiwanese air carriers, FOQA has become a primary means 
for fleet managers to identify and punish those flight crew members who 
have deviated from standard operating procedures. This punishment culture 
explains the hesitation among the Taiwanese flight crew members to 
participate in TACARE. 
Repetition of Reporting Programs 
A key ingredient of a successful voluntary incident reporting program is 
the willingness of flight crew members to submit reports after encountering 
operational deviations. The ASAP and ASRS programs have been successfid 
because they offer protection for the reporting individuals; hence, both 
programs have experienced high participations rates. 
There have been three reporting programs similar to TACARE in use by 
Taiwanese airlines. TACARE was viewed by many flight crew members as a 
repetition of the many reporting programs that have produced limited results. 
In the event of an operational deviation, it has been mandatory for the air 
carrier to submit a report for the aviation safety database of the Taiwanese 
Civil Aviation Administration (CAA). Although the report was mandatory, 
the CAA would waive certain punitive actions against reporting carriers (but 
not the flight crew members). The CAA’s aviation database contains 
considerable incident data, but due to a lack of resources, the data have not 
been utilized for trend analysis to prevent similar occurrences. Furthermore, 
the CAA’s database has been inaccessible in nature; consequently, air 
carriers and ASC personnel have not obtained data from the CAA’s 
database. The database has become a massive storage of incident reports 
and, yet, has contributed little toward the goal of improved flight safety. 
In addition to the CAA’s mandatory incident reporting database, each 
Taiwanese air carrier has adopted its own version of an aviation safety 
reporting program. These systems are managed by the air carriers’ safety 
offices, with individual databases similar to the CAA database. It has been 
mandatory for flight crew members to submit detailed incident reports to 
these air carrier databases. Unlike Western reporting programs, these safety 
reports are designed to reveal the identities of the involved flight crew 
members, and have often been used in combination with FOQA data by 
flight management personnel as evidence for disciplinary action for the flight 
crew members. 
Taiwan’s CAA has also maintained a reporting system for flight crew 
members to submit safety incidents on a voluntary basis. The 
Administrator’s Mailbox has been available for all aviation personnel (flight 
crew members, maintenance personnel, and air traffic controllers) to report 
concerns regarding flight safety. Although the Administrator’s Mailbox has 
been in existence for more than 10 years, it also suffers from a lack of 
participation. Furthermore, this CAA voluntary reporting system is often 
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misused by its intended participants, with issues not related to flight safety 
being reported. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TACARE AND ASAP 
Taiwan’s TACARE is experiencing a lack of participation by its 
intended users, the Taiwanese air carrier flight crew members. The following 
implications are a product of the first investigation of Taiwanese flight crews 
members’ use of TACARE and the flight crews members’ acceptance of 
ASAP principles into the current TACARE. 
The analysis of the survey results indicates that a significant number of 
TACARE participants would choose not to submit TACARE reports in the 
future. This was a direct result of the repetition of various incident reporting 
programs currently in existence within the Taiwanese air carrier industry. 
Furthermore, the majority of flight crew members are not confident with the 
current immunity policy. Thus, many Taiwanese pilots fear disciplinary 
actions as a result of submitting TACARE reports. This factor is a direct 
contributor to the lack of participation in Taiwan’s TACARE. 
The survey results demonstrate that Taiwanese flight crew members 
have no difficulties accepting certain ASAP operating principles evidenced 
by an overwhelming majority of participating flight crew members in 
agreement with the specific ASAP principles that were presented. This 
suggests that participation in TACARE could be improved by incorporating 
a number of ASAP principles. 
One of the fundamental challenges to incorporating ASAP principles 
into TACARE is the current structure of TACARE. There are limited 
benefits to the Taiwanese flight crew members’ participation in TACARE, 
because the ASC is the managing agency for TACARE. The survey 
participants agreed that TACARE should incorporate ASAP management 
principles, and function as an airline-specific program. An airline-specific 
voluntary incident reporting program would present a win-win situation for 
both airline management and flight crew members. An airline-specific 
incident reporting program such as ASAP would protect participants from 
disciplinary action; concurrently, increased participation would allow airline 
safety personnel to obtain a better perspective of the current and potential 
hazards and develop a more accurate trend analysis, thereby enhancing 
overall flight safety. 
Economic concerns and financial support remain essential components 
of the decision making processes of every air carrier. In Taiwan, safety has 
become a lesser concern for the success of the Taiwanese carriers. Thus, it 
becomes questionable whether an individual air carrier would be willing to 
provide additional resources and funding to support a separate reporting 
system, especially with most Taiwanese air carriers being satisfied with their 
current incident reporting systems. 
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Another challenge to incorporating ASAP operating principles into 
TACARE is the absence of a culture in which individuals are presumed to be 
not guilty of willful infractions. A significant factor that led to the success of 
ASAP in the U.S. is the fundamental belief of presumed innocence and the 
non-punitive nature of the program. Indications are that there would be 
fundamental difficulties in maintaining this nature of ASAP in Taiwan. The 
dramatic differences in culture continue to be impediments. As previously 
mentioned, the Taiwanese often believe punishment is the ultimate solution 
to most problems. Thus, most Taiwanese air carriers select disciplinary 
action as the best practice to prevent reoccurrence of operational deviations. 
It is possible that ASAP-or other similar reporting programs-would 
become an effective punishment tool for Taiwanese air carriers to identify 
and punish the flight crew members involved in the incident. Of course, 
using the incident information to punish those involved is a clear deviation 
from ASAP’s original intent, and use of the information in this way would 
create a negative impact on Taiwan’s air carrier flight safety. 
Another of the contributing elements of ASAP’s success in the U.S. is 
the inclusion of pilot union representatives in the ERT. This practice allows 
pilots to be represented by their union members, and also provides additional 
protection for ASAP participants. The presence of a pilot representative on 
the ERT has increased participation in ASAP. Taiwanese flight crew 
members have expressed a similar interest in having a union/pilot 
representative be present during the incident review process. However, there 
are several challenges to adopting this concept into TACARE. Several 
Taiwanese air carriers do not allow labor unions. Consequently, Taiwanese 
flight crew members do not have the protection of labor unions. Pilot 
representatives should be part of the incident review process; however, such 
carrier, which would be undesirable for management. 
Throughout the study, fundamental differences in the utilization of 
voluntary incident reporting systems by Western and Chinese cultures were 
identified. Western nations traditionally emphasize the importance of 
discovering the root cause of the problem, and utilize voluntary incident 
reporting systems such as ASAP as a means of identifying potential dangers 
and safety hazards. However, in Taiwan, voluntary reporting systems are 
used as effective evidence gathering tools used to punish program 
participants. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to discover that Taiwan’s 
TACARE is suffering from a lack of participation. 
pi-aciice woii;j iiidicaie =, kiiicreasing labor influence a Taiwanese air 
CONCLUSION 
In summation, ASAP principles would be well-accepted by Taiwanese 
flight crew members. However, certain Chinese cultural beliefs-in 
combination with the current unique environment of the Taiwanese aviation 
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industry-create a situation that is not suitable for any voluntary incident 
reporting program. Certain fbndamental reforms are required within the 
Taiwanese aviation industry to properly utilize a voluntary incident reporting 
system such as ASAP. Unfortunately, the concept of utilizing incident data 
to improve flight safety is still not accepted by the mainstream Taiwanese 
airline managers. However, once Taiwanese aviation safety personnel 
understand the full potential of voluntary incident reporting systems, they 
will become the most effective tools to enhance flight safety in Taiwan. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering 
(1PO) and subsequent price movements of the stock. In particular, w’e examine 
whether the euphoria surrounding JetBlue’s IPO carried over to other firms in the 
sector by testing whether the shares of JetBlue’s competitors showed a significant 
price reaction to JetBlue’s IPO. JetBlue’s IPO tooh place just a few months 
following September I I ,  2001. These events resulted in dramatic changes in the 
airline industry and had significant implications on the economic gains of airlines. 
We examine JetBlue’s accounting and stock performance and compare it to the 
relative performance of Southwest Airlines (SWA), a representative of the loa-cost 
carrier group. In addition, we compare both JetBlue’s and SWA’s financial condition 
and the relative performance of their stock to two mainline U S .  carriers, Continental 
and Northwest. representatives of the conventional-cost carrier group. We analyze 
whether there are any performance differences among the low-cost carriers and 
between low-cost carriers and conventional-cost carriers. In particular, w’e examine 
whether low-cost carriers were able to sustain the economic impacts of 9/11 better 
than the conventional-cost carriers. 
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“Keep an eye on JelBlue. That could prove to be a successful operation” 
Herb Kelleher, Co-founder, Southwest Airlines (Top Entrepreneurs, 200 I ,  p. 84) 
INTRODUCTION 
JetBlue Airways was one of the best-funded start-up airlines in U.S. 
aviation history. Its initial capitalization was $130 million. The airline was 
founded in early 1999 by David Neelman, who is currently its Chief 
Executive Officer. Before JetBlue David Neelman founded Morris Air and 
after selling Morris Air to Southwest Airlines (SWA) served as an executive 
vice president of SWA. He also worked as a consultant for West Jet 
Airlines. 
JetBlue started operations in February 2000 and went public in April 
2002, in what was described as one of the most successful initial public 
offerings (IPO) of the year. Following a very successful road show for its 
IPO, JetBlue, in connection with its lead underwriters Morgan Stanley and 
Merrill Lynch, filed several amendments to its initial S-I filing with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in which it revised its offering 
price upward from an initial price range of $22 - $24 to $27 per share. 
JetBlue sold 5.87 million shares at this price, raising more than $158 million 
for the firm. Despite the upward revisions in the firm’s offering price, 
JetBlue’s stock soared another 67 percent and closed at $45 on its first day of 
trading (Boorstin, 2002). 
During 2001, JetBlue’s second year of operation, and arguably one of 
the worst in U.S. aviation history, the airline turned profitable, earning $38.5 
million on revenues of $320 million. This fact alone may explain why 
JetBlue’s shares were in very high demand. Only two other airlines in the 
U.S. were also profitable in 2001: SWA and AirTran. Although experiencing 
a stock price deciine since its highs in June 2002, jetfiiue has stood up weii 
to its expectations, increasing sales in 2002 to $635 million with a year-end 
profit of $49 million. 
This paper examines the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s IPO and 
subsequent price movements of the stock through the present. In particular, 
we look at whether the euphoria surrounding JetBlue’s IPO carried over to 
other firms in the sector by examining whether the shares of JetBlue’s 
competitors showed a significant price reaction to JetBlue’s successful IPO. 
We focus on the relative performance of the stock and compare it with the 
stock performance of a similarly successful low-cost carrier, SWA, and two 
mainline full-service U.S. carriers, Continental and Northwest. These 
airlines are used as comparison baselines. The mainline full-service carriers 
were picked randomly and based on the fact that, to date, neither has filed for 
bankruptcy protection as a result of the systemic shocks of the events of 
September 1 1,2001 (9/11). 
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We find JetBlue’s accounting and stock performance to be significantly 
better than that of its mainline conventional-cost rivals, Continental and 
Northwest, but in similar lines with its low-cost rival SWA. Based on this 
finding, we assert that there is something unique to the low-cost model, 
which both SWA and JetBlue follow, that sets them apart from their 
conventional-cost competitors and renders them more successful in difficult 
market conditions. We do not advocate that the low-cost model is 
monolithic. In many ways JetBlue resembles a younger, smaller version of 
SWA (Boorstin, 2002). Like SWA, JetBlue flies busy routes between 
secondary airports, has a low-cost structure, and emphasizes customer 
service. But while SWA usually sticks to a single region, JetBlue flies cross- 
country. And while SWA is based at Dallas’ smaller airport, Love Field, 
JetBlue is based at New York’s Kennedy International Airport (JFK). 
Furthermore, SWA can be characterized as a low-frills airline, whereas 
JetBlue is a lifestyle seller with more finesse, even though both are low-fare. 
Our argument is that the low-cost model, in its generic manifestation, 
can be differentiated from the conventional-cost model along three 
dimensions. These dimensions, coupled with some unique operational 
features that low-cost airlines have (which will be identified in the next 
paragraph), help explain, theoretically, why low-cost carriers outperform 
their conventional-cost rivals. These dimensions are: (a) adopting a viable 
strategic position, (b) leveraging organizational capabilities, and (c) re- 
conceiving the value equation (Lawton, 2002). 
Low-cost airlines establish a viable strategic position in the market by 
finding an appropriate strategy that acts as a mediating force between them 
and the environment in which they operate. For example, both SWA and 
JetBlue serve price- and convenience-sensitive passengers only. Low-cost 
airlines, once they establish their position, move toward securing their 
competitive advantage by capitalizing on capabilities that cannot be used by 
rivals. These capabilities are quality in customer service, operational 
efficiency, innovation, and responsiveness to customers. 
Zom (200 1) advances the argument that low-cost carriers are more 
resilient than conventional-cost carriers in times of economic downturn. Our 
analysis focusing on JetBlue’s performance validates this point, and Zorn’s 
analysis helps us demonstrate it theoretically. Zorn cites several reasons for 
the resilience of low-cost carriers in times of recession: first, lower overall 
and more variable cost structures; second, lower breakeven load factors; and, 
third, business and leisure traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines 
to low-cost airlines. Our financial analysis substantiates this point to its 
fullest. We found that markets value low-cost airline stocks (focusing on 
JetBlue and SWA) as growth stocks, whereas conventional-cost airline 
stocks are treated as cyclical. Even though affected, low-cost carriers 
emerged from 9/1 I in a stronger market position than their full-fare rivals. 
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What interests us from an academic point of view is the relative 
confidence of the public in JetBlue’s stock (as measured by price 
movements) right after the IPO, as compared to both SWA and the mainline 
carriers. We build a model, test several hypotheses on why there was stock 
performance divergence, and explain these differences based on the data, 
controlling for extraneous variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly describes the 
series of events surrounding our period of analysis and sets the stage for our 
analysis. The second section discusses JetBlue’s strategy and the state of the 
airline industry in the U.S. during the period of our analysis. The third 
section describes the data. The fourth section explains the methodology used 
to test several hypotheses concerning the performance of JetBlue’s stock. 
The results are presented in the fifth section and the findings are summarized 
in the final section. 
JETBLUE AND THE STATE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
JetBlue’s strategy is to combine common sense with strategic and 
operational innovation through the use of the most appropriate technology to 
“bring humanity back to air travel” (Gittell & O’Reilly, 2001, p. 2). To 
accomplish this, JetBlue aimed to be one of the first completely paperless 
airlines, deploying information technology for every single aspect of its 
operations from flight operations and maintenance to ticketing and 
reservations. The two pillars of JetBlue’s strategy are efficiency and service. 
According to its founder, David Neelman, “We like to think of ourselves as 
customer advocates. We believe that all travelers should have access to high 
quality airline service at affordable fares” (Gittell & O’Reilly, 2001, p. 2). 
JetBlue’s hub city, New York City, represents a very large population center 
at the heart of several underserved markets. More specifically, New York 
City lacked the service by a low-cost carrier; therefore, fares were, on 
average, quite high and its true traffic potential unrealized. JetBlue chose 
JFK, a slot controlled and heavily used airport, as its hub, which was quite 
an unconventional choice for a low-cost, start-up carrier that would normally 
opt for a smaller airport as its basis of operations. When JetBlue moved to 
JFK, the slot controls were only in effect from 3:OO p.m. to 8:OO p.m., while 
the rest of the day JFK was underutilized. Furthermore, more terminal space 
was opening up at the airport due to TWA’s reduction of operations at JFK. 
Thus, JetBlue was able to secure slots, through political concessions, without 
going through the process of purchasing them from one of the airlines 
already holding these slots. 
JetBlue operates a single-type aircraft, the A320 series made by Airbus 
Industries. Through the use of a single-type aircraft, JetBlue realizes 
operational savings in the areas of maintenance and crew training. Every 
JetBlue mechanic can work on any aircraft and every pilot can fly any of 
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JetBlue’s planes. JetBlue’s operational strategy includes quick aircraft 
turnarounds, which help in improving operational performance and, thus, 
efficiency by maximizing aircraft utilization. JetBlue keeps its planes in the 
air longer than any other airline, more than 12 hours a day. Only SWA 
comes close to this, with about 1 1 hours of block time. 
JetBlue’s cost per available seat mile in 2002, seen on Figure 1, was 5.3 
cents. This was the lowest in the US. airline industry. For example, the cost 
for US Airways was more than double (11 cents), United 10.4 cents, and 
American 9.2 cents. These three topped the chart and two of them (US 
Airways and United) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in the 
months following 9/11. The cost for Northwest was 8.2 cents and 
Continental 7.9 cents, the two conventional-cost airlines that we used for the 
baseline comparison. SWA had the second lowest cost per available seat 
mile to JetBlue with 6.3 cents. 
US Airways 
United 
American 
Figure 1. Cost per available seat miles, in cents: U.S. major 
carriers comparison, 2002 
1 1  0 
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JetBlue has built its corporate culture, discussed on its Web site at 
http://www.jetblue.com/workhere/culture.html, around five core values: 
Safety, Caring, Integrity, Fun, and Passion. The airline is non-unionized. 
This is quite an unconventional practice in the U.S. airline industry, 80 
percent of which is unionized.. JetBlue follows a customized human resource 
management approach that tailors jobs, pay, and benefit packages to the 
different needs of distinct employee groups rather than the more 
conventional, universal type human resource management system. 
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DATA 
We use accounting data from January 1996 to March 2003. We 
collected this data from quarterly lOQ filings’, which are available online 
through the SEC’s “Edgar Online” database (http://www.edgar-online.com). 
For our analysis of relative stock performances pre- and post-JetBlue’s IPO, 
we use daily price data (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 
2000 to April 2003, which we retrieved from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database from the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business (http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp). To measure 
market performance during our sample period, we use the CRSP value- 
weighted market index. 
Finally, we use weekly 3-month Treasury Security indexes as calculated 
by the Treasury Department and reported by the Federal Reserve in 
publication H. 15 as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate during our sample 
period (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15). Since August 2 1, 2000, 
the Federal Reserve’s Publication H. 15 no longer reports yield data for the 
13-week (3-month) U.S. Treasury Bill auction average. Starting from this 
date, we use Treasury security yields adjusted to a constant maturity of 3 
months, as provided by the Treasury’s Public Debt Web site 
(http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov). 
METHODOLOGY 
Financial markets bring together potential investors who vote every day 
on the future profitability of the firm and the relative merits of managers’ 
strategic decisions. Simply put, if investors think that corporate decisions 
wiii iead to increases in iong-run profitabiiity, news of events such as a 
takeover will cause a firm’s stock price to rise. Conversely, news that 
investors believe will lower future profits will result in a fall in a f m ’ s  
equity value. 
The finance literature refers to the idea that news is quickly impounded 
in security market prices as the efficient market hypothesis, first described by 
Fama, Fisher, and Jensen (1969). The assumption that markets are efficient 
implies that security prices reflect all relevant information known to 
investors and thus provide us with the best estimate of a firm’s future 
profitability. There is significant empirical support of the efficient market 
’ IOQ filings are quarterly company reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
IOQ reports provide detailed information on a firm’s quarterly earnings results and must be sent 
to the Securities and Exchange Conitnission within 45 days of the end of the quarter. 
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hypothesis including the Carter and Simpkins’ (2002) study of airline stocks 
following 911 1. 
If we assume that markets are efficient, and therefore set rational prices, 
we can measure whether the corporate strategy of such low-cost carriers as 
JetBlue and SWA, post-9/1 1, was in the best interest of shareholders by 
examining the firms’ profitability and stock price performance in the months 
after 911 1 and compare them to the performance of other airlines that follow 
a conventional-cost business model (Continental, Northwest). Our 
methodology follows the event study procedure described in Brown and 
Warner (1989, Peterson (1989), and Schweitzer (1989). Event study 
methodology measures the abnormal return of the stock, the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return, around the time of the 
event. If an announcement such as news of increased profits is taken as 
good news, abnormal returns will be positive, signaling the market’s belief 
that firm value has increased. A negative abnormal return is evidence of bad 
news, indicating that the market believes the event will decrease the firm’s 
future profitability. 
To estimate the abnormal return of a stock on day t, we subtract the 
expected return on the stock from its actual return on that day: 
Where: 
AR, is the abnormal stock return; 
R, is the actual stock return; and 
E(RJ is the expected stock return, all on day t. 
In turn, we assume that the return of a stock is conditional on the return 
of the market and model E(R,) as: 
Where: 
E(Rm,t) is the expected return of the market on day t; 
RJt represents the risk-free rate as measured by the return on 90-day 
t is the estimated slope coefficient from a linear regression of the stock’s 
U.S. Treasury Bills on day t ;  and 
past returns on the returns of the market. 
Equation 2 is also called the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and is 
based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In this paper, we estimate the 
CAPM using both 60 and 360 daily returns that precede our event window. 
We employ a linear market model that illustrates the relationship between 
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JetBlue’s stock return and the market (as proxied by the CRSP value- 
weighted market index) during a normal period. 
We calculate daily abnormal returns for JetBlue and the other three 
airlines following JetBlue’s IPO on April 12,2002. In addition, we measure 
cumulative abnormal returns, CARrrrn,  the sum of abnormal returns over a 
window of n days: 
Cumulative abnormal returns enable us to measure the market’s reaction 
to the performance of the airline in a time frame that encompasses the entire 
period from the event under study to the present. 
Earlier industry research has largely focused on airline stock returns 
following a plane crash. Davidson, Chandy, and Cross (1987) find 
statistically significant negative returns for airlines on the day of the crash. 
This appears to be a short-term effect, however, and is reversed on the days 
following the event. Chance and Ferris (1987) examined 46 plane crashes, 
and discovered that in 29 cases the carrier had a significant negative return. 
A crash does not appear to have an effect beyond the initial reaction, nor 
does it affect the stock price of the airline’s competitors. Chance and Ferris 
also found a negative correlation between the airline’s abnormal return and 
the number of fatalities in the crash. 
More recently, Carter and Simpkins (2002) investigated the stock 
market’s reaction to the tragedies of 9/11. They noted the potential 
psychological effects of the attack and tested whether financial markets 
reacted rritirimally tc news of the event. Carte: am! Simpkins faund that 
despite the psychological horrors the market was able to discern among 
airlines based on fm characteristics, including the ability to cover short- 
term obligations. Their results support rational pricing and have important 
implications for our work, which seeks to examine JetBlue’s financial 
performance and stock performance in the aftermath of 9/1 1. 
To serve as a hrther control in estimating the market’s reaction to 
JetBlue’s performance post 911 1, the analysis compares the abnormal returns 
of JetBlue’s stock to the abnormal returns of SWA, on one hand, and 
Northwest and Continental, on the other hand. We choose SWA because it 
uses a low-cost business model similar to that of JetBlue, and Continental 
and Northwest because they use a conventional-cost business model and 
have done so quite successfully. These firms should provide a good 
benchmark for examining the industry’s reaction to JetBlue’s successful IPO 
and help us answer the question of whether JetBlue’s IPO was able to instill 
new hope in an industry sector that was otherwise devastated by the events 
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of 9/11. We do not consider United Airlines and US Airways since they 
weathered financial difficulties and eventually filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11  during our sample period. American Airlines, 
too, came very close to filing for Chapter 1 1.  
Adjusting for Risk: The use of Beta as a Measure of Systematic Risk 
In considering risk changes, we calculate beta, the part of a firm’s risk 
that is related to changes in the market. Beta is a measure of systematic risk, 
the risk that investors must be compensated for, and, thus, is related to a 
firm’s cost of capital. If 9/11 led to the airline industry being a more risky 
business, we would expect the betas of airline stocks to increase after 9/11. 
The calculation of each airline’s beta, can be found from the following 
formula: 
Where: 
cOv(r; ’ ) is the covariance between firm i’s returns and returns on 
the market; and 
is the variance of market returns. 
Cornell, Hirshleifer, and James (1997) reviewed several practical issues 
in beta selection and the application of regression-based asset-pricing models 
to estimating equity cost of capital. They provide assistance for resolving 
many of the conventional problems with beta estimation, such as selection of 
the risk-free rate, the time period for estimation, and the inclusion or 
exclusion of dividends. 
Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) perform direct statistical comparisons 
of beta estimates calculated by large financial data vendors such as 
Bloomberg, Compustat, Dow Jones, and Ibbotson, They find that the 
different procedures used by these commercial services produce the same 
results when simple tests of differences of means are used to evaluate them. 
They observe that most data vendors use ordinary least squares regressions 
of the returns of the firm against those of the market, where the security’s 
return serves as the dependent variable, and the independent variable is a 
user-selected index. They point out, however, that users of financial software 
packages typically have some flexibility and can select the time period for 
estimation, the market index against which they want to measure returns, the 
data frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), and whether they want to 
include dividends or not. 
Because the fmance literature is divided on the issue whether short-term 
or long-term estimates should be used in CAPM estimation, we use a rolling 
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window of both 60 and 360 calendar day returns to calculate covariances and 
variances. Although there is no consensus on what time period should be 
used to estimate beta, most authors and financial data vendors use long-term 
betas calculated over periods of three and more years. However, given the 
limited data availability for young firms such as JetBlue and the rapidly 
changing environment for the airline industry, we found short-term estimates 
to be more appropriate. 
Expected Market Returns: Historical versus Prospective Estimates 
Before we can address the question of how we estimate expected market 
returns, we have to define what we mean by market. In his famous critique 
of CAPM testing, Richard Roll (1977) indicates that the market portfolio to 
be used in CAPM estimation should contain all financial and non-financial 
assets available to investors and states that an accurate test of the CAPM will 
never be possible because of this requirement. 
Despite Roll’s criticism, most authors and financial data services use 
only U.S. common stocks to proxy for the market portfolio and rely heavily 
on the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index to represent the market. 
Because Taylor and Paolone (1997) and Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) 
observe that the power of the regressions producing the betas improve 
noticeably when a broader market index than the S&P 500 is used, we 
decided to use the CRSP value-weighted market index for calculating both 
our beta estimates and market returns. The CRSP value weights index 
covers more than 10,000 publicly traded U.S. firms, and is extensively used 
in the financial literature. 
Furthermore, when developing an estimate of the expected market return 
E(R,,J, one has to decide whether to use historical data, assuming that past 
performance is the best predictor of future performance, or make an attempt 
to forecast a return for the market, which would require an accurate estimate 
of future dividend growth. As with most other studies in this field, we do not 
consider ourselves wise enough to forecast future market returns, but rather 
we rely on past returns as an estimate of future returns. Another question we 
had to address in our estimation was which time period to use to calculate 
past market returns. Given the fact that both the events of 9/11 and JetBlue’s 
IPO occurred relatively recently and that our return data after both events is 
limited, we decided to use the geometric average of market returns during 
the past 360 calendar days as an estimate of future market returns. To test the 
robustness of our results, we also calculated 60-calendar-day returns, but 
arrived at the same conclusions as we did with our long-term estimates. 
In a long-term study of historical market risk premiums, Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield (1976) find that the average risk premium for the S&P 500 index 
during the period from 1929 to 1976 was about 8.4 percent. During our 
sample period from January 1996 to April 2003, we find a similar market 
risk premium of 8.15 percent. A closer examination reveals, however, that 
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the market risk premium pre-9/11 was 14.9 percent, influenced in part by the 
booming economy during the 1990s and the 199912000 stock market bubble, 
and that it dropped to - 19.4 percent after 91 1 1. 
RESULTS 
Accounting Performance 
The first part of our analysis focuses on the relative performance of 
JetBlue and its competitors from an accounting standpoint, by comparing 
various accounting measures and financial ratios for the four firms over time. 
An analysis of the stock performance of the four airlines follows in the next 
section. 
Table 1. Selected accounting data and financial ratios for selected airlines, 
2000-2003 
Time Period 2000 200 1 2002 2003-Ql 
Panel A: JetBlue 
Total Revenue ($M) 104.6 320.4 635.2 217.1 
Net Income ($M) (21.3) 38.5 54.9 17.4 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.7 1 .0 1.0 
Quick Ratio 0.6 0.7 1 .0 1 .0 
Return on Assets (ROA) -6.2% 5.7% 4.0% 4.8% * 
Return on Equity (ROE) n.m. n.m. 13.2% 16.0% * 
Profit Margin n.m. n.m. 8.6% 8.0% 
Asset Turnover Ratio 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 * 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 4.8 15.4 43.0 47.3 * 
Interest Coverage Ratio -6.4 7.9 5.5 5.9 
Panel B: Southwest Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 5,649.6 5,555.2 5,521.8 1.35 1.0 
Net Income ($M) 
Current Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Profit Margin 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
603.1 
0.6 
0.6 
9.0% 
17.5% 
10.7% 
0.8 
34.0 
15.6 
511.1 241.0 
1.1 1.6 
1.1  1.4 
5.7% 2.7% 
12.7% 5.4% 
9.2% 4.4% 
0.6 0.6 
47.2 31.7 
12.9 5.4 
24.0 
1.5 
1.4 
1.2% * 
2.0% * 
1.8% 
0.5 * 
37.0 * 
3.1 
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Table 1. Selected accounting data and financial ratios for selected airlines, 
2000-2003 (continued) 
Time Period 2000 2001 2002 2003-41 
Panel C: Continental Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 9,899.0 8,969.0 8,402.0 nla 
Net Income ($M) 
Current Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Profit Margin 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 
342.0 
0.8 
0.7 
3.7% 
29.5% 
3.5% 
1.1 
15.7 
(95.0) 
0.7 
0.6 
- I  .O% 
-8.2% 
-1 .1% 
0.9 
15.0 
(441.0) 
0.8 
0.7 
-4. I %  
-57.5% 
-5.2% 
0.8 
15.5 
n/a 
nla 
nla 
n/a 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.3 0.6 -0.9 nla 
Panel D: Northwest Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 11,415.0 9,905.0 9,489.0 nla 
Net Income ($M) 256.0 (423.0) (798.0) n/a 
Current Ratio 0.6 0.9 0.8 nla 
Quick Ratio 0.5 0.8 0.8 nla 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.4% -3.3% -6.0% n/a 
Return on Equity (ROE) 1 10.8% n.m. n.m. nla 
Profit Margin 2.2% n.m. n.m. nla 
Asset Turnover Ratio 1 .o 0.8 0.7 nla 
Accounts Receivable nla 
Turnover Ratio 17.8 15.6 12.4 
Interest Coverage Ratio 2.2 -1.0 -2.0 nla 
n.m. =not meaningful 
* = annualized 
Note: We used income statements from quarterly company reports, 1.e. I O Q  tilings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission which are available online through the SEC’s “Edgar 
Online” database (http://www.edgar-online.com), to calculate all ratios. First quarter-2003 data 
was not yet available for Continental and Northwest at the time of our analysis. Whenever 
meaningful for comparison purposes, we annualized (Le., projected) the first-quarter-2003 ratios 
for JetBlue and Southwest for the entire year. 
The accounting figures and financial ratios in Table 1 are based on 
quarterly IO-Q filings from January 2000 to the present. As we can see, 
JetBlue managed to grow revenues and net income consistently during our 
sample period despite 9/11. SWA managed to remain profitable on slightly 
declining sales, while Continental and Northwest registered significant 
losses on falling revenues. 
JetBlue’s liquidity ratios (current ratio and quick ratio) are mostly below 
those of SWA, but exceed those of Continental and Northwest. The 
profitability ratios [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
profit margin] of JetBlue are comparatively healthy after 9/1 I ,  although they 
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remain below the profitability levels that SWA showed in 2000 before 9/11. 
SWA experienced a considerable decline in its profitability after 911 1, while 
Continental and Northwest show very strong signs of weakening. 
JetBlue’s activity ratios (asset turnover and accounts receivable 
turnover) increased significantly during our sample period, while they 
deteriorated somewhat for the other three airlines. JetBlue remains well able 
to cover its interest expenses, as is reflected by its interest coverage ratio that 
remains well above 5 after 9/11. While SWA’s interest coverage ratio drops 
significantly during our sample period (from 15.6 in 2000 to 5.4 in 2002), 
the financial impact of 9/11 on Continental and Northwest’s ability to make 
their interest payments is tremendous: both airlines have negative ratios in 
2002, indicating that both airlines have significant difficulties making their 
interest payments. 
Stock Performance 
In order to examine whether investors put more confidence into low-cost 
carriers such as SWA than into airlines that follow a conventional-cost 
model such as Continental or Northwest, we examine the stock price 
performance of the three airlines in the aftermath of 9/11. In particular, we 
examine how the industry reacted to JetBlue’s highly successful IPO on 
April 12, 2002, in which JetBlue’s stock soared about 67 percent during its 
first day of trading in an otherwise uneventful IPO year. Table 2 presents 
quarterly and yearly returns for the four airlines and the market as proxied by 
the CRSP value weighted market index. 
The data clearly show the impact of 911 1 on the airline industry and the 
market. We observe a highly negative return for the airlines and the market 
index during the third quarter of 2001, followed by six quarters of high 
volatility when compared to the pre-9/11 period. Continental was hardest hit 
during the third quarter of 2001 and most of 2002, while SWA 
underperformed the market to a much lesser extent. 
Since the returns in Table 2 are not adjusted for risk, we cannot yet draw 
any conclusions about the significance of these performance differences. To 
measure differences in risk levels between the airlines and examine how 
those risk levels changed after 911 I ,  we calculate beta coefficients for the 
airlines pre-9/11 and post-9/11. The resulting beta estimates are presented in 
Table 3.  
Panel A presents our beta estimates for two subperiods: ( I )  fiom 
January I ,  2000, to September I O ,  2001 (pre 9/1 I ) ;  and (2) fiom the 
resumption of trading on September 17,2001, to March 3 I ,  2003 (post 9/1 I ) .  
For JetBlue, we started our estimation from the closing price on its first day 
of trading on April 12, 2002. In Panel B, we report test results for the 
equality of means and medians across groups: p-values are reported for the 
significance of difference in means and Mann-Whitney p-values are reported 
for Mann-Whitney tests for the significance of difference in medians. These 
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tests are based on 60-day trailing betas calculated for each firm. Although 
not reported here, we also calculated betas using longer estimation periods. 
We observe similar, highly significant increases in systematic risk for our 
long-term estimates. 
Table 2. Quarterly and yearly return data, for selected airlines, 2000-2003 
JetBlue South- North- Market 
Quarter west Continental west Index ** 
2000-4 1 nla 29.13% -7.89% 1.66% 2.65% 
* 
2000-42 nla -8.97% 15.02% 34.57% -3.17% 
2000-43 nla 28.04% -3.36% -19.32% -0.88% 
2000-44 nla 38.34% 13.62% 22.64% -8.42% 
nla 20.12% 3.86% 7.87% -2.54% 2000 Total 
200 1 -4 1 n/a -20.58% -19.81% -24.90% -10.81% 
200 1-42 nla 4.18% 18.96% 11.63% 5.36% 
200 1-43 nla -19.73% -69.54% -54.81% -14.49% 
200 1-44 nla 24.58% 74.73% 37.60% 9.43% 
nla -4.63% -15.59% -15.03% -3.16% 200 1 Total 
2002-4 1 nla 4.72% 8.05% 2 1.46% 0.48% 
2002-42 nla -16.46% -44.28% -36.76% -13.29% 
2002-43 - 1  1.46% -19.14% -65.84% -44.61% -16.98% 
2002-44 0.4 1% 6.44% 34.51% 9.88% 8.41% 
-5.71% -6.85% -27.48% -17.3 1% -5.90% 2002 Total 
2003-QI 2.63% 3.38% -29.38% -5.99% -3.57% 
JetBlue went public on April 12, 2002. Thus, quarterly return data is not available until the third 
quarter (43) of 2002. 
** Quarterly and yearly return data on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value- 
weighted market index. Calculations are performed using daily closing price data obtained from 
the CRSP from the University of  Chicago Graduate School o f  Business database 
(http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp). All returns are adjusted for dividends and stock 
splits. 
Not surprisingly, we find that the beta coefficients of SWA, Continental, 
and Northwest increased considerably after 911 1.  We tested whether the 
increase was significant using a standard t-test for differences in means and a 
Mann-Whitney test for the significance of differences in medians. Although 
the beta of SWA increased less than that of Continental and Northwest, we 
find that all increases are significant at the one percent confidence level. 
JetBlue’s beta, calculated from price data available after its IPO, is only 
0.72, well below the betas of SWA ( I .  14), Continental (2.19) and Northwest 
(1.71). 
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To calculate how the returns compare between the airlines after 
adjusting for risk, we employed event study methodology and calculated the 
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for each airline before and after 
JetBlue’s IPO in a CAPM framework. Table 4 provides an overview of the 
data that were used to calculate expected returns. We used 90-day U.S. 
Treasury Bill rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate and historical market 
returns based on 60 and 360 calendar days to forecast expected market 
returns. The last row of Table 4 provides the standard deviation of our 
estimates, indicating that the short-term estimates are significantly more 
volatile than long-term historical returns. 
Table 3. Differences in risk levels between selected airlines, before and after 
September 11,2001 
JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest 
Panel A: Estimated Beta Coefficients 
Pre-9il I nla 0.77 0.73 1.01 
Post-91 1 1 0.72 1.14 2.19 1.71 
Panel B: Tests for Equality Across Groups 
p-value n/a 0.001 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 
MW p-value nia 0.002 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 
* Signilicant at the one percent confidence level 
Note: We estimate beta coefficients for the four airlines in our sample as 
p, = cov( q ,  y, ) / g:, where cov( r, , r, ) is the covariance between the returns of firm i 
and the returns on the market, and 0: is the variance of market returns. We use daily returns 
based on adjusted price data of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value- 
weighted market index to proxy for market returns and price data for individual firms that has 
been adjusted for dividends and stock splits (http:llgsbwvw.uchicago.edu/research/crsp), 
~ 
We base our calculations on weekly 3-month Treasury Security indexes 
as calculated by the Treasury Department and reported by the Federal 
Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15). Since August 2 1, 
2000, the Federal Reserve’s Publication H. 15 no longer reports yield data for 
the 13-week (3-month) US. Treasury Bills’ auction average. Starting from 
this date, we use Treasury security yields adjusted to a constant maturity of 3 
months, as provided by the Treasury’s Public Debt Web site 
(http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov). In our later estimations, we calculate 
historical market returns as the geometric average of daily market returns 
during the previous 60 (360) calendar days. These returns are used as a 
forecast of the expected market return in our CAPM estimation. All returns 
below are aggregated by quarter and are not those actually used in our 
estimation. We also report the standard deviation for each column. In the 
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case of Treasury Bills, the standard deviation is based on weekly data; for all 
other series we report the standard deviation for daily returns. 
Table 4. Return estimates used in the capital asset pricing model, by quarter, 
I 
2000-2003 
Average 90-Day Market Return Market Return 
Treasury-Bill During Previous During Previous 
Quarter Rate 60 Days 12 Months 
2000-4 1 5.72% 7.99% 14.42% 
2000-Q2 5.68% 24.26% 13.07% 
2000-Q4 5.84% -2 I .  8 1 YO 4.65% 
2000-43 6.21% 12.46% 10.81% 
2000 Average 5.86% 5.72% 10.74% 
2001-Q 1 4.32% - 14.2 1 % -6.50% 
200 1 -Q2 3.55% 4.21% - 14.77% 
200 1-03 2.39% -23.29% -17.73% 
200 1-Q4 1.73% -8.01% -2 1.42% 
2001 Average 3.00% - 10.32% - 15.10% 
2002-4 1 1.82% 13.03% - 12.72% 
2002-42 1.71% -12.87% -9.68% 
2002-43 1.65% -45.61% -20.45% 
2002-44 1.18% 22.12% - 17.66% 
2002 Average 1.59% -5.83% - I 5.13% 
2003-4 1 1.17% - 19.63% -22.25% 
St. Dev. 1.56% 45.80% 2 1.20% 
Note: This table presents quarterly summary statistics for the variables used in our estimation of 
the capital asset pricing model. 
Table 5 presents non-risk-adjusted returns of the airlines for various 
time periods after 4ii i and JetBiue’s PO. We observe tinat aii airiines were 
negatively impacted by the events of 9/11, with Continental performing the 
worst, losing over 49 percent on the first trading day following 9/11 and over 
89 percent within 18 months of 911 1. In comparison, SWA lost only 24 
percent on the first trading day after 9/11 and about 27 percent within 18 
months. All airlines show a medium-term recovery three to six months after 
9/11, with SWA actually registering a 16 percent gain during that period. 
When examining the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s successful 
IPO, we find that all airlines showed sizable gains on JetBlue’s IPO date. 
Within one year of its IPO, JetBlue held on to most of its first-day gains and 
dropped only 2.9 percent from its closing price on April 12, 2002. All other 
airlines performed considerably poorer, with Continental still being the 
hardest hit. Thus, while creating some short-term euphoria for the airline 
industry, JetBlue’s IPO does not appear to have taken investors’ eyes off the 
long-term effects of 9/11 that continued to erode investor confidence in the 
airline industry following JetBlue’s IPO. 
54 Journal ofAir Transportation 
Table 5. Non-risk-adjusted returns following JetBlue’s initial public offering, 
April 12,2002 -April 12,2003 
Time 
Elapsed JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest Market 
1 Day 66.7% * 5.0% 5.9% 4.4% 0.7% 
2 Weeks -0.3% 0.3% -3.8% 2.1% -1.0% 
1 Month 4.9% -8.4% -24.0% -16.1% -4.4% 
2 Months 8.0% -7.0% -29.8% - 19.8% -7.8% 
3 Months -6.3% -26.1% -55.9% -47.5% -15.7% 
6 Months -20.7% -33.4% -84.3% -69.5% -26.7% 
I Year -2.9% -19.1% -77.8% -64.7% - 18.9% 
JetBlue’s 66.8% return on its first day of trading represents its Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
underpricing level, that it, it is measured relative to the IPO offering price. The long-term (Le., 2 
weeks to I year) return calculations for JetBlue do not include this underpricing but are 
calculated relati\e to JetBlue‘s closing price on its first da) of trading (April 12, 2002). The 
returns are adjusted for stock splits and dividends, but not for risk 
Table 6. Risk-adjusted returns using short term estimates, following JetBlue’s 
initial public offering, April 12,2001, to April 12,2002 
JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest Time Elapsed 
2 Weeks d a  * -4.65% -8.88% -0.33% 
1 Month nla * -8.19% -23.73% - 12.26% 
2 Months nla * - 12.79% -46.44% -28.44% 
3 Months - I 4.4 1 Yo -29.90% -86.83% -63.79% 
6 Months -36.85% -25.16% -168.00% * *  -1O5.09% ** 
1 Year 6.70% -0.51% -96.89% -62.44% 
The risk-adjusted short-term returns cannot be calculated for JetBlue because we require 60 
days of past performance to estimate JetBlue’s beta. 
** Returns of less than -100% appear nonsensical at first, but may occur in a risk-adjusted 
cumulative return context. 
Note: This table presents risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns during various time periods 
following JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) on April 12, 2002. We calculate daily 
abnormal returns as the difference between actual returns observed on each trading day minus 
expected returns based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The results in this table 
represent a shorr-rum approach to estimating the variables for the CAPM: we use 60-calender- 
duy trailing betas for each firm and estimate market risk premiums by using 60-calender-day 
historical returns on the Center for Research on Security Prices value-weighted market index 
minus interpolated average yields on 90-day Treasury Bills during each week. 
Table 6 presents risk-adjusted returns following 911 1 using 60-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums estimated using 60-day historical 
returns. Although negative in the short run, we find that the risk-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for SWA are positive in the medium 
and long run (2 to 18 months after 9/11). Although Continental and 
Northwest show some positive CARs in the medium term (3 to 6 months 
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after 911 I), they become negative in the long run. Following JetBlue’s IPO, 
we find that JetBlue and SWA again outperformed Continental and 
Northwest, with JetBlue actually having positive CARS within one year of its 
IPO. 
Table 7 presents a long-term approach for estimating the inputs in our 
CAPM model. Here, we calculate risk-adjusted retums by using 360-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums based on 360-day historical returns. 
The results are similar to those presented in Table 6. SWA outperforms 
Continental and Northwest on a risk-adjusted basis after 911 1 and after 
JetBlue’s IPO. 
Table 7. Risk-adjusted returns using long-term estimates, following JetBlue’s 
initial public offering, April 12,2001, to April 12, 2002 
Time Elapsed JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest 
2 Weeks n/a * -5.06% -9.5 1 Yo - 1.48% 
1 Month n/a * -7.94% -23.35% -12.47% 
2 Months n/a * -12.27% -45.28% -28.08% 
3 Months n/a * -30.59% -86.87% -64.54% 
6 Months n/a * -32.58% -175.21% ** -113.25% ** 
1 Year nla * -4.95% -98.08% -64.54% 
Note that the risk-adjusted long-term returns cannot be calculated for JetBlue because we 
require 360 days of past performance to estimate JetBlue‘s beta. 
** Returns of less than -100% appear nonsensical at first, but may occur in a risk-adjusted 
cumulative return context. 
Note: This table presents risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns during various time periods 
following JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) on April 12, 2002. We calculate daily 
abnormal returns as the difference between actual returns observed on each trading day minus 
expec!ed i e h m s  hsed on !he c~pi!.! ISSP! pricing mode! (CAPM) The rezults in this table 
represent a long-/erm approach to estimating the variables for the CAPM: we use 360-calender- 
day trailing betas for each firm and estimate market risk premiums by using 360-calender-day 
historical returns on the Center for Research on Security Prices value-weighted market index 
minus interpolated average yields on 90-day Treasury Bills during each week. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the fact that JetBlue has been an innovative operation 
and, as the numbers and our analysis shows, quite successfd, will it be able 
to maintain its success, in the future, through long periods of sustained 
growth? What would it take for JetBlue to meet its growth targets while 
maintaining productivity and flexibility? These questions cannot be 
successfully answered without an appropriate passage of time that will 
ultimately validate JetBlue’s model. 
We explain JetBlue’s overall success (and that of other low-cost 
carriers) from an operational standpoint through its lower and more variable 
cost structure, its lower breakeven load factor, and the business and leisure 
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traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines to low-cost airlines. Our 
financial analysis substantiates this point to its fullest. We find that markets 
value low-cost airline stocks as growth stocks, whereas conventional-cost 
airline stocks are treated as cyclical. Even though affected, low-cost carriers 
emerged after 9/11 in a stronger market position than their conventional-cost 
rivals. From a management standpoint, we believe that adopting a viable 
strategic position, leveraging organizational capabilities, and re-conceiving 
the value equation are critical in defining the comparative advantage of low- 
cost carriers. 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the arguments against deregulation of the airline industry has been the 
possibility that financially troubled carriers would be tempted to lower line 
maintenance spending, thus lowering maintenance quality and decreasing the overall 
safety of the carrier. Given the financial crisis triggered by the events of 9/11: it 
appears to be a good time to revisit this issue. This paper examines the quality of 
airline line maintenance activity and examines the impact of maintenance spending 
on maintenance quality and overall safety. Findings indicate that increased 
maintenance spending is associated with increased line maintenance activity and 
increased overall safety quality for the major U.S. carriers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the key concerns of opponents of airline deregulation in the U.S. 
was that once carriers were fiee to compete based on the price of their goods 
rather than on the quality of their service, the quality of their safety would 
decline as the pressure to reduce costs increased (Lee, 1996; Rose, 1992). 
The question of safety quality in the airline industry has provoked intense 
debate over issues as basic as the definition of safety quality itself and as 
complex as the relationship between safety and financial performance. In 
the wake of 9/11, there is not only renewed interest in airline safety quality, 
but concern that financially troubled carriers burdened with additional 
security expenses might be forced to reduce safety spending and line 
maintenance activity. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of 
maintenance spending and line maintenance activity in the production of 
airline safety quality. 
Background 
Prior to 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated both airline 
service quality and airline safety quality, establishing minimum standards for 
both. With the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, U.S. 
airlines were free to determine market entry and exit, flight frequency, 
aircraft type, capacity, aircraft configuration, and the level of amenities 
provided (e.g., meals, entertainment, and seat pitch), based on market forces. 
Establishing minimum standards and auditing for compliance is one of 
several ways to define and measure service quality. An airline survey such 
as those conducted by the publishers of Frequent Flyer and Conde Nast 
Traveler is another way. These surveys typically ask a cross-section of 
frequent flyers tu rank airtines on key issues of custoiiiei sziisfaction. 
Questions generally address the following ten factors of customer 
satisfaction: on-time performance, airport check-in, schedule/flight 
accommodations, seating comfort, gate location, aircraft interior, flight 
attendants, post-flight services, food services, and frequent flyer programs 
(Glab, 1998). While these surveys are an important source of information, it 
is difficult to compare the results of different surveys or to examine trends 
over time to gain a historical perspective of airline service quality. Aside 
from the quality awards created by the airlines themselves (e.g., the Grand 
Slam or Triple Crown), the most common method of defining and examining 
airline service quality is to use the results of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) monthly publication, Air Travel Consumer Report. 
This publication contains information on flight delays, mishandled baggage, 
over-sold flights, and consumer complaints filed with the DOT. In 1991, the 
Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha began using this 
data in its Airline Qualify Rating (AQR) report (Bowen & Headley, 1991). 
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This report also includes key indicators of safety quality as well as financial 
stability. Unlike the survey method, the AQR and other studies using the 
data from the Air Travel Consumer Report have been criticized for focusing 
on basic service quality issues rather than the amenities (e.g., seating comfort 
and food service) that form a larger component of the typical survey 
(Perkins, 1998). The advantages of the Air Travel Consumer Report are its 
consistent historical reporting of data and public availability. 
While airlines were now free to determine their own level of service 
quality, safety continues to be regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). The FAA has authority to establish Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) relating to: a) the design, manufacturing, and 
certification of aircraft, including their engines and other systems; b) the 
certification of airlines; and c) the certification of personnel who directly 
affect the safe operation of the aircraft, including pilots and mechanics. The 
National Aviation Safety Inspection Program was created to conduct focused 
inspections of airlines and maintenance facilities to insure compliance with 
all FARs. However, “there is also universal acknowledgement that full 
compliance with applicable safety regulation cannot be ascertained with 
existing or conventional methods of compliance surveillance” (Ozdener, 
2000). Researchers have variously defined safety quality in terms of fatal 
accidents, accident rate and/or incident rate. Proxy measures of safety 
quality include operating profit margin, maintenance expenditure, and 
inspection results (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Kanafani & Keeler, 1989; Rose, 
1989; 1990; 1992). 
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), there are four 
factors that affect the safe operation of airlines: a) financial stability, b) 
maintenance quality, c) management attitude, and d) pilot competence 
(GAO, 1988; 1996). While pilot competence and managerial attitude have 
been cited in antidotal reports of accident investigation, there is little 
empirical data examining this link. One company, Flightsafe Consultants 
Ltd., does attempt to assess management effort as it relates to safety, but the 
assessment is subjective and not available to the public (Pasztor & Michaels, 
2004). Research on the relationship between safety and overall financial 
performance has been mixed (Graham & Bowes, 1979; Kanafani & Keeler, 
1989; Lee, 1996; Moses & Savage, 1990; Rose, 1990;1992). The most 
commonly used measure of safety quality has been the level of maintenance 
expenditures, although this raw number can be misleading. Airline 
maintenance spending levels can be affected by a number of factors 
including the age of the aircraft in the fleet, the type and mix of aircraft, and 
the level of outsourcing (GAO, 1988; O’Toole, 1992). In short, to 
understand the issue of maintenance spending it is necessary to understand 
the nature of airline maintenance programs. 
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In an effort to maintain a comfortable degree of safety, a scheduled 
maintenance program is established for each transport category aircraft. For 
large aircraft, such a program is a process that can take up to five years to 
complete, and requires very close coordination between the aircraft 
manufacturer and operator (Hessburg, 200 1). 
The advent of modem scheduled maintenance programs began in the 
late 1960s with the Boeing 747. The sophistication and operating capabilities 
of the Boeing 747’s aircraft systems and engines reached a point where 
maintenance programs currently in place were no longer considered 
effective. The Air Transport Association (ATA) created a Maintenance 
Steering Group (MSG) consisting of representatives of ATA-member 
airlines. This group created a document that became known as MSG-1. 
MSG- 1 was process-and-procedures oriented. MSG- 1 was soon followed by 
MSG-2, which was used with both the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and the 
Lockheed L- I O  1 1 aircraft. 
With the development of more sophisticated aircraft utilizing higher 
performance engines, glass cockpits, and advanced materials, the MSG-3 
was introduced. The MSG-3 is a task-oriented rather than process-and- 
procedure-oriented document. Originally intended for the Boeing 757 and 
767, MSG-3 has undergone three revisions, the latest including the Boeing 
777 (Friend, 1997; Hessburg, 200 1 ; Transportation Systems Consulting 
Corporation, 1999). 
The actual purpose of MSG-3 is to establish the methodology that will 
be used to prepare the maintenance plan for a particular aircraft. An Industry 
Steering Committee (ISC) and various working groups are then established 
to create the plan. The purpose of the ISC is to oversee the activities of the 
working groups, each of which are composed of specialists in the various 
systems such as avionics, mechanical systems, structures, engines, and flight 
controls (Hessburg, 2001). The working groups in turn determine 
Maintenance Specific Items (MSIs) and specific tasks for their inspection 
and maintenance (Friend, 1997). Close cooperation between the regulatory 
agencies, the manufacturer, and the airlines is essential throughout the 
process. 
The key to the process occurs early with a listing of the MSIs, that is, 
items that require specific inspections as determined by the appropriate 
specialists. After the list of MSIs has been determined, an analysis-known 
as decision tree logic-is performed on each item, with the key function 
being to differentiate between safety-related failure and economic failure. 
Servicing and maintenance requirements are determined at this time and 
include checks, inspections, lubrication, and when to discard. These 
requirements-known as tasks-are studied to the point where maintenance 
intervals can be defined in units of time called intervals. Intervals may 
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include hours, cycles, and calendars. The final product of the ISC and 
working groups are specific maintenance recommendations that include a list 
of items, tasks, and intervals. These recommendations are then presented to 
an FAA Maintenance Review Board that has approval authority, after which 
the necessary documents are developed (Hessburg, 200 I).  
The primary focus in aircraft maintenance, according to the FAA, is to 
provide continued airworthiness. Part 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) prescribes airworthiness standards for the issuance of type certificates 
for Transport Category aircraft. The essence of the FAA regulation is that 
the instructions for continued airworthiness for each aircraft must contain 
inspection and maintenance information for not only the airframe, but also 
for every part of the aircraft, for example, appliances, engines, and propellers 
Continued airworthiness data are typically in the form of manuals in paper, 
microfilm, microfiche, and/or CD-ROM format and organized in a specific 
manner. There will be general descriptions of the aircraft and its systems, 
basic operation of components and systems, servicing information regarding 
lubrication and capacities, troubleshooting information, methods of 
removing and replacing components, testing procedures, and specific details 
relating to inspections, maintenance, and servicing (FAA, 2003). Once the 
complete inspection package is developed, it is submitted to the FAA for 
approval. An FAA approved inspection program is then implemented as 
specified and takes the form of a number of different processes. 
AlRCRAFT INSPECTIONS 
For large aircraft, inspections fall into two broad categories: scheduled 
and special. Scheduled inspections include service checks, letter checks, 
phased checks, and calendar checks. The composition, scheduling, and even 
the titles of each inspection will vary with each operator. Regardless of the 
method used, the objectives behind such inspection programs are both safety 
and to increase aircraft availability. 
Special inspection programs are the other major category of inspections 
performed on transport category aircraft, and, essentially, supplement 
existing scheduled programs. Special inspection programs-often the result 
of new technology or accidentslincidents-are approved by the FAA and 
coordinated with the aircraft and/or engine manufacturer. Aging aircraft 
inspections, corrosion control programs, Extended Twin-Engine Operations, 
low aircraft utilization, and Global Position Systems for navigation, are all 
cases where special inspection programs are utilized (Hessburg, 200 1). 
Scheduled Inspections 
The most basic of the scheduled inspections is the service check. A 
service check includes checking and replenishing fluids, and inspecting for 
apparent deterioration, damage and security. These cursory inspections are 
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made at certain times during an aircraft’s operating day. These inspections 
are made by line personnel, rather than by certificated technicians and are 
called, depending on their purpose, such names as preflight, throughflight, 
postflight, and overnight. Service checks are accomplished according to 
calendar time or flight hours depending on the requirements of the inspection 
program. 
The most widely known type of inspections are the A-D letter checks, 
with an A Check being the most basic and frequent, and a D Check being the 
most comprehensive. All of these checks are accomplished at specified 
maintenance stations with the lower checks being accomplished along the 
route structure and the higher checks at a major maintenance base. The 
detailed and idiosyncratic nature of an inspection program is such that some 
items, for example on a B Check, may be accomplished every second or 
third check rather then each time a B Check is performed. Letter checks, as 
well as all other approved inspection programs, are customized to both the 
aircraft as well as the operator. 
The A Check involves more detailed inspection than a service check, 
and focuses on servicing and periodic inspections of certain components on a 
daily basis. Some special tools and test equipment are required and the 
technicians performing them will have appropriate certifications. Fluid 
checks, system operations, and Built-in Test Equipment are all common with 
A Checks. A Checks typically occur twice per month, take 36 labor hours, 
and keep the aircraft out of service for approximately 12 hours (Hessburg, 
2001) The B Check, which is no longer employed in many inspection 
programs, involves more in-depth servicing and testing. When performed, a 
B Check will take up to a 40 hour labor week to complete, are accomplished 
every four months or so, and keep the aircraft out of service for up to 12 
consecutive scheduled flight hours (Hessburg, 200 1). Items formerly 
performed in this type of check have been incorporated into either A Checks 
or C Checks. 
The two remaining letter checks (C and D) are known as heavy checks 
and involve extensive inspection, testing, tools, and training. The C Check is 
the most common heavy check and is typically performed every 12 months 
or so. C Checks require approximately 450 labor hours and keep the aircraft 
out of service for as much as four days (Hessburg, 2001). Typical tasks 
performed during a C Check include detail visual inspections, specified 
systems hnctional testing, and major component lubrication. The most in- 
depth scheduled inspection is the D Check, which is predominately a major 
structural inspection designed to detect corrosion and fatigue failure through 
the use of sophisticated techniques such as Non-Destructive Testing. D 
Checks require as much as 1,500 labor hours and take a week or more to 
complete (Hessburg, 2001). Most operators have discontinued the D Check 
and have incorporated the various tasks into C Check intervals. An example 
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would be to inspect wing attached bolts every eighth C Check (or 16,000 
flight hours). It is also important to note that each higher check includes all 
lower checks; for example, technicians performing a C Check would include 
items in both A Checks and B Checks as well as various service items. 
A common way to distribute items contained in the heavy checks is to 
utilize a phased inspection program. A phase check is where parts of C 
Checks and D Checks are incorporated into lower A Checks and B Checks. 
For example, an inspection item scheduled to be performed in a C Check 
(which is typically performed every year or approximately 1,600 flight 
hours), will be incorporated into a B Check. While it will lengthen the B 
Check by perhaps a few hours, it will still only need to be performed once 
per year and the next B Check will include another part of the C Check. 
Over the period of a year, each C Check item is completed only once and the 
aircraft will not be out of service for the typical four consecutive days 
required for a complete C Check. When establishing a scheduled 
maintenance plan, the MSG will essentially describe tasks and intervals. 
The actual packaging of the inspection program into logical groupings is 
determined by the operator. 
Service Difficulty Reports 
Under 14 CFR section 121.703 and 135.415 of Title 14 (Code of 
Federal Regulations available at www.gpoaaccess.gov/cfr/index.html) each 
holder of an airworthiness certificate must submit “reports on certain 
failures, malfunctions or defects of specific systems and on all other failures, 
malfunctions, or defects that, in the opinion of the certificate holder, have 
endangered or may endanger the safe operation of the aircraft.” These 
difficulties may be discovered during the course of operations, or during 
inspections. Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) are the publicly available 
record of line maintenance activity performed at repair stations, both those 
directly managed by the airline itself and outsource repair stations. This data 
are a key source of safety information for FAA inspectors as well as 
manufacturers interested in issues relating to the reliability and problems 
encountered with aircraft components. 
Regulations require certificate holders to report specifically on matter 
relating to: a) a fire or fire warning system, b) an engine exhaust system, c) 
any aircraft component that causes the circulation of smoke or harmful 
vapors, d) any engine flameout or shutdown, e) a propeller feathering 
system, f) a hel-dumping system, g) a landing gear system, h) a breaking 
system, i) any component or system that results in a rejected takeoff or 
emergency action, j )  any emergency evacuation system or component, and k) 
the autothrottle, autoflight or flight control system. 14 CFR section 12 1-704 
deals with reporting related to structural defects or failures. These reports 
must specify the nature of the problem and the action taken. They must also 
identify any precautionary or emergency measures (called procedures) taken 
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to address the problems in question citing the categories above for reference 
(Rohrbach, 2004). From a glance at the above categories and those listed 
below for reportable procedures, the safety implications behind such actions 
as engine shutdown or a failure in the landing gear should be reasonably 
clear. 
The reported data are entered and compiled into a database for weekly 
distribution to aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, repair stations, and the 
general aviation community. The raw data in the SDRs are available to the 
public through the FAA Web site (www.faa.gov) or other related Web sites 
such as www.landings.com. The FAA Aeronautical Center uses these 
reports to identify trends and significant safety issues. Based on this review 
of the database, the FAA may propose changes to existing procedures after 
due comment and may then issue an airworthiness directive or service 
bulletin. 
In this study, we examined SDR history for the major U.S. carriers in 
order to understand the relationship between this measure of line 
maintenance activity (quality), maintenance spending, and safety outcomes, 
namely the number of procedures reflected on the SDRs. The historical 
nature of the data on the SDRs, their public availability, and close link to 
safety-related problems in maintenance appear to make them an excellent 
proxy for safety-related maintenance activity. Specifically, we wished to 
determine whether maintenance spending does improve the quality of line 
maintenance activity as reflected in the SDRs. 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
Data on safety outcomes were gathered from the FAA safety databases 
on accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collision. These data and the 
annual number of departures per carrier are contained in work previously 
conducted by Rhoades and Waguespack (1999; 2000; 2001). Data on line 
maintenance activity were collected from the Web site www.landings.com, 
which obtains the publicly available information directly from the FAA. 
Information collected included the total number of yearly SDRs filed and the 
total number of procedures by category. The categories are: a) unscheduled 
landing, b) aborted takeoff, c) aborted landing, d) engine shutdown, e) 
emergency descent, f, return to blocks, and g) deployment of emergency 
oxygen and/or fire activation systems. lnformation on maintenance spending 
was gathered from the Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly, compiled 
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and published by the US. 
Department of Transportation. Information on the operational statistics 
(departures, miles, hours) was collected from the Air Currier Traffic 
Statistics Monthly and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. These data 
were used to normalize the safety and maintenance spending data for each 
carrier. 
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Table 1 shows the calculated figures for maintenance spending per mile 
flown for the carriers in this study. The last row on the table shows the mean 
maintenance spending per year. Spending rates below the industry mean are 
indicated. It should be noted that maintenance spending per year has 
increased for the industry overall between 1994 and 2000. 
Table 1. Maintenance spending per mile flown, for U.S. airlines, 1994-2000 
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alaska .0009* .0008* .0008* .OOlO* .OOlO* .0012* .0015* 
AmericaWest .0008* .0009* .0009* .0012* ,0014' .0016* ,0018' 
American .0014* .0015 .0015 .0020 .0020 ,0019 .0021 
Continental .0017 .0014* .0014* .0015* .0016* .0016* .0016* 
Delta ,0015 .0014* .0013* .0014* .0015* .0016* .0018* 
Northwest .0017 .0018 ,0021 .0021 ,0025 ,0024 ,0029 
Southwest .OOlO* .OOlO* ,001 I *  .0010* ,001 I *  .0013* .0012* 
TWA ,0019 .0019 ,0021 ,0020 .0020 ,0020 .0020* 
United ,002 1 ,0022 .0022 .0022 ,0024 ,0024 ,0024 
USAir .OO 18 .0018 ,0019 .0021 .0023 .0022 ,0022 
Mean ,0015 .0015 .0015 ,0017 ,0018 .a018 .0020 
* Spending rate is below the industry annual mean 
Note: The raw data are from A i r  Currier Finunciul SIufrsrrcs Quur/er/y. 1994-2000, Washington 
DC: U.S. Department of Transportation Center for Transportation Information. 
Table 2 provides the ratio of procedures to total number of SDRs for 
these same carriers. If SDRs in general reflect the performance of routine 
maintenance, then-all other things being equal-a carrier performing more 
maintenance should demonstrate a higher level of maintenance quality, and 
thus a smaller number of procedures. A higher number of procedures, on the 
other hand, would not be a desirable outcome. We would expect the ratio of 
SDRs to procedures to be one indication of overall maintenance quality. In 
this case, Southwest stands out as being above the industry mean for 1994- 
1998, despite an excellent reputation for quality and an excellent record of 
safety. 
Analysis of the relationship between maintenance spending, SDRs, and 
safety quality reveals a number of interesting findings. There does not 
appear to be a significant correlation between maintenance spending per 
departure, mile or hour and the total number of SDRs filed each year by the 
major carriers. There was a small correlation (.362) between maintenance 
spending per average haul and total SDRs. This is to be expected for two 
reasons. First, A Checks and B Checks are performed whenever a flight 
lands or terminates; airlines with short average hauls (total miles divided by 
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departures) would be expected to perform more of these checks. Second, 
much of the wear and tear on an aircraft is the result of the pressure changes 
experienced during ascending and descending. Aircraft flying short hauls 
can be expected to experience more of this type of stress. 
Table 2. Ratio of reportable procedures to total service difficulty reports, for 
U.S. airlines, 1994-2000 
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alaska 9.24 11.35 21.63 12.17 59.78 101.44 53.10 
America West 6.87 4.19 7.54 8.31 7.38 5.23 10.90 
American 4.96 4.96 10.71 5.14 13.01 7.93 7.81 
Continental 1.91 2.80 8.05 7.40 19.98 25.41 38.06 
Delta 14.55 12.39 6.31 4.76 8.08 4.53 3.40 
Northwest 3.41 3.08 5.82 3.90 3.64 5.44 3.85 
Southwest 14.73 8.80 12.82 9.61 20.96 10.95 13.05 
TWA 4.23 2.02 3.97 6.15 8.26 16.76 20.00 
United 2.71 1.82 3.12 2.75 1.97 1.96 2.07 
USAir 3.60 3.98 3.38 3.07 3.96 7.86 8.41 
Mean 6.62 5.54 8.34 6.33 14.70 18.75 16.06 
Note: The raw data on SDRs are collected from http://www.landings.com. 
These same maintenance rates do show a significant, moderate 
correlation (.273-.522) with the number of reported yearly procedures 
indicating that maintenance spending increases with the level of procedures 
experienced in a given year. It is unknown whether increasing levels of 
procedures generate more maintenance costs to carriers or whether carriers 
increase maintenance spending as a result of increasing levels of procedures. 
Examining the relationship between the ratio of procedures to SDRs and 
maintenance spending, we found a significant negative relationship (-.328), 
that is, as the level of maintenance spending increases then the ratio of 
procedures to SDRs declines. Maintenance spending was also negatively 
associated with the total safety rate, that is, as maintenance spending 
increases the number of safety problems per year decreases. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis demonstrates that there is a relationship between 
maintenance spending rates and the level of both SDRs in line maintenance 
and the safety outcomes of the major carriers in the U.S. airline industry. As 
maintenance spending increased, carriers decrease the ratio of procedures to 
total SDRs. This is good news in several respects. Good routine 
maintenance appears to help lower the level of emergency and precautionary 
procedures. This in turn lowers the overall level of maintenance spending. 
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Increased maintenance spending also appears to decrease the number of 
safety problems experienced by airlines. This is the good news. As one 
articles recently stated, “[alircraft maintenance matters-a lot” (McCartney, 
2004). 
The bad news is that this relationship is not as simple as it would seem, 
nor does it appear to hold for all major carriers, leading to questions about 
the maintenance process itself. Southwest consistently posts a level of 
maintenance spending well below that of comparable major carriers and yet 
has an exceptional safety record. In part, this is due to the nature of their 
fleet which consists solely of B-737s. Maintaining a single aircraft fleet 
allows them to benefit from economies of scale in parts and equipment 
purchasing as well as lower training costs. United Air Lines, on the other 
hand, has posted a relatively high level of maintenance spending without any 
apparent improvement in safety outcomes. Of course, spending is not enough 
to guarantee safe outcomes nor can the total spending alone be used to judge 
maintenance quality since it is a function of fleet mix and age as well as the 
efficiency of the overall process and the stage at which potential safety 
problems are detected and corrected. Several recent articles have pointed to 
a key weakness in the maintenance field, namely FAA inspection. SDRs, 
while required of all repair stations, are covered under a fairly broad set of 
regulation. However, an effort by the FAA to tighten reporting to include a 
wider range of routine repairs and failures provoked an outcry from repair 
station operators (Rohrbach, 2004). Since reporting is and continues be 
subject to interpretation and individual carrier discretion, then active 
oversight of repair station operations is critical to ensure standards are met. 
Unfortunately, the FAA has been heavily criticized in recent years for its 
failure to provide adequate oversight, particularly of outsourced and foreign 
repair stations (McCartney, 2004; Pasztor, 2004; Alexander, Reed & 
Mellnik, 2003). 
No  study is without its limitations. In relying on SDRs, it is clearly 
possible that we have not fully captured the quality of line maintenance 
activity. The concept of quality in any area is a complex, multifaceted one. 
Maintenance quality is presumably a function of well-trained mechanics 
equipped with the proper tools and/or systems, utilizing parts that meet 
industry standards, and installing and maintaining them in ways proscribed 
by their manufacturer. However, these aspects of quality are not available to 
researchers. Data on the level of qualifications of the personnel hired by 
individual carriers are not available. Likewise, there is no source other than 
the airlines themselves (through voluntary reporting to researchers) of the 
level of corporate spending on training. Finally, as noted above, we must 
consider the accuracy of the SDRs themselves and the variation that exists 
between in-house and outsourced maintenance activities. 
1 
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Future research should address the impact of fleet mix and age on 
maintenance spending as well as the actual reporting process itself. Based 
on our review, there appears to be a good deal of variation both within and 
between carriers in the number and type of events reported. The relationship 
between maintenance quality, as reflected by SDRs and procedures should 
be examined to understand their relationship to direct safety outcomes such 
as accidents and incidents. Other issues that should be addressed include the 
effect of aircraft utilization and maintenance training on overall maintenance 
spending and safety quality. This study should also be extended to examine 
these relationships for national and regional carriers. 
Safety quality has been seen as an economic good that is both desired by 
consumers and costly to provide. Viewed in this context, “it no longer 
follows that the socially desirable level of safety is the highest that is both 
technologically and humanly possible,” (Ozdener, 2000, p. 18) since such a 
level would be prohibitively expensive. Even when a consensus can be 
reached on an acceptable level of safety, it is difficult to observe safety 
directly. Regulators, firms, and researchers have tended to observe safety 
outcomes such as accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collisions and relate 
these to safety inputs such as financial condition, maintenance spending, and 
training spending. This study is only one step in understanding the complex 
process of airline line maintenance activity. This process has come under 
increasing scrutiny in the last several years due to a series of high profile 
accidents (e.g., Alaska Airlines Flt 26 1 [2000], Flash Airlines Flt 504[2004]). 
While U.S. airlines continue to be some of the safest in the world, there is 
always room for improvement. Before this improvement can begin, it is 
necessary to develop a better understanding of the factors that affect 
maintenance quality and the processes that could be used to improve it. 
failures to adequately oversee airline safety, particularly maintenance 
practices. Unfortunately, “outside groups and academics have made limited 
efforts to fill the gap” (Pasztor & Michaels, 2004, p. A14). This paper is one 
attempt to f i l l  this very large gap. A gap we believe must be filled in order 
to provide consumers with the safety they expect and deserve. 
IT,.+:,.. xarlvllal and international organizations have been criticized for their 
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ABSTRACT 
Declining enrollments in the Indiana State University (ISU) aerospace administration 
program prompted this case study. which evaluates the program in comparison ~ i t h  
parallel programs at other universities, industry standards, and an independent audit. 
Survey instruments were administered to graduates, faculty, and employers for their 
views on competencies of an excellent aerospace administration program Results 
show the deficiency of the ISU program. Graduates, faculty, and employers rated all 
competencies-from moderate to considerable importance-similarly for an 
excellent program. Recommendations for program improvement were made, and 
suggestions for further research include studies to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
revised aerospace administration program. 
INTRODUCTION 
Only after students graduate are they able to step back and evaluate the 
value of their program’s curriculum in their careers. Faculty may be so busy 
teaching and performing administrative duties that they do not take the time 
to examine the adequacy and sufficiency of the current program. Also of 
significance in evaluating a program is feedback from employers once 
graduates are out in the field. Thus, an evaluative case study of a given 
university program involving graduates, faculty, and employers is most 
appropriate for assessing the value of that program. 
The following case study of the Indiana State University (ISU) 
aerospace administration program is such a study. The structure of the study, 
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methods used, and findings are presented here as a model for other 
universities to define and explore their own programs and make best use of 
the feedback obtained from graduates, faculty, and employers. In turn, this 
feedback may be used for recommendations to improve a given program 
toward greater applicability to current industry standards, university 
accreditation, and student and graduate satisfaction. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This case study examined possible sources of declining enrollment over 
the past I O  years in the ISU aerospace administration program. In 1991, as 
reported in 1991 by the Dean the ISU School of Technology (SOT), of 
approximately 350 students in the Department of Aerospace Technology, the 
aerospace administration program had an enrollment of 105 students, 
representing approximately 30% of the total enrollment. After a period of 
declining enrollments, total department enrollments recovered and increased 
to 239 students making the Department of Aerospace Technology the largest 
in the SOT. However, the number of students in the aerospace administration 
program decreased to 29, or only 12% of the department total. 
PURPOSE 
The research reported here is part of a larger case study, which 
evaluated and made extensive recommendations for improvement of the 
aerospace administration program at ISU, with the goal of accreditation by 
the nationally recognized Council on Aviation Accreditation (CAA). The 
paper reports primarily on the several ways in which the program was 
evaluated and offers several pertinent recommendations. 
I nis case study evaiuation of the iSti aerospace administration program 
took place through five modes. These were benchmarking; comparisons with 
criteria for excellence in aerospace administration programs, as mandated by 
the CAA; comparisons with other CAA-accredited university aerospace 
administration programs; the results of surveys administered to graduates, 
faculty, and potential employers of ISU aerospace administration graduates; 
and an external audit of the aerospace administration program by the 
University Aviation Association (UAA). The case study approach is 
particularly appropriate in evaluations of programs, with systematic study 
and multiple qualitative and quantitative methods (McMillan & Schumacher, 
1997). 
-. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Four research questions were formulated to guide this case study. 
1. What does the literature review provide as the appropriate and 
valid criteria for an excellent aerospace aviation management 
74 Journal of Air Transportation 
program, as indicated by accrediting agencies, professional 
industry organizations, and other university programs? 
What instrument is appropriate to measure graduate, faculty, 
and employer feedback with regard to the present aerospace 
administration program? 
Do significant gaps exist between the established criteria for 
excellence of an aerospace administration program and the 
present program at ISU? 
What recommendations can be made to enhance the quality of 
the aerospace administration program at ISU? 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
This case study was designed to evaluate the gaps between CAA 
accreditation standards and the aerospace administration program at ISU. 
Thus, findings can be generalized only to highly similar settings. Given the 
unique nature of the ISU aerospace administration program, it is unlikely 
that this study is completely replicable at another institution. However, 
efforts were made to ensure a substantial framework of detail and discussion 
for replication. 
With regard to the comparison of the ISU program with those of the four 
CAA-accredited programs at sister universities, although close review of 
program coursework was conducted, review of these universities’ self- 
studies was not conducted. Thus, it is possible that some conclusions 
concerning how certain programs met CAA standards were inaccurate. 
Nevertheless, in each case, all programs had met CAA standards and 
received CAA accreditation. 
With regard to the instruments, although selection and development of 
some survey items were based on informed recommendations of the expert 
committees and the researcher, other relevant items may have been omitted, 
such as employers’ formal aviation industry education or graduate school 
experience. In addition, each survey instrument was developed for a specific 
subject base and field-tested with small samples. Thus, survey results may 
lack some reliability and validity. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Benchmarking 
Among the central methods implemented in the accreditation process is 
benchmarking. This is a method of identifying the best practices of similar 
institutions or programs and comparing them with the institution or program 
being assessed. As Rothwell (1996) points out, benchmarking is “the search 
for industry best practices that lead to superior performance” (p. 116). 
Benchmarking is widely advocated and accepted across many fields to 
compare and contrast best practices to identify areas for improvement in 
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programs (Camp, 1998). Czarnecki ( 1  998) observes that comparisons focus 
on key performance gaps, rallying support internally around findings to 
create consensus to move forward. 
Accreditation 
Excellence in aerospace administration programs is an important aspect 
of the health of the national aviation industry. Accreditation has two 
fundamental purposes: (a) to ensure the quality of the institution or 
programs, and (b) to assist in the improvement of the institution or program 
(CAA, 2003). With accreditation, students are assured of receiving quality 
education and training, which prepare them for performing a broad range of 
professional responsibilities. Further, graduates are assured that their 
educational degree program has met desired industry standards. Although 
accreditation is a voluntary process, accrediting decisions are used as 
considerations in many formal actions by governmental funding agencies, 
scholarship commissions, foundations, employers, counselors, and potential 
students (CAA, 2003). 
The CAA was recently recognized by the Council for Higher Education 
Accreditation (CHEA). CHEA is a private, nonprofit, national organization 
that coordinates accreditation activity in the United States. The Council 
represents more than 3,000 colleges and universities and 60 national, 
regional, and specialized accreditation associations (CAA, 2002). 
North ( 1999) encourages university aviation departments to acquire 
aviation accreditation because traditional academic accreditation falls short 
of the specialized focus needed in the aviation industry. North also suggests 
that aviation industry representatives play an advisory role in universities to 
help faculty develop curricula of immediate and practical value to students 
who enter the industry. 
Recruitment literature for students considering an airline career appears 
to show a bias toward accredited programs. The Airline Pilots Association 
(ALPA) specifically suggests that students who desire careers with airlines 
should seek out university aviation departments that have achieved 
accreditation from the CAA. To become a pilot or manager with an airline is 
an often stated goal of the vast majority of aviation students, and the ALPA 
recruitment brochure states that programs without CAA accreditation are at a 
distinct disadvantage for their graduates’ acceptance into the industry 
(ALPA, 2002). 
Criteria of Excellence for Aerospace Administration Programs 
Central to the present case study was the comparison of industry- 
recommended CAA curriculum requirements with ISU aerospace 
administration requirements. CAA requires that any accredited program’s 
curriculum be designed to allow a graduate to function as an aviation 
professional (CAA, 2001). An aviation professional is one who uses the 
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knowledge gained for “the design, management and operation of safe, 
efficient, and comprehensive national and international aviation and 
aerospace systems” (p. 8). 
Because of the broad scope of the aviation professional’s duties, CAA 
mandates criteria addressing interdisciplinary studies that include general 
education, aviation core, aviation option, business management, and a 
capstone experience course (CAA, 2003). The program requirements for 
each of these are described below. 
General education 
CAA recommends sequential coursework that culminates in advanced 
assignments. The purpose of this curriculum is to prepare students to be able 
to identify and solve problems. All programs must incorporate courses that 
require students to demonstrate mastery of written and verbal 
communications; mathematics, including calculus; science, including 
physics or chemistry appropriate to the level of aviation option pursued; and 
competence in computers. CAA requires 12 semester credits in this 
curriculum area (CAA, 2003). 
Aviation core 
The program must have a foundation of essential as well as specialized 
knowledge of aviation systems. The purpose of this component is to ensure 
students’ foundation in essential knowledge appropriate to the aviation 
degree. CAA requires 12 semester credits in this curriculum area. Topics 
may be addressed in entire courses or in portions of courses (CAA, 2003). 
Aviation option 
This component supplies students with a coherent series of courses that 
provide specialized knowledge for preparation as aviation professionals. 
CAA approves the following baccalaureate degree option areas: (a) aviation 
management, (b) aviation electronics, (c) aviation studies, and (d) flight 
education. CAA requires 36 semester credits in this curriculum area (CAA, 
2003). 
Business manugement 
Because an aviation professional’s duties encompass a wide range of 
knowledge, CAA specifics a number of business management courses for 
the aviation management program. These courses include the following: (a) 
accounting, (b) micro and macro economics, (c) finance, (d) management, 
(e) business law, and (0 human resource management (CAA, 2001). CAA 
requires 36 semester credits in this curriculum area (CAA, 2003). 
Career focus 
Each institution has some flexibility in program design, but to meet the 
CAA standards, the curriculum must focus on a potential career field rather 
than provide a generalized extension of the aviation core area. Career focus 
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may address various industry areas, such as airport management, 
maintenance management, aviation management, or air carrier management. 
Each area should be developed with the assistance of industry 
representations, appropriate industry associations, and professionals in the 
field. 
Regardless of career focus, the aviation management option track 
requires a combination of business and aviation coursework. This track 
requires significant upper-level experience in aviation management, with a 
minimum of 3 semester credit hours. These may be filfilled by a capstone 
course, an internship, or a special project that build upon prior coursework. 
Table 1. Four-year educational institutions with programs accredited by the 
Council on Aviation Accreditation, as of ZOO4 
Year Most 
Institution Accredited Accredited 
Auburn University 2003 2003 
Year First Recently 
Arizona State University 2000 2000 
Central Missouri State University 1995 200 1 
Daniel Webster University 200 1 200 I 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 1992 200 1 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 1999 200 I 
Florida Institute of Technology I992 2002 
Hampton University 2002 2002 
Louisiana Tech University 1993 2004 
Middle Tennessee State 1992 2002 
u 111 v GI M y  
Parks College 1996 200 1 
Purdue University 1998 2003 
Saint Cloud State University I994 2004 
University of Nebraska-Omaha 2002 2002 
University of North Dakota I992 2002 
Western Michigan University 2002 2002 
University, FL 
University, AZ 
,,.-: :. 
Utah State University 2004 2004 
Note. Of the 19 educational institutions accredited, 2 are two-year community colleges, Mercer 
County Community College, NJ, and North Shore Community College, MA, and are not listed 
here. Council on Aviation Accreditation (2004): http://www.caaaccreditation.org/programs.html 
Comparison with Other University Aerospace Administration Programs 
As of October 2004, CAA accredited aviation programs at 19 
educational institutions in the U.S., 17 four-year programs and 2 two-year 
programs. These offer a variety of programs that include flight training, 
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aircraft maintenance, aircraft dispatch, air traffic control, and aviation 
management. Table 1 lists these institutions. 
For the present study, detailed information was gathered from 
curriculum brochures listed on the Internet for analysis of four directly 
competitive CAA-accredited universities. These were Purdue University, 
Middle Tennessee State University, Central Missouri State University, and 
Saint Cloud State University (Table 2). 
A comparison reveals that not all of the institutions required the same 
coursework but each met the CAA requirements by various means. With 
regard to the general education requirement, each required courses in speech, 
English composition, business writing, computers, and some form of 
calculus. Additional CAA requirements were met through combined 
coursew ork. 
With regard to the aviation core requirement, each required a basic flight 
course, current issues, aviation safety, and introduction to technology. In 
some cases, universities appeared to meet CAA requirements through 
combined coursework. 
Additional aviation core coursework varied by institution, as did 
preparatory coursework. In addition, although many course options were 
available, no consistency was found among the institutions reviewed. It is 
possible that aviation core offerings varied because of availability of faculty 
to teach a specific class or series of classes. 
With regard to the aviation option curriculum, each institution required 
complete coursework in one of the selected aviation option areas. These 
were the baccalaureate option areas listed above. 
With regard to the business management curriculum, each institution 
required complete coursework in microeconomics, macroeconomics, 
introduction to accounting, manageriakost accounting, and introduction to 
law. Several business-related courses were required by all of the reviewed i 
Table 2. Overview of selected Council on Aviation Accreditation accredited 
educational institutions with aerospace administration or parallel programs 
Institution and Program Title 
Central Missouri State University, Warrensburg, MO 
Aviation Management 
Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN 
Aerospace Administration 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 
Aviation Administration 
Aviation Management 
Semester Hours 
124 
124 
I28 
120 Saint Cloud State University, Saint Cloud, MN 
Source: Council on Aviation Accreditation (2004). Available at 
013102.htm. 
ww*w.caaaccreditation.org/ 
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institutions, such as microeconomics, introduction to accounting, and 
statistics. Additional business management coursework varied by institution, 
as did preparatory coursework. As with other categories, although many 
class options were available, there was no substantial consistency among the 
institutions. It is possible that the institutions’ business management 
offerings varied because of faculty availability or departmental problems in 
obtaining a course from the appropriate campus department, possibly 
because of specific course content required by CAA. 
With regard to the CAA capstone requirement, each university used a 
different method of fulfillment. CAA allows some flexibility in this 
requirement, provided that coursework is addressed and documented within 
other course areas (CAA, 2004). 
Evaluations of Other Aerospace Administration Programs 
Evaluations of aviation management programs for case study are sparse. 
However, Ruiz et al. (2000) surveyed 806 individuals who graduated from 
the aviation management program at Southern Illinois University Carbondale 
between 1985 and 1996. Graduates were asked for their perceptions of the 
usefulness of the program and evaluation of the program regarding their 
achievement of occupational and/or life goals. 
Results for major courses in aviation management indicated that airline 
management and aviation maintenance management were considered the 
most valuable, and airport planning and general aviation operations were 
considered the least valuable. Recommendations based on results of this 
survey included a number of changes in the curriculum. At the time of article 
publication, changes were “under consideration or have been made to the . . . 
program” (Ruiz et al, 2000, p. 58).  This study provided a model for the 
present case study, especially the survey of university graduates. 
Flouris and Gibson (2002) conducted a similar study of 59 graduating 
seniors, focusing on aviation management job placement. Subjects surveyed 
were graduating from one of four major university aviation management 
programs. Results showed that the students were most interested in major 
airlines, regional airlines, fixed-based operations, and corporate flight 
departments. Students also indicated more interest in operations positions 
rather than staff responsibilities. Recommendations included adding 
internships for students to gain a more realistic view of career and workload 
responsibilities. 
Graduates’ and employers’ ratings on important items varied 
considerably. For example, employers rated the candidate selection areas 
highest, such as ability to prioritize, plan, and organize, whereas graduates 
focused on medical insurance and retirement pension plans. Employers 
stressed the importance of the basic general education curriculum and 
favored communication, leadership, and computer skills, whereas graduates 
were more interested in operations (Flouris & Gibson, 2002). 
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Based on these results, Flouris and Gibson (2002) made several 
recommendations. Most important was better student preparation through a 
solid academic foundation that integrates general education and a 
comprehensive aviation core, such as programs accredited by the CAA. Also 
important was the recommendation that students engage in internships, 
capstone, or cooperative education opportunities to gain greater experience 
in the field before actual employment. 
Prospective employers of aviation program graduates were surveyed by 
Kaps and Ruiz (1997). Thirty presidents of airline companies were asked 
what they felt students who are seeking an airline career should study. 
Results indicated that airline presidents placed the most value on courses 
stressing a better understanding of fiscal requirements, legal aspects, and 
airline operations. The presidents also stressed the importance of an 
understanding of operating in a global marketplace environment. 
Respondents placed less importance on airport planning, airport 
management, professional development, and general aviation operations. 
Kaps and Ruiz (1997) also compared the importance of the CAA’s 
recommended curriculum with the presidents’ views on what a new aviation 
management graduate most needed. The CAA curriculum was used by Kaps 
and Ruiz as representative of the best criteria for comparing required courses 
to competencies necessary in the aviation industry. Results mirrored the 
previous comparisons: the importance of a solid business base was 
highlighted, coupled with intensive aviation studies, as outlined by the CAA. 
However, in both comparisons, Kaps and Ruiz (1997) found that the airline 
presidents rated airport management, general aviation, and aviation history 
low in importance compared to the other CAA recommended courses. 
Thus, the case studies reviewed generally agree on the recommendation 
on student preparation for aviation careers. Each case study reflected high 
emphasis on a solid general education, with additional knowledge in aviation 
and business courses equally important, for graduates’ employability in the 
industry. 
METHODOLOGY 
Survey Development 
A cross-sectional survey design was used for this study. The survey was 
conducted from May to July 2003. Three groups of ISU-related individuals 
were surveyed: graduates of the program, current faculty, and current and 
potential employers in the state of Indiana. The survey was developed with 
reference to the literature and input and advice in aviation and education 
from ISU faculty and industry representatives. The final survey was divided 
into two main sections, the first on demographic information, and the second 
on the five aerospace administration competencies-general education, 
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aviation core, aviation option, business management, and aviation capstone. 
At the end of the surveys, respondents were invited to comment. 
The surveys for the three groups varied slightly because items were 
customized. For example, the graduate survey included items on reason for 
selecting the aerospace administration degree program, demographic 
information, employment position, and salary levels. The faculty survey 
included items on demographic information, professional rank and teaching 
experience, and expert knowledge areas. The employer survey included 
items on demographic information, occupational category, position title, and 
comparisons of ISU graduates to graduates of other programs. All survey 
instruments asked respondents to rate the importance of aerospace 
administration competencies noted above. The graduate survey contained 43 
items, the faculty survey contained 38 items, and the employer contained 40 
items. For all three surveys, each item was scored on a Likert-type scale, 
from 1 indicating no importance to 5 indicating great importance. 
Field-testing took place with a sample of 10 graduates, 5% of the total to 
be surveyed; 5 faculty members, 30% of the total; and 10 employers, 10% of 
the total. After revisions for clarity and consistency, the final survey, the 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey (AAPES), was 
administered by the researcher to graduates, faculty members, and employers 
(see Appendix for sample survey). 
Administration of Surveys 
Surveys were mailed to 204 graduates of ISU’s aerospace administration 
degree program, 17 current faculty associated with teaching the aerospace 
administration degree program, and 100 actual and potential employers of 
graduates within the state of Indiana. The names of the graduate students 
were obtained from the ISU alumni office. The names of the employers were 
obtained from state aeronautics records. Follow-up mailings took place at 2 
weeks. Responses were received from a total of 61 graduates (33% response 
rate), 17 faculty ( 1 OO%), and 4 1 employers (4 1%). 
RESULTS 
Comparison of ISU Program with CAA Standards 
The present ISU program fell short in each curriculum area when 
compared with CAA standards. In the general education curriculum, physics 
or chemistry and calculus requirements were lacking. In the aviation core 
area, although the program contained 16 credit hours, meeting the 12 credit 
hours minimum, this curriculum did not meet the CAA standards for aircraft 
systems, airspace, or meteorology. 
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Table 3. Characteristics and responses to the Indiana State University 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey, of respondents who are 
graduates of the program, 2003 (N = 66) 
Number Percent 
1. Highest degree held 
Bachelor 65 98.5 
Master 1 1.5 
24-26 10 16.2 
27-30 14 21.2 
31-35 33 50.0 
Male 52 78.8 
Female 14 21.2 
Caucasian 62 78.8 
African American 1 1.5 
Hispanic 1 1.5 
Asian 1 1.5 
Other 1 I .5 
2. Age 
3. Sex 
4. Ethnic background 
5. Primary reason for selecting a degree from ISU Dept. of Aerospace Tech 
Federal government 
Local or authority government 
Airline pilot 
Airline management 
Airport management 
Air traffic control 
Military assignmentladvancement 
Post-military education 
Salary advancement 
Very well 
Adequately 
Poorly 
Not at all 
7. Current employment status 
Full-time employed 
Part-time employed 
Self-employed 
Armed Forces 
$20,000 to $29,999 
$30,000 to $39,999 
$40,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $69,999 
6. Your technology degree prepared you for first job 
8. Current salary 
8 12.1 
2 3 .O 
18 27.3 
20 30.3 
10 16.2 
2 3.0 
1 1.5 
1 1.5 
1 1.5 
18 27.3 
34 51.5 
4 6. I 
7 10.6 
56 84.8 
2 3.0 
2 3.0 
3 4.5 
7 10.6 
16 22.7 
7 10.6 
8 13.6 
Greater than $70,000 14 21.2 
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Table 3. Characteristics and responses to the Indiana State University 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey, of respondents who are 
graduates of the program, 2003 (N = 66) (continued) 
Number Percent 
9. Occupational category that most closely describes your present job 
Mi 1 itary 6 9.1 
Federal government 5 1.6 
Air carrier 13 19.7 
Airport-based business 1 1.5 
Aviation manufacturing 2 3.0 
Airport 4 6.1 
Corporate aviation 2 3.0 
Self-employed 2 3.0 
Other area in aviation industry I O  15.2 
Employed outside of the aviation industry 19 28.8 
Management skills 36 29.0 
Oral communications 32 26.0 
Written communication 19 15.0 
Human relations 15 12.0 
Mathematical skills 12 10.0 
Human relations 11 9.0 
Total percentage exceeds 100% because of rounding. 
* Top six skills indicated by subjects. Total number equals 125 because many graduates listed 
more than one skill. 
IO. Skills essential for your current job* 
The aviation option area did not exist as part of the aerospace 
administration degree. Thus, the program had only 18 credits hours of the 36 
CIFU~L hours requirement. In the business management area, only one of the 
seven course areas met CAA standards. Finally, no requirement for a 
capstone course existed in the program, as required by CAA standards. 
Comparison of ISU Aerospace Administration Program with Similar 
CAA-Accredited Programs 
Detailed comparisons of the CAA-accredited programs at Purdue 
University, Saint Cloud State University, Central Missouri University, and 
Middle Tennessee State University compared with the ISU aerospace 
administration program revealed substantial gaps in each of the five 
competency areas. Each of the four reviewed universities has a well-defined 
general education curriculum that includes coursework in physics and 
calculus, an aviation core curriculum that includes coursework in aircraft 
systems and meteorology, an aviation option curriculum that includes career 
tracks in airline management and airport management, a business 
management curriculum with coursework in finance and marketing, and a 
---A:* 
' 
I 
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capstone requirement that includes coursework in internship and airport 
certification. 
In comparison, at ISU, as noted, the general education curriculum 
lacked a physics or chemistry course and a calculus course. The aviation core 
curriculum lacked an airspace course and aircraft systems course. The 
present program also did not have a specific aviation option track. The 
business management track lacked accounting, finance, and marketing 
courses. The program did not have a capstone requirement. Thus, in 
comparison with the four programs at the CAA-accredited programs 
reviewed, the ISU aerospace administration program had many deficiencies. 
Results of the Aviation Administration Program Evaluation Survey for 
Graduate, Faculty, and Employer Respondents 
Results of the survey of gruduute respondents (AAPES-C) 
Table 3 shows the demographic composition and responses of the 
graduate sample (N = 66). Most graduates, 98.5% (n = 65), possessed a 
bachelor degree, followed by 1.5% (n = 1) with a master degree. The oldest 
group of graduates, 50.0% (n = 33), was 31 to 35 years old; followed by 
those between 27 to 30, 21.2% (n = 14); and those 24 to 26, 16.2% (n = IO). 
Most subjects were male, 78.8% (n = 52), with 21.2% (n = 14) female. 
Caucasian graduates were the largest group represented, 78.8% (n = 62), 
with 1.5% (n = 1) each African American, Hispanic, Asian, and Other. 
The largest categories of graduates’ reasons for selecting a degree from 
the ISU Department of Aerospace Technology were to pursue a career in 
airline management, 30.3% (n = 20); airline pilot, 27.3% (n = 18); airport 
management, 16.2% (n = 10); and the federal government, 12.1% (n = 8). 
The smallest categories were air traffic control, 3.0% (n = 2); and military 
assignment/advancement, post-military education, and salary adjustment, 
each I .5% (n = 1). 
When indicating how well the technology degree prepared them for their 
first job, 5 I .5% (n = 34) indicated that the degree prepared them adequately, 
followed by 27.3% (n = 18), who felt very well prepared. The smallest 
percentage of graduates felt they were not at all prepared, 10.6% (n = 7), and 
poorly prepared, 6.1% (n = 4). 
Over four-fifths, 84.8% (n = 56) of the graduate respondents were 
employed full-time, with 4.5% (n = 3) reporting service in the armed forces. 
A total of 3.0% (n = 2) each indicated part-time employment and self- 
employment. The two largest income categories were $30,000 to $39,999, at 
22.7% (n = 16), and greater than $70,000, 21.2% (n = 14). The next three 
largest income categories were $50,000 to $59,999, 13.6% (n = 8); and 
$20,000 to $29,900 and $40,000 to $49,900, each 10.6% (n = 7). 
Graduate respondents indicated a variety of occupational categories. The 
four largest groups were employed outside of the aviation industry, 28.8% (n 
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= 19); air carrier, 19.796 (n = 13); other area in aviation industry, 15.2% (n = 
lo); and military, 9.1% (n = 6). Smaller categories are federal government 
7.6 YO (n = 5) ;  airport, 6.1% (n = 4); and aviation manufacturing, corporate 
aviation, and self-employed, each 3.0% (n = 2). The smallest category of 
occupation was airport-based business, 1 .S% (n = 1). 
Graduate respondents selected six top skills considered essential for the 
current job. Management skills, 29.0% (n = 36), was the largest; followed by 
oral communications, 26.0% (n = 32); written communication; 15.0% (n = 
19); human relations, 12.0% (n =lS); mathematical skills, 10.0% (n = 12); 
and human relations, 9.0% (n = 1 I) .  
Table 4 shows the results of the curriculum competencies section of the 
AAPES-G. The mean for general education was 4.0 (SD l.l),  for aviation 
core 3.8 (SD 1 .l), for aviation option 3.9 (SD 1. I) ,  for business management 
4.0 (SD 1 .O), and for aviation capstone 4.2 (SD 1 .O).  For the total survey, the 
mean was 3.9 (SD 1.1). These means indicate that the graduate respondents 
felt that the items in the survey were between moderate importance and great 
importance for an excellent aerospace administration program. 
Table 4. Results of Indiana State University Aerospace Administration Program 
Evaluation Survey, for respondents who are graduates of the program, 
2003 (N = 66) 
Standard Mean 
Competency Mean deviation Range value 
General Education 4.0 1.1 16-29 (6-30) 24 
Aviation Core 3.8 1 .1  17-57 (12-60) 46 
Aviation Option 3.9 1.1 0-20* (4-20) 16 
L,"d.L&*., R * , C ; " P C S  4.9 - A  1 .u 6-30' (6-36j 24 
Management 
Aviation Capstone 4.2 1 .o 0-5* (1-5) 4 
Total Survey 3.9 1.1 75-136 (29-145) 114 
Note. Means are based on scoring scales: I = No importance. 2 = Little importance, 3 = 
Moderate importance, 4 = Considerable importance, 5 = Great importance. Numbers in 
parentheses indicate total range possible. 
* Actual minimum is 0 be,cause some subjects did not respond to items within competency. 
Additional comments from the graduate respondents reflected their 
feelings that the department needed to reinforce the present curriculum with 
additional requirements that would help future graduates of the program. 
This gap corroborates the deficient courses in business management 
compared to CAA standards. Graduates commented that this area offered 
them the least preparation to enter the workplace with confidence. Graduates 
recommended additional courses, including speech and writing, accounting, 
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public media relations, finance, and required student participation in 
internships. 
Results of the survey to fuculty respondents (AAPES-F) 
Table 5 shows the responses and demographic composition of the 
faculty sample. The majority, 58.8% (n = IO), possessed a master degree, 
and 4 1.2% (n = 7) a doctorate degree. The largest group of faculty members, 
35.3% (n = 6), were ages 46 to 50, followed by those over 50, 29.4% (n = 5) .  
Most faculty members were male, 76.5% (n = 13), with 23.5% (n = 4) 
female. Caucasian faculty members were the largest group represented, 
88.2% (n = 15), with 5.9% (n = I )  each African American and Asian. A total 
of 47.1 % (n = 8) of the faculty held a tenure-track position, and 47.2% (n = 
7) held tenured positions. Only 11.8% (n = 2) held full-time temporary 
nontenure-track positions. 
Table 5. Characteristics and responses to the Indiana State University 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey, respondents who are 
faculty of  the program, 2003 (N = 17) 
Characteristic Number Percent 
1. Highest degree held 
Doctorate 7 41.2 
Master 10.5 58.8 
46-50 6 35.3 
More than 50 years 5 29.4 
Male 13 76.5 
Female 4 23.5 
Caucasian 15 88.2 
African American 1 5.9 
Asian 1 5.9 
Full-time faculty member, tenured 7 41.2 
Full-time faculty member, tenure track 8 47.1 
2. Age 
3. sex 
4. Ethnic background 
5. Employment status 
Temporary full-time, nontenure track 2 11.8 
Dept. of Aerospace Technology 6 35.3 
Dept. of Industrial Technology Education 6 35.3 
Dept. of Mfg and Construction Technology 2 11.8 
6. Occupational category 
Dept. of Electronics and Computer Technology 3 17.6 
Assistant Professor 12 70.6 
Professor 2 11.8 
Associate Professor 1 5.9 
Instructor 1 5.9 
7. Current job title* 
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Regarding faculty respondents’ occupational categories, which reflect 
their teaching departments, 35.3% (n = 6) each were in the Department of 
Aerospace and the Department of Industrial Technology Education. A total 
of 17.6% (n = 3) were in the Department of Electronics and Computer 
Technology, followed by 1 1.8% (n = 2) in the Department of Manufacturing 
and Construction Technology. Over two-thirds, 70.6% (n = 12) were 
assistant professors, 11.8% (n = 2) were professors, and 5.9% (n = 1) each 
were an associate professor and instructor. 
Table 6 shows the results of the curriculum competencies section of the 
AAPES-F. The mean for general education was 4.4 (SD 0.8), for aviation 
core 4.4 (SD OX), for aviation option 4.4 (SD 0.7), for business management 
4.5 (SD 0.6), and for aviation capstone 4.6 (SD 0.5). For the total survey, the 
mean was 4.4 (SD 0.7). These numbers indicate that faculty respondents felt 
that the items in the survey were between considerable importance and great 
importance for an excellent aerospace administration program. 
Table 6. Results of Indiana State University Aerospace Administration 
Program Evaluation Survey, for respondents who were faculty of 
the program, 2003 (N = 17) 
Standard Mean 
Competency Mean deviation Range value 
General Education 4.4 0.8 22-29 (6-30) 2 
Aviation Core 4.4 0.8 42-60 ( 1  2-60) 53 
Aviation Option 4.4 0.1 12-20 (4-20) 18 
Business Management 4.5 0.6 2 1-30 (6-30) 27 
Aviation Capstone 4.6 0.5 4-5 (1-5) 5 
Total Survei 4.4 0.7 108-143 (29-145) 128 
Note. Means are based on scoring scale: 1 = No imoortance. 2 = Little imoortance. 3 = 
Y 
Moderate importance, 4 = Considerable importance, 5 = Great importance. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate total range possible. 
Some of the faculty respondents added written comments. These 
reflected feelings that the present curriculum was deficient and additional 
courses should be added to help future graduates prepare for industry 
employment. Examples of such reinforcement include student participation 
in internships, research project, or industry certification. Most faculty 
respondents felt the department’s coverage of the general education, business 
management, and aviation option coursework appeared to be satisfactory, 
although not all respondents agreed. 
Results of the survey of aviation employers (AAPES-E) 
Table 7 shows the demographic composition of the employer sample (N 
= 41). Most employers, 58.5% (n = 24) possessed a bachelor degree, 
followed by 17.1% (n = 7), with a master degree. The largest group of 
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employers, 36.6% (n = 15), was more than 50 years old, followed by those 
between 41 and 45, 17.1% (n = 7); and 36 to 40 and 46 to 50, each with 
4.6% (n = 6). Most subjects were male, 70.7% (n = 29), with 29.3% (n = 12) 
female. Caucasian employers were the largest group represented, 95.1% (n = 
39), with 2.4% (n = 1) African American. Over four-fifths, 87.8% (n = 36) 
were employed full-time, with those employed part-time 7.3% (n = 3). 
Employers indicated a variety of occupational categories. The four largest 
were airport, 48.8% (n = 20); airport-based business, 12.2% (n = 5); 
employed outside of the aviation industry, 9.8% (n = 4); and other area in 
aviation industry, 7.3% (n = 3). A total of 4.9% (n = 2) each were in the 
federal government, air carrier, and corporate aviation. The smallest category 
of occupation was that of self-employment 2.4% (n = 1). Almost the 
majority, 43.9% (n = 18), had been in their position for 1 to 5 years; 
followed by 17. I %  (n = 7) for 6 to 10 years; and 14.6% (n = 6) more than 20 
years. 
Almost three-fourths, 73.2% (n = 30) did not employ any ISU graduates. 
A total of 7.3% (n = 3) employed four or more ISU graduates, and 2.4% (n = 
1 )  each employed two and three ISU graduates. When asked to compare ISU 
graduates to other university graduates, 61.0% (n = 25) of the employers 
indicated that no 1SU graduates were employed. A total of 17.1% (n = 7) 
indicated ISU graduates were about the same as those from other 
universities, and 9.8% (n = 4) indicated ISU graduates were better than 
some. The smallest category, 4.9% (n = 2), indicated 1SU graduates were 
better than most. 
Table 7. Characteristics and responses to the Indiana State University 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey, of respondents who 
were actual and potential employers within the state of Indiana of graduates of 
the program, 2003 (N = 41) 
Characteristic Number Percent 
1. Highest degree held 
Bachelor 24 58.5 
Master 7 17.1 
36-40 6 14.6 
41-45 7 17.1 
46-50 6 14.6 
More than 50 years 15 36.6 
Male 29 70.7 
Female 12 29.3 
2. Age 
3. Sex 
Schwab 89 
Table 7. Characteristics and responses to the Indiana State University 
Aerospace Administration Program Evaluation Survey, of respondents who 
were actual and potential employers within the state of Indiana of graduates of 
the program, 2003 (N = 41) (continued) 
Characteristic Number Percent 
4. Ethnic background 
Caucasian 
African American 
5. Current employment status 
Full-time Employed 
Part-time Employed 
Federal government 
Air carrier 
Airport-based business 
Airport 
Corporate aviation 
Self-employed 
Other area in aviation industry 
Employed outside aviation industry 
1-5 years 
6- I O  years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
More than 20 years 
6. Occupational category* 
8. Years in present position 
39 
1 
36 
3 
2 
2 
5 
20 
2 
1 
3 
4 
18 
7 
5 
4 
6 
95.1 
2.4 
87.8 
7.3 
4.9 
4.9 
12.2 
48.8 
4.9 
2.4 
7.3 
9.8 
43.9 
17.1 
12.2 
9.8 
14.6 
9. Number of ISU graduates currently employed by firm 
0 30 73.2 
2 ! 2.4 
3 1 2.4 
4 or more 3 7.3 
No other graduates employed 25 61.0 
About the same 7 17.1 
Better than some 4 9.8 
Better than most 2 4.9 
Note. Numbers of characteristics follow numbers of items in Aviation Administration Program 
10. Assessment of ISU graduates compared to other university graduates 
Evaluation Survey-Employers (AAPES-E) 
* Titles are collapsed for brevity. 
Based upon industry experience, employers also provided written 
comments about the present ISU aerospace administration program. Most 
employers felt the curriculum was lacking in a number of components 
essential for successful employment. Employers suggested additional 
courses such as speaking and people skills, marketing, writing, finance, and 
required student participation in internships. 
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Table 8 shows the results of the curriculum comparisons of the AAPES 
completed by the employers. The mean for general education was 4.1 (SD 
l.O),  for aviation core 4.0 (SD 0.9), for aviation option 4.0 (SD 0.9), for 
business management 4.0 (SD 0.9), and for aviation capstone 4.3 (SD 1.0). 
For the total survey, the mean was 4.0 (SD 0.9). These means indicate that 
employer respondents felt that the items in the survey were between 
considerable importance and great importance for an excellent aerospace 
administration program. 
Table 8. Results of Indiana State University Aerospace Administration Program 
Evaluation Survey, for respondents who were actual and potential employers 
within the state of Indiana of graduates of the program, 2003 (N = 41) 
Standard Mean 
Competency Mean deviation Range value 
General Education 4. I 1 .o 18-30 (6-30) 24 
Aviation Core 4.0 0.9 37-60 ( 12-60) 48 
Aviation Option 4.0 0.9 10-20 (4-20) 16 
Business Management 4.0 0.9 12-30 (6-30) 24 
Aviation Capstone 4.3 1 .o 0-5* (1-5) 4 
Total Survey 4.0 0.9 96-141 (29-145) 1 I7 
Note. Means are based on scoring scales: 1 = No importance, 2 = Little importance, 3 = 
Moderate importance, 4 = Considerable importance, 5 = Great importance. Numbers in 
parentheses indicate total range possible. 
*Actual minimum is 0 because some subjects did not respond to items within the competency. 
Results of UAA audit of the ISU Department of Aerospace Technology 
In the fall of 2002, the ISU department chairperson requested an 
independent audit by the UAA of the entire department, including reviews of 
curriculum programs, facilities and equipment, contractor operations, and 
faculty with particular interest and evaluation on the aerospace 
administration program. This was the first external agency review of the 
department since 1992 and the first review ever conducted by an aviation 
organization. In the spring of 2003, the UAA audited the aerospace 
department and provided a report that corroborated the underlying problem 
identified in this study (University Aviation Association, 2003). 
Table 9 displays the curriculum areas reviewed by the UAA audit. 
Except for the aviation option area, all evaluated areas fell short of CAA 
standards. Within the general education curriculum, the audit noted that ISU 
must add both calculus and physics to meet the CAA standards. The audit 
also noted that since the aerospace administration program lacked any 
cohesive management content courses, the program should more 
appropriately be termed an aviation studies program rather than an 
administration or management program. The audit team specified that for the 
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aerospace administration program to meet CAA standards, addition of a 
comprehensive list of management content courses would be needed. 
Table 9. Selected results of University Aviation Association audit of Indiana 
State University Aerospace Administration Program, 2002 
Aerospace Administration Competency Met Noted 
General Education Curriculum No Lack of calculus 
Lack of physics 
Aviation Core Curriculum Yes 
Aviation Option Curriculum Unknown Not reported 
Lack of any 
management 
Business Management Curriculum No content courses 
Lack of segment 
Aviation Capstone Curriculum No focus 
Source: University of Aviation Association. 2003. Indiana State University: Department of 
Aerospace Technology Audit Report. Auburn, AL: University Aviation Association Press. 
DISCUSSION 
As this case study demonstrated, to achieve CAA accreditation a 
program must meet specialized accrediting criteria and standards. Programs 
that have been awarded CAA accreditation are recognized to have achieved a 
high level of quality. The results of the present study, as determined by 
comparisons with CAA standards, a detailed program review, survey results, 
and a UAA audit visit, demonstrated substantial gaps between ISU’s 
aerospace administration program and the industry-recommended standards 
of CAA. 
The Surveys 
Graduates, faculty, and employers responded similarly with regard to 
the contents necessary for an excellent aerospace administration program, as 
indicated by the means for each group: graduates, 3.9; faculty, 4.4; and 
employers, 4.0. These means show that all three groups rated the items in all 
competencies from moderate to considerable importance for incorporation 
into an excellent aerospace administration program. 
Graduate survey 
In the curriculum areas of the survey, the graduate respondent means for 
all five curriculum areas were between 3.9 and 4.2, with aviation capstone, 
general education, and business management the highest (see Table 4). The 
overall mean was 3.9, indicating that all areas were of moderate to 
considerable importance to graduates for an excellent program. 
These results corroborate those of the program review, in which 
business management and capstone CAA requirements were severely 
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lacking in the ISU aerospace administration program. The program, in fact, 
had no capstone experience. These results indicate that graduates recognized 
the importance of strength in these curriculum areas for substantial 
employment preparation. 
Faculty survey 
Faculty respondent means for all five curriculum areas were slightly 
higher than graduate respondents’ means; between 4.4 and 4.6, with the 
highest means also for business management and capstone (see Table 6). The 
faculty total mean was 4.4. This mean indicates that faculty respondents 
evaluated all coursework specified as of considerable to great importance in 
an excellent aerospace administration program. 
Employer survey 
The employer respondent results were also similar; their means were 
between 4.0 and 4.3, with general education and capstone the highest (see 
Table 8). The overall means was 4.0, comparable to the ratings of the other 
two groups. Thus, the employer respondents’ mean indicates that they 
evaluated all coursework specified as of considerable to great importance in 
an excellent aerospace administration program. 
Thus, graduates, faculty, and employers all rated CAA-required 
curriculum components similarly, with regard to both individual curriculum 
areas and overall means. These results imply the strong support by all groups 
for the revision of the present ISU aerospace administration program. 
Qualitative feedback also supported these results. Graduate respondents 
commented most on the business management curriculum, stating that the 
addition of accounting, marketing, and public relations would improve the 
program. Some remarked that the aerospace administration program needed 
to raise its standards so that graduates would enter the workforce better 
prepared. 
Faculty respondents commented that the most glaring omission was the 
capstone course requirement. One faculty respondent even suggested that the 
program should be elevated to a master degree program, suggesting that 
most students could not secure administrative positions in aviation without 
advanced training. 
Employer respondents commented that additional emphasis should be 
placed on speaking and briefing skills as well as addition of a capstone 
experience. Employers respondents provided the most specific advice of the 
three groups, suggesting that more interpersonal and leadership skills courses 
should be developed and required within the business management. 
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The UAA Audit 
Results of the site visit by the UAA audit team in May 2003 hrther 
corroborated the gaps identified in the present aerospace administration 
program and the need for program revision. The report noted within the 
general education curriculum the lack of required physics and calculus 
courses. In addition, although the report stated that the aviation core 
curriculum appeared to meet CAA standards, the auditors also noted that 
they had not completed a course matrix that would verify compliance with 
CAA standards. 
Further, the team observed that because the present program does not 
contain a specific aviation option, that area could not presently meet CAA 
standards and therefore the option could not be evaluated. As a result, the 
program also does not meet the CAA capstone requirement. In support of the 
survey results, the UAA audit was the most critical of the present business 
management coursework, noting that the program lacked cohesive business 
management focus. 
Thus, the results of survey respondents and the UAA audit report 
provide concurrent evidence that the present aerospace administration 
program shows major gaps in essential aviation curriculum, and that 
extensive revision is warranted. Especially in conjunction with the reviews 
of aviation programs at competitive universities, these findings suggest the 
basis for the steadily declining enrollment at ISU. 
Significance of the Study 
Based on the study results, five implications are evident. First, the 
present aerospace administration program does not meet current industry 
standards as determined by the literature review, comparisons with other 
..-... UII;VFI&C>, ^_ ^.*.^” CAA staidads, zib x i r V q s  complctcd by graduates, faculty, 
and employers. This gap indicates one possible reason for the aerospace 
administration program’s history of declining enrollments. 
Second, unless the curriculum is revised, the department could 
experience continued loss of enrollments in the aerospace administration 
program. 
Third, without revision, the current and future aerospace administration 
graduates will not meet industry expectations. Thereby, both the department 
and its graduates will be at a competitive disadvantage. Revision of the 
current curriculum would almost certainly place the program at a more 
competitive market advantage. 
Fourth, if the department elects to revise the program to meet CAA 
standards, the program should then meet current industry standards. Such a 
revision, with proper marketing and recruitment efforts, would likely reverse 
the trend of declining enrollments. 
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Fifth, if the department considers accreditation, the study results and 
recommendations should provide a curriculum blueprint for the required 
changes necessary. These curriculum changes would reduce the timeline 
necessary to complete the CAA-directed self-study as part of the 
accreditation process. 
A decision to pursue CAA accreditation was not considered as part of 
the present study, and no support for such effort from the respondents was 
requested. However, as demonstrated in this study, the CAA standards are 
recognized as valid criteria as judged by the formative and summative 
committees, industry, as well as the respondents of the survey instrument 
completed for the present research. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of recommendations stem from the study findings. First, 
within the ISU aerospace technology department, the curriculum committee 
should receive a report of the findings so as to consider extensive revision of 
the aerospace administration degree program. 
Second, the department should pursue CAA accreditation, beginning 
with a CAA self-study. This self-study would consider and incorporate the 
curriculum recommendations stemming from this study. 
Third, based on the gaps identified in the UAA report, the department 
should utilize UAA for future department external audits. The UAA audit 
process was an effective method of gaining an outside perspective on the 
status of the department and especially the aerospace administration 
program. 
Study results prompt several directions for further research. First, for 
greater insight into appropriate revision of the aerospace administration 
program, a study of graduates’ occupations compared with the skills they 
most valued in the program should be conducted. Second, with curriculum 
revisions in place, a follow-up AAPES of recent graduates after they have 
been employed for 1-2 years should take place. Replication and comparison 
with present study results would show effectiveness of the revisions and 
provide assessment of the program’s improvements and its adequacy in 
preparing students for employment in the aviation industry. 
Third, this study surveyed 100 aviation employers, specifically airport 
managers or individuals directly supporting them, such as operations staff, 
security, and airport consultants in Indiana only. To enlarge the scope of the 
employer’s responses, the study should be replicated with a larger number of 
employers to include air carrier managers both in and out of the state. 
Fourth, a similar study should be conducted of the department’s other 
degree program in professional aviation flight technology. The present 
research appears to have been the most comprehensive undertaken of the 
aerospace administration program, and results indicate a substantial revision 
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to the aerospace administration program. A parallel study of the professional 
aviation flight technology degree program could yield similar valuable 
results. 
It should be noted that examination and evaluation such as those 
conducted in this study might produce considerable uneasiness and concern 
within departments, since previous policies, procedures, and decisions 
become open to scrutiny. For the present study, much lively debate and even 
disagreement accompanied the data gathering and review of information. 
Nevertheless, even with strong programs not subject to declining enrollment, 
periodic evaluations can helphl for currency and revitalization. 
With additional goals such as accreditation, program reviews become 
even more important. The present study was undertaken as a first step 
toward the goal of accreditation, as well as to strengthen the aerospace 
administration program. Through examination of CAA standards, 
comparisons with competitive universities, surveys of significant groups, and 
a professional audit, the study demonstrated that the present ISU aerospace 
administration program requires extensive revision in highly specific 
curriculum areas. These findings have been shared with the university 
administration, and the process has been initiated for ISU to offer an 
excellent aerospace administration curriculum that meets industry standards 
and thoroughly prepares its graduates for responsible employment in 
aviation. Other universities and departments of aviation may find the 
procedures described here usehl for comprehensive evaluation of their 
aviation curricula toward substantial improvement and industry 
accreditation. 
REFERENCES 
Airline Pilots Association. (2002, July). Looking for a career: Where the sky is the 
limit? Herdon, VA: Airline Pilots Association Press. 
Camp, R. C. (1998). Global cases in benchmarking: Best practices from 
organizations from around the world. Milwaukee, WI: ASQC Quality Press. 
Council on Aviation Accreditation. (2001). Soaring to new heights ofprofessionalism 
in aviation. [Brochure]. Auburn, AL: Council on Aviation Accreditation Press. 
Council on Aviation Accreditation. (2002). CAA news brief Council on aviation 
accreditation granted recognition status. Retrieved July 20, 2002, from 
http://www.caaaccreditation.org/ 0 13 102.htm. 
fO1. Auburn, AL: Council on Aviation Accreditation Press. 
Council on Aviation Accreditation. (2003). Accreditation standards manual: Form 
Council on Aviation Accreditation. (2004). Council on aviation accreditation: 
Accredited programs. Retrieved February 22, 2004, from 
http://www.caaaccreditation.org/programs.html. 
96 Journal of Air Transportation 
Czarnecki, M. T. (1998). Managing by measuring: How to improve your 
organizations performance through effective benchmarking. New York, NY: 
Amacom Publications. 
Flouris, T. G., & Gibson, B. (2002). Aviation management job placement: The 2002 
perspective. Collegiate Aviation Review, 20(1), 29-48. 
Kaps, R. W., & Ruiz. J. R. (1997). Educational requirements for a career in airline 
management: An industry perspective. Collegiate Aviation Review, 15(1), 43-57. 
McMillian, J. H., & Schumacher, S. (1997). Research in education: A conceptual 
North, D. M. (1999, February 6). Aerospace must invest in students to stay ahead. 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 94. 
Rothwell, W. J. (I 996). Beyond training and development: State-of-the-art strategies 
for enhancing human performance. New York, NY: AMACOM. 
Ruiz, J. R., Worrellis, D. S., Kaps, R. W., NewMyer, D. A., Liberto, J., & Brown. T. 
S. (2000). A follow-up survey of 1985-1996 graduates of the Aviation 
Management Program Bachelor of Science degree at Southern Illinois 
University Carbondale. Collegiate Aviation Review. 18(1), 49-69. 
University Aviation Association. (2003). Indiana State liniversity: Department of 
Aerospace Technology audit report. Auburn, AL: University Aviation 
Association Press. 
introduction. New York: Longman. 
Schwab 97 
APPENDIX 
AEROSPACE ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM EVALUATION 
SURVEY4RADUATES (AAPES-G) 
The purpose of this study is to obtain your views on how well the 
Indiana State University Department of Aerospace Technology Aerospace 
Administration Program prepared you for your present work in the aviation 
industry. Your responses will help the department meet the needs of future 
students who, like you, seek to become well prepared for a successful career 
in aerospace administration. Please read and sign the attached consent form 
prior to beginning this survey. 
Your input will assist us in identifying important factors in the 
aerospace administration program for inclusion, deletion, or revision. Your 
experience in the field makes your opinions of great value to us, and we 
appreciate your input. 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Please circle your preferred response. 
1. The highest degree you now hold: 
A. Bachelor degree 
B. Master degree 
C. Doctorate degree 
2. Your current age: 
A. 21-23 years 
R .  24-26 years 
C. 27-30 years 
D. 3 1-35 years 
E. 4 1-45 years 
F. 36-40 years 
G .  46-50 years 
H. More than 50 years 
3. Sex: 
A. Male 
B. Female 
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4. Your ethnic background: 
A. Caucasian 
B. African American 
C. Native American 
D. Hispanic 
E. Asian 
F. Pacific Islander 
G. Other, please specify 
5 .  Number of years you attended ISU: 
A. 1 year 
B. 2 years 
c .  3years 
D. 4years 
E. 5 years 
F. 6 years 
G. 7 years 
H. 8 years or more 
6 .  Your primary enrollment status while attending ISU: 
A. Full-time student 
€3. Part-time student 
7. Number of years since you (last) graduated from 1SU: 
A. Less than a year 
B. 1-9years 
C. 10- 14 years 
D. 15 to 19years 
E. 20 to 24 years 
F. 25 to 30 years 
8. Primary reason you selected a degree from the Department of Aerospace 
Technology: 
A. Aviation Industry Employment 
1. Federal government 
2. State government 
3. Local or authority government 
4. Airline pilot 
5. Airline management 
6. Airport management 
7. Air traffic control 
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B. Other Reasons 
1 .  Military assignment/Advmcement 
2.  Post military education 
3. Salary advancement 
4. Personal enrichment 
9. Your current employment status: 
A. Full-time employed 
B. Part-time employed 
C. Self employed 
D. Student 
E. Armed Forces 
F. Homemaking 
G. Not working by choice 
H. Retired 
I. Unemployed 
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10. Your current annual salary: 
A. Less than $14,999 
B. $15,000 to $19,999 
C. $20,000 to $29,999 
D. $30,000 to $39,999 
E. $40,000 to $49,999 
F. $50,000 to $59,999 
G. $60,000 to $69,999 
H. Greater than $70,00 
11. Occupational category listed below that most closely describes your present 
job: 
A. Military 
B. Federal government 
C. Aircarrier 
D. Airport-based business 
E. Aviation manufacturing 
F. Airport 
G. Corporate aviation 
H. Self-employed 
I .  
J. 
Other area in the aviation industry 
Employed outside of the aviation industry 
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12. Skills essential for your current job (select 3 most important) 
A. Use of physical sciences 
B. Mathematical skills 
C. Written communications 
D. Hands-on skills 
E. Management skills 
F. Supervisor skills 
G. Human relations 
H. Technical skills 
I. Computer skills 
J. Oral communications 
13. Please list your current job title: 
14. Your technology degree prepared you for your first job: 
A. Verywell 
B. Adequately 
C. Poorly 
D. Not at all 
AEROSPACE ADMINISTRATION COMPETENCIES 
Please indicate your views about the importance of the following 
competency areas on the skills an aerospace administration student should be 
learning as part of an excellent program of study. Note that the competencies 
are categorized into five areas: general education, aviation core, aviation 
option, business management, and capstone. 
Using the scale provided, indicate your level of agreement with each of 
the following statements. Please circle your preferred response. 
RATING 
1. No Importance 
2.  Little Importance 
3. Moderate Importance 
4. Considerable Importance 
5. Great Importance 
MEANING 
Completely not needed 
Nice to know but of little value 
Desirable to acquire if time permits 
Not essential but of great value to acquire during 
a college program 
Essential that competency be acquired during a 
college program 
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General Education Curriculum 
complete as part of an excellent aerospace administration degree. 
This area addresses the basic education foundation all students might 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Demonstrates a basic understanding of chemistry or physics. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Applies mathematics that could include technology-based calculus skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates effective communication skills, Le., persuasion, logic, 
discussion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Leads a group/team discussion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates skills needed for using computer systems for problem solving 
I 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates effective written communication skills through reports, letters, 
emails, and business communication. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Aviation Core Curriculum 
general as a foundation for advanced coursework that follows. 
This aspect of training encompasses a broad understanding of aviation in 
2i.  
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Deveiops skiiis needed when inierviewing Tor a job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Develops skills needed as a manager to interview a job candidate for a 
position. 
I 2 3 4 5 
Recognizes professional titles, and develops a general knowledge of their job 
description. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates knowledge of the types of organizations in the aviation 
industry. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates basic flight knowledge. 
I 2 3 4 5 
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26. Demonstrates knowledge of airports. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Demonstrates knowledge of air traffic control and airspace. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Shows generalized understanding of national and international aviation law 
and regulations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Identifies key components of aircraft design, performance, operating 
characteristics of aircraft. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. Identifies key components of general maintenance of aircraft. 
I 2 3 4 5 
3 I .  Demonstrates an understanding of meteorology. 
1 1 1 1 1 
32. Demonstrates an understanding of environmental issues 
I 2 3 4 5 
Aviation Option Curriculum 
and identifies specific career tracks students might want to pursue. 
This aspect of training provides an additional degree of specialization 
33. 
34. 
35. 
3 6. 
Is able to provide in-depth knowjledge of the major career employment tracks 
as components in aviation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Is able to discuss concepts of general aviation, corporate aviation, airports, 
manufactures, air carriers, and military aviation. 
I 2 3 4 5 
Analyzes how technological evolution has shaped the industry and the 
outlook for new technologies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Analyzes the impact of limited airspace and airport capacity on the aviation 
industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Business Management Curriculum 
This area encompasses advanced business management skills to provide 
students the ability to conduct operations in the business environment, such 
as airport management, airline management, and fixed-based operations. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Recognizes marketing research principles and analyzes the significance of the 
results. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates ability to interpret and analyze accounting statements, financial 
control concepts, and decision and control activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Recognizes micro and macro economic market conditions and demonstrates 
ability to apply cost benefit analysis. 
I 2 3 4 5 
Demonstrates ability to employ Human Resource Management techniques. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Recognizes key finance terms and fundamentals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Applies advanced management concepts in the aviation industry. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Aviation Capstone Curriculum 
This area encompasses the final phase of training and is demonstrated 
tllluugh advanced coursework showing that key components of the training 
have been mastered and integrated. 
r l . _ _ .   
43. Demonstrates ability that is an apparent result of a comprehensive education 
degree program and reflects multiple levels of training applied to aviation 
knowledge. Examples include a research paper, internship. or industry 
certification. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Comments you wish to make: 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
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ABSTRACT 
This case study provides a review of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA’s) involvement in system safety during research and 
evolution from air breathing to exo-atmospheric capable flight systems culminating 
in the successful Project Mercury. Although NASA has been philosophically 
committed to the principals of system safety, this case study points out that budget 
and manpower constraints-as well as a variety of internal and external pressures- 
can jeopardize even a well-designed system safety program. This study begins with a 
review of the evolution and early years of NASA’s rise as a project lead agency and 
ends with the lessons learned from Project Mercury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I05 
The concept of system safety is well known today but there are valuable 
lessons to be learned in examining the historical roadmap of aeronautical 
safety methodologies, specifically system safety programs, which have 
evolved from origins within and around the aviation industry. The value in 
this review is to better understand what programs and processes have been 
successfully employed and more importantly how to preserve the benefits of 
those expensive lessons learned. Hopefully this effort will help to identify 
some of the best practices that have evolved over the past century and 
produce a basis for system safety program managers to emulate in all 
applications. 
METHODOLOGY 
The term case study can have more than one meaning that includes the 
description of a particular organization or a research methodology. 
According to Bramley (1990), it is a “systematic inquiry into an event or a 
set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of 
interest” (p. 302). Yin defines the scope of case study research as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context (Yin, 2002). The unit of analysis for this study is the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), specifically the 
early years of the manned space program. This study is focused on an 
exploration and description of NASA’s use of system safety during the early 
years of the man in space program and not in formulating any specific 
proposit ions. 
The Beginning 
The first four decades of powered flight proved that a piecemeal, 
rearview mirror approach to safety is ineffective and expensive. Early 
airplane pioneers such as the Wright Brothers, Samuel P. Langley, Glenn 
Curtiss, and others practiced the fly-fix-fly approach to safety. Although 
aircraft performance improved dramatically during these early years, so too 
did the military accident rate. The U.S. Army Air Service reported in 1921 
“that the Air Service desires to perfect preventive accident measures to the 
fullest possible may be readily appreciated from the fact that during the 
calendar year 1920, 5 1 officers and enlisted men of the Air Service lost their 
lives in airplane accidents, [and] 3 12 airplanes were damaged or destroyed” 
This early expression of concern was soon translated into the first 
practical steps toward a formal accident prevention program. In December 
1925, Major Henry “Hap” Arnold identified the need for a systematic 
approach to aircraft maintenance. Military leadership stressed a systematic 
discipline, which focused on a proactive effort, seeking to identify hazards, 
(P. 25). 
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analyze them for risk, and then to control them as known quantities. The 
focus of this approach is to establish an acceptable level of safety, designed 
into the system as a whole before production or operation. This approach 
then seeks to identify and evaluate hazards before an incident or accident 
causes a loss-anything less is arguably a gamble. The current definition of 
system safety seeks to optimize all aspects of safety within constraints of 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle. 
The significance of the emphasis on all phases of the system life cycle will 
become apparent in the following history of NASA. 
An interesting case study presents itself while examining these early 
years of system safety practice. The marked contrast between what was 
available and what was employed, in terms of system safety management 
and engineering, is so striking that it calls for a more in- depth look. As with 
any program, gaining acceptance and support with subsequent 
administrations almost always requires an effort to convince the new 
management team that the old management team knew what they were 
doing. Egos and narcissism are plentiful in the aviation industry; the 
humorous quip, “You can tell a pilot - you just can’t tell him much” is true 
even among those who manage pilots, and the systems they fly. 
NACA History 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) was demonstrating worldwide leadership in 
aeronautical sciences. They concentrated their research in aerodynamics and 
aerodynamic loads, with lesser attention to sub-systems and components 
such as structures and power plants. During this era, NACA worked closely 
with the military services in joint projects that were its contractual lifeblood. 
Even as late as 1939, NACA was a relatively small organization with an 
annual budget of $4.6 million and a total workforce of approximately 500 
people, of which slightly over one-half were researchers (Swenson, 
Grimwood, & Alexander, 1966). 
In 1941, Jerome C. Hunsaker, head of the Department of Aeronautical 
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a 
member of the Main Committee of NACA, assumed the NACA 
chairmanship. As the U.S. geared its industrial might for war, NACA 
watched as Germany and the United Kingdom led aviation in areas such as 
jet propulsion and high-speed flight. Going into the war years, the majority 
of NACA’s research effort was oriented toward improving current designs or 
quick fixes to military aircraft already in production (Hunsaker, 1956). This 
organizational culture would follow NACA into the next decade. 
After the close of WW 11, the cold-war years continued to place 
demands for research, acquisition, and the fielding of new systems. 
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By 1946, NACA had grown to approximately 6,800 personnel with an annual budget 
of $40 million. Chairman Hunsaker and others on the Main Committee felt that 
NACA’s principal mission should be research into the fundamentals of aeronautics, 
however, the aircraft industry continued to rely on NACA as a problem-solving 
agency. The pressure and culture for quick fixes prevailed within the agency as the 
United States entered the conflict in Korea-war justified the need for expediency in 
solving various performance challenges and resulting system problems. (Hunsaker, 
1956, pp. 267-268) 
Closer inspection reveals that at this time in aviation industry’s history, 
the valuable lessons learned in the previous decade had not proliferated 
broadly into the overall aviation industry culture. 
The windfall discovery of extensive German aeronautical research 
programs after WW I1 compelled both the Army Air Force (AAF) and 
NACA to propose airplane research programs to Congress. For the AAF, 
struggling to achieve independence from the U.S. Army, the proposed new 
role was founded on justification that no other agency could do its flight 
research and development. The AAF’s safety program development since the 
earliest days of aviation lends credibility to that position. The mission was 
also a logical one for NACA as an extension of the research roles they had 
established in aeronautical systems development. 
In 1946, a team was assembled at Muroc Army Air Field, California 
[present day Edwards Air Force Base (AFB)] to begin the effort between the 
AAF, NACA, and research project manufacturer Bell Aircraft. Major 
General Albert Boyd, commander of Wright Field Flight Test Division and 
later the Flight Test Unit at Edwards AFB, reflecting on the success of  the 
X-1 research vehicle, said of the accomplishment, “[This work stands] as a 
monumental tribute to both the USAF and the NACA, since the sonic barrier 
monster was not only completely licked, but a blow-by-blow account of its 
defeat was recorded for future use” (Air Force-NACA Conference, 1948). 
President Harry S. Truman recognized the partnership’s 
accomplishments and presented the Collier Trophy for significant 
contributions in aerospace research to United States Air Force (USAF) 
Captain Chuck Yeager, Mr. Larry Bell of Bell Aircraft, and John Stack of 
NACA. 
The methodologies employed during the research conducted at Edwards 
AFB, including the work of the U.S. Navy (USN) and NACA on the 
Douglas Aircraft Company D-558, affected the designs of future military 
aircraft, which profited from the system acquisition approach employed by 
the military services. Follow-on tests of improved versions of the X-1 and a 
new design, the X-2, methodically tested the outer regions of supersonic 
flight in an effort to better understand hypersonic flight, which had to  be 
mastered to escape the bounds of earth. Proven designs found their way into 
future aircraft systems. More reliable systems translated to lower mishap 
rates and by the early 1950s the entire aviation industry (commercial and 
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military) were profiting from this research. Incorporating a proven 
acquisition process with system safety engineering at the basis, the military 
services and NACA were moving forward on a new experimental aircraft 
that would employ a rocket propulsion system capable of flying to nearly 
400,000 feet-the upper boundaries of the atmosphere where the traditional 
knowledge of aerodynamics were almost unrecognizable (Swenson et al., 
1996) 
The assault that took place on the upper regions of the atmosphere was 
arguably second only to the Wright Brothers conquering of sustained flight 
just 50 years previous. In 1952, Robert Woods of Bell Aircraft Corporation 
began efforts to promote manned space flight by urging the U.S. to analyze 
the basic problems of space flight. He further recommended research into a 
suitable test vehicle for space flight. Unfortunately, the urgency and 
resources for such an endeavor were simply not available at that time. 
By March 1954, however, the combined efforts of the USAF, USN and 
NACA’s laboratories at Langley, Ames, and the High Speed Flight Station at 
Edwards AFB produced contracts to study the concept and ready the studies 
for hypersonic flight. Using a cradle-to-grave approach, the first feasibility 
studies were used to identify all major hazards in detail and initiate means to 
either eliminate or reduce the severity of those known threats. Recognizing 
there were regions of flight that could not be duplicated in wind tunnels, the 
test program established goals that recognized materials and technology 
limitations, while leaving enough flexibility to modify the program as they 
discovered new facts. NACA Langley requested that boundaries to the 
development be established, calling for a flight research tool to be used to 
obtain the maximum amount of data for the development of follow-on 
systems in a three-year time limit. This was a brute force effort on its part to 
obtain flight information as soon as possible (Stillwell, 1964). 
History highlights a culture of expediency pervading within NACA and 
its successor NASA. This could be as a result of the motivating factors 
during WW I1 and the Korean War that provided contracts to NACA for 
quick fixes. Additionally, their use of unmanned test vehicles launched to 
gather test points had been successful but lacked the motivation or oversight 
of those who manage human lives. In the interest of time, higher risks can be 
accepted during unmanned test flights in a fly-fix-fly approach to testing, 
however the paradigm might be a difficult one to break when attempting to 
reduce the overall system risk in later human endeavors. Clearly, NACA’s 
focus was test data. 
It is difficult to prove, but certainly noteworthy, that it appears the 
NACA research engineers were willing to accept more risk than those who 
would fly the aircraft. In the design of the X- 15, NACA: 
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Emphasized that the airplane should not become encumhered with systems or 
components not essential to flight research. These requirements were tempered by 
knowledge that a three-year development schedule would leave little or no time to 
perfect systems and subsystems before first flight. (Stillwell, 1964, p. 3) 
With Department of Defense (DoD) oversight, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between the military services and NACA 
establishing guidelines for the program, with lines of authority and control. 
Establishing these fundamental understandings among the various agencies 
“had no small effect on the successful pursuit of the research. In essence, it 
states briefly that each partner agrees to carry out the task it is best qualified 
for” (Stillwell, 1964, p. 5). 
The USAF Aeronautical Systems Division (formerly the Wright Air 
Development Center) provided a shepherding role during concept 
development. In December 1954, an agreement between the military services 
and NACA was accepted with operational arrangements similar to those in 
the X-1 and other experimental flight tests conducted at Edwards AFB. The 
USAF was responsible for finding a contractor and supervising design and 
construction; both the USAF and the USN would fund the project. 
Technical direction would come from NACA. 
The Los Angeles Division of North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA) 
won the design based on past performance and safety records. (NAA had 
already demonstrated system safety approaches in development of other 
systems and Los Angeles was the aerospace Mecca of system safety 
engineers.) Although NACA studies had possible solutions for major 
technological concerns, the basic challenge of how to build an airplane 
capable of Mach 6 speeds flying to 250,000 feet was not precisely defined 
and iiie aerodynamic information necessary was incomplete or simply not 
available. Throughout this phase, the DoD program managers were 
continually forced to provide a reconciliation of differing viewpoints as each 
partner in the project had different objectives. The X-15 was to become the 
product of one year of study, one year of design and one year of 
construction. These types of broad milestones are frequently used in the 
early phase of system safety planning groups. 
The preliminary hazard identification effort during the design concept 
phase did not limit safety concerns to only the X-15 pilot. The potential 
danger to the B-52 crew (stage 1 propulsion system) also had to be 
considered, as an explosion of the X-15 during separation and initiation of 
self-powered flight could be a serious threat to the launch vehicle. For this 
reason, safe operation of the X-15 (stage 2 propulsion systems) became a 
primary objective. Reaction Motors Inc. (soon to become a division of the 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation) was chosen for the task. Reaction Motors 
had designed and built many rocket engines for X-series research projects 
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and, in over 384 flights, had never had a catastrophic engine failure. The 
technical specifications for the X- 15's XLR-99 engine outlined that: 
Any single malfunction in either engine or propulsion system should not create a 
condition which would be hazardous to the pilot. [Engineers set about an exacting 
design philosophy] ... endeavoring to prevent malfunctions ... [by designing] the 
engine so that the conditions following any malfunctions would be controlled before 
they became hazardous. (Stillwell, 1964, p. 5 )  
The result of these efforts was a 96% reliability rate, a figure that 
shames other missile engines in this era. This is the essence of system safety 
philosophy in the concept and design phases, clearly demonstrating its 
practice within the military services, NAA, and the rocket motor division of 
the Thiokol Corporation in 1954. 
A vibrant product improvement and development program continued 
throughout the operational life cycle of the X-15. In 1956 the aerodynamic 
design was established, while NAA pushed the limits of available materials 
with heat resistant Inconel-X to complete the structural design. In 1958 the 
introduction of new fabrication techniques happened, while the 
development-test program during the years 1959 to 1964 produced many 
examples of product improvement during the operational phase of use. 
Using a system approach to design and acquisition does not guarantee a 
risk-free program without unexpected surprises. However, the frequency, 
severity, and total cost of such an event should be a calculated risk-not a 
gamble-accepted by someone at the appropriate level of decision making. 
The X-15 project had a few surprises. One aircraft broke in half on landing. 
A more spectacular event occurred during ground tests of the XLR-99 
engine when the engine violently exploded due to a sub-component failure. 
This mishap would most certainly have cost test pilot Scott Crossfield his 
life had this occurred in-flight, however the controlled environment in which 
the test was conducted (land based) combined with the cockpit design, 
aircraft structure, and the life support systems built into the design allowed 
him to survive (Stillwell, 1964). 
The flight test program progressed from flight to flight on foundations 
of discovery. Since testing involved venturing into the unknown, operational 
considerations required an answer to every possible issue. What-if questions 
involved many man-hours of fault tree analysis before allowing a pilot to 
potentially face such a critical event in flight. Analog and then digital 
computers were used to simulate flights on the ground, thus allowing pilots 
and engineers to work literally side by side as they test-flew a mission on the 
ground before any actual flight attempt. The operational margin of safety 
was the governing issue of the program. Each flight became an extrapolation 
of previous experience to more stringent parameters. 
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The significant accomplishments of the X-15 program are often 
compared to those of the unmanned efforts in space exploration during this 
era. The advantages or disadvantages of human versus automated machine 
are often at the center of the debate and continue to this day. However, the 
success rate at achieving research objectives over a five-year period, 
covering 120 flights with a 92% mission success rate certainly speaks highly 
of the reliability designed into the X-15 program. Was it the man in the 
cockpit or the men on the ground and the value they placed in human life 
aboard the research vehicle that contributed to the success of this project? 
Did the fact that the Flight Controller, responsible for the coordination and 
control of the complete mission, and one of the experienced test pilots, 
insure the tough issues were resolved with an err toward conservativeness? 
How were these conflicting positions resolved when the cultural differences 
between the various organizations represented in the research project 
gridlocked in a heated debate? Were system safety processes responsible for 
the differences noted between this and other programs outside of DoD 
management? These and other behind-the-scenes issues are outside the scope 
of this study; however, the strong commitment to safety of those in 
leadership positions far outweigh less formal processes left to resolve 
differences on their own. Clear-cut guidance from above is essential when 
the tough questions surface, as they inevitably do. 
The successes of the X-planes programs, managed by the collaborative 
effort of the military services and employing system safety processes, even 
though it was still an evolving process, boosted the prestige of NACA as a 
research agency. The reputation for thorough aeronautical research that 
NACA quietly built in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s continued 
to grow until the organization transformed into a new space agency, almost 
evemight, when President Eisenhower sigiied the Space Act on Jiiiy 29, 
1958 (National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958). 
USAF Leadership into Space 
The X- 15 operated in what was termed the near-space equivalent. (Its 
pilots wore astronaut wings and dealt with re-entry issues much more 
demanding than a capsule re-entry from space into the earth’s atmosphere.). 
However, the expediency felt by some to simply place a man into orbit 
around the earth compelled research engineers to seek other solutions to the 
goal as winged craft were taking too much time to accomplish that objective. 
In one camp, aerodynamicists were working on a hypersonic research 
aircraft with delta wings to handle the heat of atmospheric re-entry using a 
program managed by the USAF. The other camp was reviewing how to 
quickly modify an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch vehicle 
(also managed by the USAF) to propel a ballistic capsule system, 
irreverently referred to as man in a can, into low Earth orbit. The capsule 
method was nothing more than an extension of re-entry vehicles used in the 
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development of ICBMs. The limiting factor for adding a man was payload 
capabilities of existing launch vehicles and the weight of the capsule with its 
life support systems. Reliable missile technology did not currently exist with 
an ability to lift the heavier (winged) hypersonic-glide vehicle into orbit. For 
this reason, industrial firms were mainly investigating the ballistic capsule 
option as the quickest solution to orbiting a manned vehicle even though 
winged craft were already operationally testing the lower regions of space. In 
late 1956, NACA agreed in principle with the USAF Air Research 
Development Command (ARDC) to cooperate on the manned glide rocket 
research system. By January 1957, the NACA Ames group reported 
conclusions that a rocket-powered vehicle for efficient hypersonic flight was 
feasible. A minority report from a NACA Langley aerodynamicist in the 
Flight Research Instrument Research and Pilotless Aircraft Research 
Division (PARD), recommended a spherical capsule be considered for global 
flight before a glide rocket. There was little interest expressed in work on 
this proposal within the main body of NACA at this time (Swenson et al., 
1966). 
NACA study groups continued the investigation of manned glide rocket 
concepts. A 1957 study on the Preliminary Investigation of a New Research 
Airplane for Exploring the Problems of Efficient Hypersonic Flight (NACA) 
supported a raised-top, flat-bottom glider configuration. Soon thereafter, on 
October 4, 1957, the opening bell of the space race sounded. The U.S.S.R. 
had launched a satellite into earth’s orbit and altered our nation’s altitude 
about space exploration. 
Even though the official position of the Eisenhower Administration was 
a no race policy, a new urgency was adopted and efforts to expedite space 
exploration were accelerated. On October 15, 1957, representatives from the 
various NACA laboratories met at the Ames center in an effort to resolve 
conflicts in aerodynamic thinking. Dubbed the Round Three Conference, the 
meeting produced the fundamental concept for the X-20 project. A small 
contingent returned to Langley convinced that maximum concentration of 
effort to achieve manned orbital flight as quickly as possible meant use of 
the ballistic-capsule approach. Dr. Maxime A. Faget, speaking to the entire 
conference, declared that NACA had misplaced its research emphasis on the 
hypersonic-glide option and should work on orbiting a man as fast as 
possible (Swenson et al., 1966). 
In December 1957, Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, USAF Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Development, moved to establish a directorate-level 
program for aeronautics within the USAF. The effort was quickly opposed 
by the Secretary of Defense, who was not supportive of any military services 
venturing into astronautics despite their ongoing research efforts. The newly 
appointed DoD Director of Guided Missiles accused the USAF with trying 
to grab the limelight and establish a position. It is interesting to note the 
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Secretary of Defense, a political appointee of President and retired General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, would fail to recognize the value added from the 
DoD’s own acquisition program and chide the USAF for continuing to do 
what President Truman had spoken so highly of in the effort to break the 
sound barrier. It appears the politics of space exploration had overridden 
common sense. 
The directorate idea was shelved and USAF Headquarters (HQ) ordered 
the ARDC to prepare a comprehensive review of the astronautics program, 
including estimates of funding and space technology projections over the 
next five years. ARDC had already been working on a 15-year plan for 
USAF research and development in astronautics and quickly reduced its 
finding down to a 5-year plan. General Putt wrote to NACA Director Hugh 
L. Dryden on January 3 1, 1958, formally inviting NACA to participate with 
the USAF in both the boost-glide research airplane (the Dyna-Soar) and a 
manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a satellite orbit. 
Dryden informed General Putt that NACA was working on their design for a manned 
space capsule and would “coordinate” with the USAF later when they completed 
their studies. By this date. NACA had already developed its own goals of managing 
manned space exploration and was beginning to spread its wings. (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 74) 
Behind the scenes, NACA HQ administrators saw an opportunity for the 
agency to broaden their activities by moving into astronautics. Some 
managers within NACA wanted to leave behind its principal role in research 
projects and expand into system development and flight operations, despite 
having only been a participant in such programs with no managing 
experience. Seeking a leadership role in the uncertain world of contracts, 
fii!!-sca!e flight operations and puS!ic i ~ l a t i c ~ ~ ,  NACA fixed their sights oii a 
broad-based national space program with a principal objective to 
demonstrate the practicality of manned space flight. During the ten months 
between the first Sputnik launch and the establishment of a manned space 
program under a newly designated agency, NACA leadership continued to 
ensure their current role in traditional research and consultation while at the 
same time unleashing an ambitious team of engineers scattered throughout 
the NACA establishment to allow themselves to take a dominant role in the 
nation’s new objective in space (Swenson et al., 1966). The DoD was slowly 
abdicating its ability to positively influence the nation’s space efforts. At 
least five years of successful system safety management was soon to be 
pushed aside as project management of space exploration was handed over 
to a new entrant into the big leagues of government contracts, public 
relations and Congressional oversight. 
President Eisenhower’s stated U.S. policy held that space activities 
should be conducted solely for peaceful purposes. The objectives of guided 
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missile projects of the time reflected this policy. In a letter to Soviet Premie] 
Nikolai Bulganin, dated January 12, 1958, the President stated; 
Outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes ... Can we not stop the 
production of such weapons which would use or, more accurately, misuse, outer 
space, now for the first time opening up as a field for man’s exploration? Should not 
outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purposes 
of war? (Eisenhower letter to Nikolai Bulganin, 1958) 
By April 1958, members of Congress would introduce a total of 29 bill5 
and resolutions calling for re-organization of the nation’s space efforts. Thc 
Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee under Senator Lyndon B 
Johnson summarized its findings with recommendations to establish ar 
independent space agency. During these times of transition, the militarq 
services dutifully continued their planning of space programs using prover 
system acquisition practices in the hope of securing their role in future space 
programs and with the knowledge that a newly formed organization woulc 
take several months if not years to take the reigns currently held by the 
various research program managers within the armed services. 
NACA Covets a Leadership Role 
Consistent with Eisenhower’s peaceful space policy, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the DoD had been used as an interim 
oversight agency pending establishment of a new civilian-controlled 
aerospace management organization. Top-level management of these 
programs shifted from the DoD to a completely new organization in shorl 
order. President Eisenhower ordered an 18-member Presidential Scientific 
Advisory Committee (PSAC), chaired by James R. Killian, Jr., President oi 
MIT, for advice on these matters. Eisenhower’s directions to this committee 
were to draw up two documents: (a) a broad policy statement justifying 
government-financed astronautical ventures and (b) a recommendation for 
organizing a national space program. The early PSAC work was dubbed the 
Killian Committee and was divided into two subcommittees. One 
subcommittee was charged to develop policy and was headed by Edward H. 
Purcell, a physicist and executive vice-president of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories; the other subcommittee developed an organizational structure 
and was led by Harvard University physicist James B. Fisk. (Swenson et al.? 
1966). 
Two physicists, one a corporate leader and the other an academic, 
developed the policy and organizational structure of a neophyte flight 
research, development, and operations organization charged with conquering 
this new flight environment called space. The organizational work was 
completed first and the subcommittee produced a crucial report to the PSAC 
in February 1958. A new agency built around NACA would be created to 
manage a comprehensive national program in astronautics, emphasizing 
Hansen and Pitts 115 
peaceful, civilian-controlled research and development. The PSAC report, 
titled Introduction to Outer Space, was published in March, and stated, “the 
compelling urge of man to explore and to discover, the defense objective, 
national prestige, and new opportunities for scientific observation and 
experiment are four factors which give importance, urgency, and 
inevitability to the advancement of space technology” (PSAC, 1958, p. 2). 
The President’s intense conviction that space should be primarily 
reserved for scientific exploration, not military exploitation, called for the 
establishment of a “National Aeronautical and Space Agency.. .which would 
absorb NACA and assume responsibility for all space activities ... except ... 
those projects primarily associated with military requirements” (Swenson et 
al., 1966, p. 84). A single executive and a 17-member advisory board called 
for extension of the NACA Main Committee concept with a centralized 
authority that would “have not only research but development, managerial, 
and flight operational responsibilities” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 83). This 
was a significant executive decision that launched a loosely woven group of 
research scientists and engineers into a national agency, unlike its NACA 
predecessor, with extensive authority for contracting research and 
development projects. The USAF and USN lost management control of the 
research programs into outer space and would take a subordinate advisory or 
support role in non-atmospheric flight operations. Would the valuable 
experience in flight test and research program management be transferred as 
well? 
NACA’s Focus 
In addition to their contract work to date, engineers at all NACA 
installations had been stepping up research in materials and aerodynamics 
preparing for large-scale development and operational activities. The 
primary purpose of NACA’s work to this point in its history had always been 
to improve the performance of piloted aircraft. Different philosophies existed 
within the various NACA labs and not everyone was convinced that the 
agency’s best interests lay in managing programs and carrying out satellite 
launching. Many of the more focused research engineers endorsed the 
official NACA HQ position that, “with respect to space it neither wanted not 
expected more than its historic niche in government-financed science and 
engineering. ..it should remain essentially a producer of data for use by 
others” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 77). The prevailing attitude within the 
Ames Research Center about the prospect of managing programs was 
exceedingly distasteful. The Ames engineers enjoyed the quasi-academic 
focus on research, the outside-of-the-box thinking it was noted for and the 
freedom from political pressures. This same attitude did not exist at the other 
two labs or at the High Speed Flight Station at Edwards AFB. The years of 
direct participation with USAFAJSN and research aircraft manufacturers 
provided Walter Williams and his staff at the Flight Station a rather clear 
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operational orientation. The NACA Lewis and Langley staffs apparently 
understood the magnitude of the effort, but seemingly minimized it as they 
only stated it would be quite a challenge to manage a program versus simply 
advising the military or industrial providers. Most of NACA did approve of 
the scientific measures provided by President Eisenhower to Congress 
espousing their ideas. 
In the various NACA Flight Research facilities at Langley, Wallops 
Island, and Lewis, there were engineers who had experience in operational 
issues while developing airfoils, however, they had always turned those 
research findings over to DoD management. Now, enticed by the prospect of 
national prominence, vast amounts of government funding, and the surge of 
emotions delivered by the Soviet’s first-in-space achievements, it is easily 
recognizable why an ambitious group of research engineers seized the 
opportunity to put their expertise to work. 
Man in a Can Prevails 
In the months following the Soviet satellite launchings, NACA’s 
attention to spacecraft design accelerated as they realized their nose-cone 
research for ICBMs was applicable and transferable to manned vehicles as 
well. While still working with the USAF on plans for a manned orbital 
project in March 1958, they had in fact been given official sanction to 
provide work they had already been accomplishing. Thus the Langley 
engineers had found a clever way to perform early development work for 
their own ambitious enterprise-Project Mercury. 
The primary advocate behind much of this activity was Dr. Faget, head 
of the Performance Aerodynamics Branch in PARD, who embodied the 
traditional Langley research culture that preferred to test aerodynamic 
theories on instrumented free-flight vehicles versus wind tunnel testing. Dr. 
Faget was on record favoring the quickest solution to space, the capsule 
option, while NACA Ames was avidly pushing the semi-lifting body 
concept, without the responsibility to build the vehicle or manage the 
program. 
The choice between the semi-lifting configuration (X-20 concept) 
favored by the Ames group and the capsule device really was an academic 
one to supporters of the capsule option. Accepting the assumption that a 
manned satellite should be placed into low-earth orbit as quickly as possible, 
the Atlas ICBM would have to serve as the launch vehicle for the relatively 
lighter capsule. The Atlas ICBM was undergoing a rigorous systematic 
review toward status as a reliable rocket (per military specifications) and it 
was the only launch vehicle near operational readiness. These questionable 
caveats limit the choices and build a paradigm around the option, which 
allegedly uses the simplest, quickest, and most dependable approach-ruling 
out the heavier, semi-lifting vehicle that would have required adding an extra 
stage to the Atlas rocket. Interestingly enough, Faget did not have detailed 
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data on the Atlas’ design performance; such information was highly 
classified and he lacked clearance. 
While the engineers at NACA accelerated their designs, tests, and plans, 
and Congress received Eisenhower’s space bill, the organizational 
transformation of NACA began. After the White House Advisory Committee 
on Government Organization recommended that a national civilian space 
program be built around NACA, Director Dryden and his subordinates in 
Washington began planning the revamping that would have to accompany 
the reorientation of NACA functions. On April 2, 1958, as part of his space 
message to Congress, Eisenhower instructed NACA and the DoD to review 
the projects then under ARPA to determine which should be transferred to 
the new civilian space agency (NASA, n.d.). 
NACA and DoD representatives, in consultation with Bureau of the 
Budget officials, reached tentative agreements on the disposition of 
practically all the projects and facilities in question, with the notable 
exception of manned space flight. In accordance with Eisenhower’s directive 
that NACA “describe the internal organization, management structure, staff, 
facilities, and funds which will be required (Rosholt, 1966, p. 8), NACA set 
up an ad hoc committee on organization. The Space Act additionally called 
for a civilian-military liaison, appointed by the President, to ensure “full 
interchange of information and data acquired in NASA and Defense 
Department programs” (Swenson et ai., 1966, p. 98). 
The U.S. military systems management experiences of the past decade 
would not make the transition. The handoff from DoD management of flight 
research, especially in the area of system acquisition and safety, to the new 
national space exploration agency was not going to be a clean one. 
Ambitious research engineers, dividing their attention between their 
11 ~ U I L ~ O I I ~ I  I UICS iii support of goveiiiinent pi ojeeis atid ioiai tnatiageiiietit of 
their new enterprise, essentially failed to capture valuable lessons learned by 
the USAF and USN management of the activities at Edwards AFB. Political 
pressures within NASA to fulfill this new destiny forced many of those 
dissenting opinions to join the team that was now taking control of a 
program in support of a national objective. The pressure to think as the group 
thought must have been tremendous for those researchers and engineers who 
had been educated in the school of hard-knocks at the various military test 
facilities over the last decade. This was certainly not the last time that group- 
think would become problematic for the space agency. 
Quantitative System Safety Programs 
In 1958 while NACA engineers were maneuvering to take over research 
and development as the lead organization in the space race, the USAF was 
pressing ahead with the successful acquisition programs that had been 
evolving for the past five decades. The first quantitative system safety 
analysis effort to address hazard prevention in new designs was initiated 
*..-A:* - - l  ..-I-.. 
1 l I 8  Joirrnal of Air Transportation 
with the X-20 Dyna-Soar program. Due to its design criteria to fly beyond 
the atmosphere, the X-20 was recognized to have unique emergency, rescue, 
and survival problems. Fulfilling a safety objective that states each person 
should be allowed to live and work under conditions in which hazards are 
known and controlled to an acceptable level of potential harm, system safety 
pioneers such as USAF Colonel George Ruff, of the Ballistics System 
Division, participated in initiating the first system safety programs required 
of prime contractors. (Roland & Moriarty, 1983) Unfortunately, NACA 
management did not learn this during their operational exposure at Edwards 
AFB. Predictably it was not transferred to their follow-on agency, NASA. 
While safety experts struggled with hazards, politicians dealt with their 
own threats-the budget. That same year, the USAF attempted to invite 
NACA to join them in the man in space program on either the boost-glide 
(X-20) or the manned capsule (Mercury) projects. Director Hugh Dryden 
signed a formal agreement on the boost-glide research while rejecting the 
offer to join in the capsule option, as they were working on their own 
designs. This somewhat disingenuous act was self-serving for NACA, and 
readily points to how the X-20 program was overcome by politics and 
leapfrogging national priorities. Without doubt, the X-20 program would 
have escorted system safety concepts into the exploration of outer space, just 
like those ballistic missile programs managed by DoD. The budget for the X- 
20 was restricted. Funding waned as the nation embraced the man in a can 
approach. Ultimately, in December 1963 Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara canceled the project and a majority of USAFKJSN participation 
in the exploration of space (Swenson et al., 1966). 
The military services never abandoned their commitment to system 
safety, and continued to use a system approach as ballistic missile 
development pressed ahead during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In July 
1960, a system safety office was established at the USAF Ballistic Missile 
Division in Inglewood, California. In April of that year, the USAF had 
published the first system-wide safety specification titled BSD Exhibit 62-4 1 
(Stephenson, 1991). The Naval Aviation Safety Center was the first to 
become active in promoting an inter-service system safety specification for 
aircraft, using BSD Exhibit 62-41 as a model. By 1962, system safety was 
identified as a contract deliverable item on military contracts and that same 
year Roger Lockwood held organizational meetings in the Los Angeles area 
of what would become the System Safety Society-a professional 
organization incorporated as an international, non-profit organization 
dedicated to the safety of systems, products, and services. (Stephenson, 
1991). By 1964, The University of Southern California had developed a 
Master’s degree program to support industry demands for these specialties. 
BSD Exhibit 62-41 was broadened in September 1963, as MIL-S-38130, 
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which in 1969 became the model for MIL-STD-882, a standard that has been 
updated over the years and exists today (USAF, 2000). 
Project Management by Trial and Error 
The rapid growth of NASA from a research-support agency to that of 
primary agency and program management for space exploration points to a 
hazard in itself and offers hindsight into the executive decision to make such 
a bold move. Almost certainly there was no intent to abandon the successful 
programs and relationships forged by the USAFIUSN and even NACA, but 
the reality of politics is that once you lose control of the purse strings you 
often lose input to the direction of a program. Almost immediately 
discussions between the managing NASA agency and the manufacturer of 
various components of the ballistic capsule option highlight the lack of 
understanding and commitment, from the top down, to maintain previously 
established DoD relationships with the contractors. Debates of semantics 
broke out and a numbers game was tagged to some of the developmental 
efforts to quantify various engineering decisions. Some complained that 
reliability was a slippery word, suggesting more than could be proven. Of 
course in other endeavors, including aviation and missile acquisition, it had 
already achieved a recognized discipline as an engineering practice 
In mid-1959, well after design and development work on major systems 
of the Mercury capsule were well under way, a search for a means of 
predicting failures and increasing reliability was modestly undertaken by 
NASA’s Space Task Group (STG) and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation 
(MAC) engineers. This paradigm was consistent among other groups 
working in support, which also had not used formal processes to achieve 
quality control in various systems and sub-systems. “Mathematical analyses 
of the word reliability both clarified its operational meaning and stirred 
resistance to [a] statistical approach to quality control” (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 178). 
Aviation research and development in the 1950s had witnessed a 
remarkable growth in the application of statistical quality control to ensure 
the reliability of various systems. The science of operations analysis and the 
art of quality had emerged by the end of the 1950s as special vocations. 
Amazingly, in what can only be viewed as a narcissistic not-invented-here 
attitude, STG executive engineers overlooked DoD examples and studied 
new methods for more scientific management of efficiency provided by the 
automobile industry. 
By 1959, when it was finally decided to organize engineering design 
information and data on component performance, the definition of critical 
parts had to be established. The STG and MAC worked to create that 
definition while analysis suffered. NASA HQ sought outside help and USAF 
systems engineers were used. They pointed to certain semantic problems in 
the primitive concepts being used for reliability analyses by NASA. 
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Amazingly, some of the debates centered on questions such as, what 
constitutes a system, and how should we define failure. An indication of a 
more mature process was the question, what indices or coefficients best 
measure overall system performance from subsystem data (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 179). 
Indications of the level of resistance to these proven methodologies were 
the positions taken by some creative engineers who felt the features of 
reliability prediction were so subjective that many seriously questioned the 
validity and even the reliability of reliability predictions. One apologist in 
this field admitted, “Reliability engineering may seem to be more mysticism 
and black art than ... down-to-earth engineering. In particular, many 
engineers look on reliability prediction as a kind of space-age astrology in 
which failure rate tables have been substituted for the zodiac” (Swenson et 
al., 1966, p. 179). 
Although a skeptical attitude did exist within STG, newly arrived 
Associate Administrator Richard E. Homer brought a staff of 
mathematicians and statisticians led by Nicholas E. Golovin, who transferred 
from the USAF to NASA some of the mathematical techniques lending 
quantitative support to demands for qualitative assurance. NASA HQ and the 
Langley laboratory worked at cross-purposes for nearly a year as reliability 
and safety were debated. NASA HQ worked aggressively to align the STG 
and MAC worked to change their methods. Increasing the level of reliability 
became a major goal during testing in 1960. 
Sorting Wheat from Chaff 
Statisticians, and actuaries, working with large and statistically 
significant amounts of data, have long been able to achieve excellent 
predictions (as witnessed in the insurance industry’s successes) by defining 
reliability as probability. However, this has never provided the ability to 
predict what would happen in a specific instance. STG and MAC managers 
working a specific system or project ridiculed probability theory and 
continued to reference the numbers game, failing to accept the statistical 
value of such efforts. They felt that reliability could be demonstrated as 
ability. Harry Powell, the senior statistician at Space Technology 
Laboratories for the Atlas weapon system, elaborated on this debate while 
man-rating the Atlas rocket. 
If reliability is to be truly understood and controlled, then it must be thought of as a 
device, a physical property which behaves in accordance with certain physical laws. 
In order to insure that a device will have these physical properties it is necessary to 
consider it first as a design parameter. In other words, reliability is a property of the 
equipment, which must be designed into the equipment by the engineers. Reliability 
cannot be tested into a device and it cannot be inspected into a device; it can only be 
achieved if it is first designed into a device. Most design engineers are acutely aware 
that they are under several obligations-to meet schedules, to design their equipment 
with certain space and weight limitations, and to create a black box (a subsystem) 
Hansen and Pitts 121 
uhich will give certain outputs when certain inputs are fed into it. It is imperative 
that they also be aware of their obligation to design a device which will in fact 
perform its required function under operation conditions whenever it is called upon 
to do so. (Swenson et al., 1966, p.180) 
A generally accepted standard in probability theory states the reliability 
of a system is exactly equal to the product of the reliability of each of its 
subsystems in series. The obvious way to mitigate risk (a hazard with 
measured probability multiplied by severity) is to place two mission critical 
components in parallel to perform the same function. If one system fails, the 
other assumes the critical function. Redundancy is a favored technique used 
to ensure reliability. 
The MAC production of the Mercury capsule was taking longer to build 
than forecast primarily as a result of limited system integration within the 
project. Fuzzy lines of authority and communications without the benefit of 
the sharing of intelligence across organizational lines of reporting among the 
various activities involved in the program were hindering an efficient 
process. Even with these strong indicators of a flawed acquisition 
management style, STG and MAC felt the basic dispute over safety versus 
success, or positive versus negative redundancy, could be settled only with 
actual flight test experience, that is, a fly-fix-fly approach. 
A precaution for safety program managers is highlighted by this 
historical event. Even though safety programs are in place, a lack of 
standardization and commonality of purpose among line organizations will 
result in non-effective monitoring, evaluation, and eventually loss of control 
in safety efforts throughout an organization. 
As Project Mercury matured, the costs of solutions to technological and 
training problems rose. NASA administrators appeared frequently before 
~ ~ ~ ~ 5 ~ & u ~ ~ a ~  vvcI&ut committees and admitted their growing concern 
with manned space flight, as opposed to other space activities. T. K. Glennan 
requested a supplemental $23 million appropriation to the fiscal year 1960 
NASA budget of $500.6 million and justified $19 million of that extra sum 
on the basis of the urgent technological demands of Project Mercury. “It 
would be no exaggeration to say that the immediate focus of the U S .  space 
program is upon this project” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 1 SO), stated Glennan, 
waving the national objective in front of those with the purse strings in hand. 
In February 1960, at NASA HQ in Washington, a high-level debate over 
the meticulous versus the statistical approach to reliability was vigorously 
discussed between NASA HQ, STG, and MAC representatives. They met in 
conference to decide what weight to give the numbers game in a frank and 
confidential estimate of readiness. The Chief of Reliability, John C. French, 
defended STG’s practical procedures against the theoretical approach of 
NASA HQ’s Nicholas E. Golovin. Eugene Kunznick also outlined the 
particulars of the prime contractor’s quality control measures, and delivered 
pnnnror .A- - - . - - - - - I -  
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the third revision of MAC’s reliability program. Walter Williams presented 
STG’s latest views on operational flight safety, and STG generally endorsed 
MAC’s reliability program review as its own. At the conclusion of the 
meeting, NASA HQ was not convinced with the efforts taken by STG and 
MAC. 
Reliability issues caused scheduling delays and raised eyebrows toward the end of 
June 1960, when the qualification flight tests had been postponed by at least six 
months. Capsule system testing needed a completely new process, including 
organization, procedures, and test equipment. The top technical managers of Project 
Mercury and STG began to recognize some of their flawed thinking regarding 
reliability and admitted that quality control and reliability testing had to be raised to 
a new level. This effort targeted not only man and machine but man-rating (ensuring 
the equipment is certified safe for humans) and machine-rating (ensuring the human 
can safety operate the machine) processes as well. (This is consistent with today’s 5- 
M model, which addresses the man, machine, media. management and mission as 
part of the entire human performance equation in system approaches.) A NASA HQ 
internal note recorded some of the issues: 
One of the major problems facing Mercury management is the contlict between a 
real desire to meet schedules and the feeling of need for extensive ground tests. The 
MAC capsule systems tests are not meeting this need since they were not intended 
for this purpose and since the pressure of time sometimes forces bypassing of some 
details (to be caught later at the Cape). Further, there has not been time available (or 
taken) on the part of MAC to study and update the CST [Capsule System Test] 
procedures and SEDR’s (sic) [Service Engineering Department Report]. I t  was 
concluded that a group (mostly MAC effort) should be set up to review and update 
the CST and SEDR procedures. It is also firm that no details will be bypassed in the 
Cape checkout without the express approval of STG management (Swenson et al., 
1966. p. 258). 
Risk management was evolving at NASA. At the highest level within 
NASA, Administrator Glennan and associates recognized that the 
opportunity to make significant changes in NASA’s organization and 
procedures would not exist much longer. A report written by a consultant 
firm McKinsey and Company revealed that NASA’s record in supervising 
out-of-house efforts was spotty. Their findings highlighted that NASA had 
neglected to manage certain basic prerequisites in their oversight of the 
various contractors. NASA had failed to provide comprehensive statements 
of work, sufficient funding, ill-defined tasks, and ineffective contractor 
supervision, as well as failing to provide properly focused technical 
responsibilities-a NACA strong suit in previous DoD programs. (A basic 
problem was NASA’s tendency to establish two channels of supervision- 
one from HQ, the other from the field center. 
New Leadership 
January 1961 saw a change in the nation’s administration and a change 
at NASA HQ. President-elect Kennedy commissioned an ad hoc committee 
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on space, chaired by Jerome B. Wiesner. The press received the hastily 
prepared report with mixed reactions. 
Roscoe Drurnmond, a syndicated columnist ... charged that no Kennedy 
representative had consulted NASA to study the workings of the agency nor had any 
Kennedy official read or listened to briefings that had been prepared for the new 
leaders by outgoing Administrator Glennan and his staff. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 
360) 
The press was also highly critical of the political transition process, 
noting that Administrator Glennan had departed from Washington on 
Inauguration Day, January 20, 1961, with no one named as a successor. In 
accordance with Washington protocol, Hugh L. Dryden had resigned as well. 
The report was tacitly adopted when President Kennedy appointed 
Jerome Wiesner Chairman of the PSAC for the new administration, although 
Aviation Week stated that President Kennedy had rejected the committee’s 
advice and decided to accept the risk if the first manned shot failed (Hotz, 
1961). This kind of executive decision with full knowledge of a formal risk 
analysis is certainly within bounds of a system safety program. However, 
Drummond fbrther charged that no persons representing the Kennedy 
administration had read or been briefed regarding the workings of NASA as 
prepared by the outgoing Administrator. This coupled with a superficial 
review of the workings of such an immense project as Project Mercury is 
insufficient to adequately allow for an informed decision and absent these 
kinds of review, accepting risk at this point appears to be more politics than 
science. 
An interesting sidebar to this political intrigue is that the Eisenhower 
administration’s last budget recommendation for manned space flight 
research and dcvelopiiieni was to cut $i9O.i miiiion from NASA’s fiscai 
1962 $1.1 billion total budget. The Bureau of the Budget in January allowed 
a total NASA request of $919.5 million, only $1 14 million of which was 
earmarked for manned space flight, including Project Mercury. Some $584 
million was requested for military astronautics within the DoD budget that 
same fiscal year. (Swenson et al., 1966) 
On February 2, 1961, Senator Robert S. Kerr, chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, presided over the 
confirmation hearings for a new NASA Administrator. James Edwin Webb, 
experienced businessman, lawyer, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and 
Under Secretary of the Department of State from 1949 to 1951, who had also 
served as a director of MAC. Armed with a resume full of bureaucratic 
qualifications, Mr. Webb certainly had a technical challenge facing him. It 
was felt that even though his background was not that of a scientist, he was 
widely known in governmental and industrial circles for having worked with 
scientists and engineers. From history’s recordings, one can feel safe in 
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presuming that during Mr. Webb’s stint at MAC he was not exposed to a 
comprehensive background in system safety management. The Senate 
confirmed Webb’s nomination after he severed all his business connections 
with MAC. 
Even as NASA struggled to launch unmanned test vehicles, it was 
apparent Project Mercury’s ends were merely a means to the greater goal of 
landing on the Moon. The funding for Project Apollo was under review in 
Congress as U.S.S.R. Major Yuri Gagarin’s flight provided a tremendous 
impetus to the desires of Americans to continue the race that was now 
officially a race. Congress appeared willing to appropriate more money than 
NASA could spend. Robert Seamans, third in command of NASA as 
Associate Administrator and general manager, actually had difficulty 
restraining the House space committee’s demands for an all-out crash 
program for a lunar landing. President Kennedy, consistent with one of his 
campaign promises, reacted to the U.S.S.R.’s manned orbit of earth by 
saying, “We are behind ... the news will be worse before it is better, and it will 
be some time before we catch up (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 336).” 
On March 9, 1961, Representative Overton Brooks wrote to President 
Kennedy regarding reports in trade journals that the space program might 
turn toward military oversight. Representative Brooks was concerned the 
Wiesner report pointed to this as he was also aware of a special PSAC 
investigating committee of scientists led by Donald F. Hornig. This 
committee was conducting a top down review of the manned space program. 
In his letter, Brooks reminded President Kennedy of the spirit and intent of 
the 1958 Space Act which was to: 
Ensure that control of space research remain in civilian hands so that resulting 
information and technological applications would be open for the benefit of all 
enterprise, both private and public. [Further,] too much information would become 
classified if the military were preeminent in space research, development, and 
exploration. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 325) 
President Kennedy gave reassurance that NASA’s conduct of space 
exploration would not be placed subordinate to the military. For better or 
worse the marriage of the neophyte NASA management team and space 
exploration was now consummated. 
Project Mercury Lessons Learned 
Project Mercury lasted 55 months, from authorization through Gordon 
Cooper’s final MA-9 mission. The earliest planned orbital mission ran 22 
months past its originally scheduled launch date and achieved its original 
objectives (placing a man in low-earth orbit) with John Glenn’s MA-6 flight 
40 months after formal project approval. From some perspectives this was a 
good record compared to advanced missile or aircraft development 
programs, however there were critics who denied the validity of such a 
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comparison given the national priority and virtually limitless hnds made 
available for Project Mercury. 
On October 3-4, 1963, NASA and the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) 
held a gala affair in Houston, Texas, called the Mercury Summary 
Conference. They covered program management, mission performance, 
astronaut preparation, network operations, and the most recent successes of 
the MA-9 experiments. Much to NASA's chagrin, along with the official 
press releases came another document publicly released by four MSC 
engineers. They outlined procedures following delivery of the MA-9 capsule 
and necessary actions prior to launch. The authors spoke of quality assurance 
and component defects found by processes designed to prevent errant 
components from being installed in various systems. These inspections had 
produced approximately 720 system or component discrepancies; 536 
attributed to faulty workmanship, in the MA-9 mission alone! The unofficial 
engineer's release stated: 
Thousands of man-hours were expended in testing, calibration. assembly, and 
installation of a variety of hardware that later failed to meet performance 
specifications or that malfhctioned during systems tests in a simulated space 
environment.. . [Unnecessary delays could have been avoided if] adequate attention 
to detail during manufacture or thorough inspection before delivery had been 
exercised. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 507) 
The history of Mercury spacecraft system acquisition presented a good 
object lesson in how not to manage a major program. The tone of the public 
relations coming from NASA was to attack the industry, failing to see their 
role in the oversight of those contractors. The Government Accounting 
Office was criticizing NASA and fueling attacks on the upcoming great 
lll"",,cI" ~fifi-J-ggk, as it W I ; S  i;rcvc;cnt!y beiiig ca:leb. NASA failed io ncogtiice 
exactly what had gone wrong. 
Post Project Mercury Lessons Learned 
The effort to place man in orbit required 12 prime contractors, 75 major 
subcontractors, and approximately 7,200 sub-subcontractors. NASA 
employed approximately 650 workers from STG and 710 from MSC and, 
conservatively, 18,000 DoD personnel supporting each individual Project 
Mercury mission. The scope of managing the total manpower figure of 
approximately 2,020,528 highlights the difficulties facing project managers. 
Knowing what is known today about the management techniques employed 
by NASA in this conquest it certainly becomes easy to see why the program 
ran behind schedule and over budget. 
Total cost estimates of Project Mercury, delivered in October 1963, 
show that Project Mercury "had cost $384,13 1,000 throughout the program, 
of which 37% went for the spacecraft, 33% for the tracking network, and 
24% for launch vehicle procurement" (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 508). Flight 
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operations, research and development costs made up the remainder. The co- 
mingling of Project Mercury and Project Gemini costs during 1962 and 1963 
complicated the final cost accounting. It is generally agreed that through 
MA-9 NASA estimated the total costs of Project Mercury at roughly $400 
million, not considering the hundreds of millions spent by DoD in space 
research with NACA/NASA contracts. 
NASA engineers and physicians listed three primary lessons learned for 
manned space flight from their experience with Project Mercury. Their 
medical objectives had been fulfilled through demonstrations that human 
beings could function normally in space if adequately protected. The X-15 
missions had also demonstrated most of this knowledge. The main medical 
problems to be addressed were simple personal hygiene in flight 
Second, Project Mercury had also demonstrated that launch preparations 
were highly time consuming in an effort to ensure readiness and reliability of 
both the machines and men (the holistic system). NASA subsequently 
designed an automated digital system, Acceptance Checkout Equipment, to 
reduce human error in testing and the time required on the flight line. 
Third, mission control requirements had grown to encompass real-time 
telemetry, tracking, computing, and data display systems. Two more 
controlling agencies came into being. One was the new Mission Control 
Center at Houston. The other was the Ground Operational Support Systems, 
both new organizations reflecting the degree of complex system integration 
and automation being installed for positive ground control of future space 
flights. (Swenson et al., 1966). 
It appears that the most valuable lessons learned may have been listed in 
the other section of the report. In the internal reviews on improving their 
performance for succeeding programs, NASA management spoke of other 
valuable technological and managerial lessons from Project Mercury. In 
system design they had encountered problems with safety margins, 
redundancy, accessibility, interchangeability, and with materials whose 
behavior under unfamiliar environmental conditions had not been wholly 
predictable. Regarding qualification of systems and components, they 
believed there should be more analysis in an effort to make techniques 
conservative, complete, integrated, and functional. Fabrication and 
inspection standards carried over from development into manufacturing 
work should be made still more rigorous, detailed, current, and enforced. 
Engineers called for continuous upgrading of tests, inspections, and other 
validation procedures, particularly with respect to interface compatibilities 
between systems. In configuration control, NASA developers recognized 
weight control problems and their need to become more responsive and 
aware of leading indicators in the production and fabrication phases. The 
managers of Project Mercury now acknowledged, “that methods of 
management that had worked well enough in the first American manned 
Hansen and Pitts 127 
space project would not suit Gemini and Apollo, already in motion” 
(Swenson et al., 1966, p. 509). 
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